Korea, South

According to the data from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) the RoK had the world’s 10th largest defence budget in 2018, just behind Japan. The National Assembly of the RoK approved for the fiscal year of 2020 the proposed by the government defence budget of 50.152 Trillion Won, which later was revised to 49.25 Trillion Won (US$40.34 Billion) due to the consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

For 2021, the Ministry of Defence asked from the South Korean Government 52.92 Trillion Won (US$44.73 Billion) for its annual budget.  This would be the first time that the defence budget of the RoK surpassed the 50 Trillion Won threshold and according to President’s Moon Jae-in “Defence Reform 2.0” program the defence budget of the country will be increasing every year until 2023 by 7.5%.

During 2020, the Ministry of Defence was planning to spend, US$14.87 Billion (16.68 Trillion Won) on arms procurements and US$29.85 Billion (33.47 Trillion Won) for managing military assets and forces, but as it was mentioned the Defense Budget eventually was reduced due to COVID-19.. It is important to mention that the government of the RoK had earmarked for 2020, US$5.54 Billion (6.22 Trillion Won) for projects to counter threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, US$1.75 Billion (1.97 Trillion Won) had been earmarked for the implementation of projects such as securing military communication and counter-artillery assets, while US$5.34 Billion (5.99 Trillion Won) had been allocated in order to maximize the latest technologies for the defence industries and the restructuring of its organization.

Defence 

The division of the Korean peninsula and the military threat from North Korea is still the most important and dangerous threat that South Korea is facing. In addition to this threat South Korea must deal with the territorial differences it has with China and Japan, regarding the Socotra/Ieodo/Suyen rock in the Yellow Sea and the islands of Dokdo/Takeshima, respectively.

Since the end of the Civil War in 1953 and till late 1960’s the United States was the main provider of military material, training and guidance to the South Korean Armed Forces. In the 1970’s the United States withdraw part of its forces from the RoK. The U.S partial withdraw, forced Seoul to develop an independent, self-reliant national defence capability and military industry.

The new policy was implemented during the Presidency of General Park Chung-hee and was based on the Yogok program, which included the development of the local defence industry. During this period the South Korea government established the Agency for Defence Development (ADD established in 1970).

The new agency will be the corner stone for the development of the local defence industry, the transfer of foreign Know-how to the local industry, the development of new local weapon systems, the partnership of South Korean defence industries and of course the implementation of important defence procurement programs. During this period, South Korea also examined the possibility of the development of an indigenous nuclear program, an idea that soon was abandoned under the pressure of the United States that aimed to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

On the other hand, during the same period, the beginning of 1960’s, the leadership of DPRNK decided to pursue an independent arms industry and initiate a ballistic missile program and a nuclear weapons program asking the assistance of the USSR. The Soviet agreed to build an IRT-2000 research reactor which became operational in 1965 and was upgraded in 1974.

In April 1975 the RoK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT) and ten years later in 1985 DPRNK joined the countries that had signed the Treaty. In 1979, DPRNK began to build a second research reactor in Yongbyon, an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication plant. The beginning of 1980’s found DPRNK to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion and conducted high-explosive detonation tests.

The efforts of the North Koreans to produce long range ballistic missile with the capacity to carry heavy load became true in 1998 when a Taepodong-1 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) was launched towards Japan and flew over the country before crashing into the Pacific Ocean. Several years after the assassination of President Park, the new President Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) proposed the reform “818 Plan” which distinguished and codified the roles and responsibilities, between the Joint Chief of Staff of the South Korean Armed Forces and the Armed Services.

The “818 Plan” intended to form a Unified Joint Command structure and although there were many reactions eventually the Chief of Staff of the South Korean Army transferred the command authority to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the South Korean Armed Forces under the direction of the President of the country. Although in 2000 the leaders of DPRNK and RoK met for the first time and there was a general feeling that both countries could move into a phase of reconciliation, the deadly naval clashes of June 2002 initiated by the DPRNK close to the South Korean Yeonpyeong island exactly two years after the Summit took place, as well as the revelation in Autumn 2002 that Pyongyang conducted uranium enrichment activities, destroyed any possible opportunity for the improvement of the bilateral relations of DPRNK and RoK.

In 2005 the new South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) initiated the “Defence Reform 2020” (DR 2020). The main idea of the new reform was a smaller size Army, by reducing the duration of the mandatory military service, more professional military personnel, more technologically advanced forces balanced across the services and under civilian control. The “DR 2020” was designed so South Korea could be able to deal with the North Korean threat, as well as aiming for a balanced force capable of operations in all domains land, sea and air, departing from what had till then been a land-centric military force.

Furthermore, the “DR 2020” included the establishment of:

  • A single ground operation command instead the existing number of frontline Army Headquarters,
  • A submarine and Naval Aviation Command for the Navy,
  • The Northern Command for the Air Force
  • The development of the “high low mix” concept for the Air Force
  • The procurement of air refueling and air command and control capabilities

Finally, the “DR 2020” included the transfer of the wartime Operational Control Authority (OPCON) from the United States Forces Korea (USFK) to South Korea in 2012, the dissolution of the South Korean/U.S.A Combined Forces Command and the establishment of a Combined Future Command.

The turning point of the DPRNK – RoK security relations, was the nuclear test that Pyongyang conducted on the 9th of October 2006 (0.7 - 2 kt) which was followed by another one on the 25th of May 2009 (2 - 5.4 kt). The two nuclear tests and the official development of DPRNK to a nuclear power, was part of the strategic plan of Pyongyang to obtain nuclear warheads and the means to deliver the nuclear devices to the enemy with short, medium and even long range ballistic missiles. The new President Lee Myung-bak who was elected in 2008, promoted the strengthening of the South Korean -U.S alliance rather than the transfer of OPCON.

Furthermore, the new South Korean President reduced the defence spending of the 5-year long term defence budget plan from US$552 Billion to US$532 Billion, with significant impacts on the military procurements. In addition to this, the new President delayed the reduction of the size of the Armed Forces and promoted the development of more global force to address regional powers like China. Although the new President tried to implement his new policy, the leadership of DPRNK had completely different priorities.

In 2010 the North Korean leadership ordered the sinking of the South Korean patrol boat “ROKS Cheonan” a Pohang-class corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island. These two events, as well the two nuclear tests, resulted to the issuing of the “Defence Reform Plan 307” (DR 307) in 2011, according to which the South Korean Armed Forces established the North West Island Defence Command and enhanced the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But the most important change that was incorporated into the “DR 307” plan was the re-prioritization of force improvements. Till that time the existing “DR 2020” plan focused on the preparation of South Korea for future challenges. The new “DR 307” plan focused on the preparation of the country to deal with the immediate threat from DPRNK. The “DR 307” plan focused on the improvement of the anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the Navy, the counter-artillery measures of the Army, the capabilities of South Korea to combat North Korean weapons of mass destruction, the acquiring of next generation capabilities like the future fighter program F-X and the deployment of the RQ-4 Global Hawk systems.Lastly the “DR 307” plan included measures to counter North Korean special forces and cyber threats by establishing units and procuring equipment tailored to these missions.

Six years later in 2017, the newly elected President Moon Jae-in announced his plans to reform the South Korean Armed Forces. The new plan was called “Defense Reform 2.0,” and it was an improved version of “Defense Reform 2020” plan.

The new plan designated five focus areas:

  • Strengthen counter-asymmetric capabilities to include the nuclear threat from DPRNK;
  • Early return of wartime operational control based on a strong ROK-U.S. alliance;
  • Strong drive toward civilian control of military affairs;
  • Eliminate defense acquisition-related fraud and foster a defense industry in accordance with the fourth-generation industrial revolution;
  • Marked improvement of addressing human rights issues and service conditions for soldiers.

The Moon Jae-in administration tried to complete the development of a four-pronged strategy in order to counter the North Korean threat by 2020:

  • Kill Chain, is an offense-oriented defense system that detects missiles in real-time. The goal is to detect any potential threats from the North and take a head start in attacking the nuclear weapon within 30 minutes.

Related weapon system: Global Hawk (NGC), military satellites, long-range air to ground missile (TAURUS), Army Tactical Missile System (indigenous development by Hanwha), etc.

  • Korea Air, and Missile Defense (KAMD), is a lower ground (approx. 20 km above ground) defense system where patriot missiles, AMD cell and early warning radar play indispensable roles.

Related weapon system: TBM early warning radar (foreign purchase), ground to air missile upgrade (indigenous development), Patriot missile upgrade (Raytheon), etc.

  • Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), is the system that allows to destroy the control tower of the enemy when attack occurs.

Related weapon system: UAV and grenade launcher for special operation (indigenous development), CH-47 upgrade, etc.

  • Platform Force

Related weapon system: Aircrafts such as F-35, Maritime Operation Helicopters (LMCO vs. Leonardo), Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Boeing’s P8) and Vessels such as Jangbogo-II/III, Gwangaeto-III batch-II

Besides the troubled relations with DPRNK, the RoK has to deal with two more important geopolitical issues, the dispute with Beijing about the Socatra rock (Ieodo in South Korean, Suyan Rock in Chinese) in the Yellow Sea and the dispute with Tokyo about the Dokdo/Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan.

The dispute of RoK with P.R of China in the Yellow Sea refers to the status of the Socatra rock, a submerged rock 4.6 meters below the surface of the sea. Both countries claim that the rock lie within their respective Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The rock is located 149 km from the South Korean territory and 287 km from the territory of the P.R of China. Since 2003 the RoK has established on the Socatra rock a research station, the “Ieodo Ocean Research Station” as well as a helipad.

Furthermore, since 2013 both countries have been claiming that Socatra rock is within their “Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ)”, defining an ADIZ as a zone that allows a coastal state to "identify, monitor, control and react to aircraft entering this zone with potential air threats”. The “East China Sea ADIZ” was announced by the P.R of China in November 2013 and is covering most of the East China Sea including the Socatra rock. In response to China’s establishment of “East China Sea ADIZ”, the Government of the RoK decided one month later to expand its ADIZ and encompass the rock of Socatra. It is important to notice that both ADIZ Chinese and South Korean are overlapped by the ADIZ of Japan. Since 2013, Chinese military aircrafts have been entering the airspace of this region several times provoking the reaction of Seoul.

The second important geopolitical issue but less dangerous compare the first one that Seoul has to deal with, is the status of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan. The two main islets and 35 smaller rocks of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets, are located 87.4 km from the South Korean territories and 157 km from the territories of Japan. Both countries have been arguing about the sovereignty over the islets with conflicting interpretations about the historical state of sovereignty over the islets. Currently the islets are under the control of the RoK and since 2009 a lighthouse, a helicopter pad, a police barracks two desalination plants and several cellular telephone towers have been built by the South Korean Government and are currently in use by the forces based on the small island.

Defence Budget and Procurement

The imminent threat that Seoul has been facing from DPRNK since the end of the Civil War, forced the South Korean Governments to spend a lot of money for the defence of the country. According to the data from SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) the RoK had the world’s 10th largest defence budget in 2018, just behind Japan.

According to SIPRI in 2006, when DPRNK did its first nuclear test, the defence budget of the RoK was US$25.177 Billion (2.488% of the GDP). In 2007, one year after the test the South Korean defence budget was US$27.726 Billion (2.47% of the GDP). In 2009 when the DPRNK did its second nuclear test, the defence budget of the RoK was US$24.576 Billion (2.6% of the GDP) reduced by -2.4% compared to 2006.

The next year (2010) the defence budget of the RoK it was US$28.175 Billion (2.463% of the GDP) increased by 14.6% compared to 2009 and the following year (2011) it reached to US$30.99 Billion (2.473% of the GDP) increased by 26% compared to 2009. The annual increase of the defence budget of the RoK continued due to the troubled relations with DPRNK and because of the new nuclear tests that Pyongyang performed on 12th of February 2013, on the 6th of January 2016, on the 9th of September 2016 and on the 3rd of September 2017.

More specifically according to the data from the “World Bank” the defence budget in constant (2018) US$ prices of the Rok in

  • 2012 was US$31.95 Billion (35.993 Trillion Won), (2.49% of the GDP)
  • 2013 was US$34.31 Billion (37.566 Trillion Won), (2.50% of the GDP)
  • 2014 was US$37.55 Billion (39.541 Trillion Won), (2.53% of the GDP)
  • 2015 was US$36.57 Billion (41.367 Trillion Won), (2.49% of the GDP)
  • 2016 was US$36.88 Billion (42.816 Trillion Won), (2.46% of the GDP)
  • 2017 was US$39.17 Billion (44.451 Trillion Won), (2.42% of the GDP)
  • 2018 was US$43.07 Billion (47.395 Trillion Won), (2.50% of the GDP)
  • 2019 was US$43.89 Billion (49.180 Trillion Won), (2.67% of the GDP)

The National Assembly of the RoK approved for the fiscal year of 2020 the proposed by the government defence budget of 50.152 Trillion Won, which later was revised to 49.25 Trillion Won (US$40.34 Billion) due to the consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic. For 2021, the Ministry of Defence asked from the South Korean Government 52.92 Trillion Won (US$44.73 Billion) for its annual budget.

This would be the first time that the defence budget of the RoK surpassed the 50 Trillion Won threshold and according to President’s Moon Jae-in “Defence Reform 2.0” program the defence budget of the country will be increasing every year until 2023 by 7.5%. During 2020, the Ministry of Defence was planning to spend, US$14.87 Billion (16.68 Trillion Won) on arms procurements and US$29.85 Billion (33.47 Trillion Won) for managing military assets and forces, but as it was mentioned the Defense Budget eventually was reduced due to COVID-19. It is important to mention that the government of the RoK had earmarked for 2020, US$5.54 Billion (6.22 Trillion Won) for projects to counter threats from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore, US$1.75 Billion (1.97 Trillion Won) had been earmarked for the implementation of projects such as securing military communication and counter-artillery assets, while US$5.34 Billion (5.99 Trillion Won) had been allocated in order to maximize the latest technologies for the defence industries and the restructuring of its organization.

On January 21st, 2020, the South Korean Defense Ministry delivered its year report to President Moon. According to the report in order, “To establish a sound national defense posture, we will create a defense that none can underestimate through an appropriate defense buildup in the age of 50-Trillion-Won defense budgets”. For the purpose of “securing military response capability against threats from all directions,” the report included a budget of US$5.54 Billion (6.215 Trillion Won) for the procurement of the following equipment for “securing response capability to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction”:

  • F-35A/B aircraft,
  • Military surveillance satellites,
  • Tactical surface-to-surface guided weaponry,
  • JangBogo III submarines,
  • Gwanggaeto-the-Great-class destroyers,
  • Radar for early warning of ballistic missiles,
  • Ship-to-air guided missiles, and
  • Improving the performance of Patriot Missiles

On August the 10th, 2020, the RoK Ministry of National Defence released its latest five-year defence spending proposal.

The “2021-2025” mid-term defence spending plan proposes funding of US$268.22 Billion (300.7 Trillion Won) of which US$178.93 Billion (200.6 Trillion Won) will be allocated for operating expenses and US$89.28 Billion (100.1 Trillion Won) for military modernization including procurement and research and development. This new plan represents a 3.5% increase on the previous proposed funding of US$259.11 Billion (290.5 Trillion Won) during the 2020-2024 mid-term defence plan, which was announced in August 2019.

According to the new proposal the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the RoK’s military development seems not to be as severe as it was initially feared. The RoK Ministry of National Defence has declared that the defence budget will be increased annually by 6.1% during this time-period (2021-2025).

According to the new defence spending plan, the Defence Budget will increase from 50.2 Trillion Won (eventually 49.25 Trillion Won) in 2020 to 52.9 Trillion Won in 2021 of which, 17.73 Trillion Won will be spent for the procurement of new defence systems and R&D programs and 35.84 Trillion Won for military operations and related expenses. Finally, the defence budget in 2025 will reach to 67.7 Trillion Won.

By 2025, the spending for the procurement of new defence systems will have marked an overall increase of 35%. Compared to the 2020-2024 mid-term defence spending plan, the new proposal increases the total funding for operating expenses by 7.4% although the budget for the modernization of the Armed Forces is decreased by 2.6%. According to the defence spending plan of 2020-2024 the RoK was planning to spend US$82.6 Billion for the acquisition of military hardware.

By 2023 the procurement budget will account for more than 36% of the total defence spending and it will be used for the procurement of:

  • PAC-3 missile defence systems
  • Three more destroyers KDX-III Batch-II Sejong the Great-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar system
  • New KDDX-class destroyer (KDX-IV)
  • New spy satellites
  • High altitude reconnaissance drones
  • Anti-submarine helicopters
  • P-8A Poseidon Maritime patrol aircraft
  • Submarines capable of firing cruise and ballistic missiles
  • Warships armed with guided missiles
  • Light armed helicopters
  • Sea Bow naval missile intercept system
  • Peace Eye AEWC
  • KF-X future fighter program
  • M-SAM Block II
  • Mid-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (MUAV)
  • Locally made long-range surface-to-air missile KM-SAM program known also as Cheolmae-2
  • Procurement of more locally built K2 Black Panther main battle tanks (MBT)
  • Procurement of more locally built K21 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AFIV)
  • Development of the Hyunmoo-3D cruise missile with 3,000km range
  • Procurement of initially 36 new AH-64E Guardian with a target the procurement of 100 AH-64E Guardian
  • Light aircraft carrier equipped with F-35B aircraft

Although the most important supplier of military material of the RoK is the U.S.A, France, Germany and the Netherlands had sold subsystems to the local defence industry or transfer technology for the development local defence systems. France has shared with the South Korean industry cutting edge technology in the fields of electronics, radar, missiles, helicopters, the Netherlands has sold Close in Weapons Systems (CIWS) and naval radars, while Germany has sold to the RoK thousands of MTU diesel engines for the MBT and AIFV of the South Korean Army.