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# STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND 2022

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## Introduction

State and its citizens' security assurance belongs to the vital national interests of the Republic of Poland. National security denotes the state's and its society's ability to provide conditions for its existence and development, territorial integrity, political independence, internal stability and quality of life. This ability is formed through activities consisting in taking advantage of chances, accepting challenges, reducing risk and eliminating internal and external threats, what provides duration, identity, functioning and freedom of development of the state and the nation (society)<sup>1</sup>.

Processes taking place in contemporary, global environment of security possess overwhelming influence on national security of Poland of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They are characterised by high dynamics, complexity of alterations and by occurrence of asymmetrical threats among which the most dangerous are: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, international organised crime and cyberspace threats. Also potential challenges may become threats, if there is no reaction to them. They include such phenomena as destabilisation of political system, malfunctioning of economic and social mechanisms, mass violations of human rights, impoverishing of societies, limited water resources, degradation of natural environment, natural disasters, increasing demand for energy connected with hindered access to energy resources, exhausting resources of rare metals as well as demographic issues. Primary chances to reinforce national security should be sought in strengthening the role of Poland in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, as well as in building better relations with neighbouring countries.

Counteracting all potential threats to security requires an **integrated system of national security** guaranteeing fast and efficient actions in all conditions and in a reaction to threats and crises of all type. The necessity to prepare, control and improve the national security system is stipulated in *the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland [PL. Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej]* of November 13, 2007 which has formalised the definition and has created theoretical foundations of functioning of such a system.<sup>2</sup> The national security system constitutes the entirety of forces, means and resources assigned by the state to perform tasks in the field of security, being adequately organised, controlled and prepared for these tasks, in which the management subsystem and a number of executive subsystems are distinguished.

External security conditions of Poland, intensive development of its economic potential and extending its involvement in active development of international security environment as well as increasing 'sensitivity' of open societies to contemporary threats, impose gradual optimisation of forces and means of national security toward creation of an integrated, comprehensive national security system enabling simultaneous use of elements of **national defence system and crisis management system**<sup>3</sup>. Integrated planning and preparing of military and civil components on each level of reacting, comprehensive approach to resolving crisis situations and regulation and assignment of tasks in this scope to public administration and also creation of stable foundations of financing those tasks, is the mainspring of growth of the level of national security and the effective tool for its implementation.

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<sup>1</sup>Based on, R. Zięba, J. Zając, *Budowa zintegrowanego systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski* (the expertise drawn up by order of the Ministry of Regional Development within the works on actualisation of the mid-term national development strategy), Warsaw 2010

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, p. 16

<sup>3</sup> The issues of crisis management are also included in *Sprawne Państwo 2020 [The Efficient State 2020]* strategy.

Adopting new regulations of conducting development policy by the Council of Ministers in 2009 enables the alteration of former approach to the national security policy and connecting it with the social-economic development policy. The governmental *Plan of Ordering Development Strategies* [PL. *Plan uporządkowania strategii rozwoju*] with the concept to put in order effective strategic documents<sup>4</sup> aimed at implementing the mid- and long-term national strategy of state's development<sup>5</sup>, included *the Development Strategy of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland* [PL. *Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*] into the group of nine integrated national development strategies. This solution offers a chance to strengthen the implementation layer of the strategy and initiation of a new impulse to works related to establishing of the integrated national security system, in association with the social-economic development of the state.

*The Long-term National Development Strategy "Poland 2030. The Third Wave of Modernity"* acknowledges the provision of external and internal security as a condition indispensable for auspicious development of Poland<sup>6</sup>. The similar approach is represented by *the Mid-term National Development Strategy 2020* (MNDS) which acknowledges *the Consolidation of National Security*(1.3.4) [PL. *Utrwalanie bezpieczeństwa narodowego*] as one of the directions of the public intervention in the strategic area: *the Efficient and Effective State* [PL. *Sprawne i efektywne państwo*]. In particular MNDS indicates the necessity to 'undertake and conclude fast works on the integrated national security system.'<sup>7</sup>

The realisation of this demand constitutes *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022*<sup>8</sup>. It defines conditions of functioning and methods of development of the national security system. The particular role in this system is played by the entities responsible for the external security (diplomatic service, the Polish Armed Forces, intelligence agencies), in cooperation with entities responsible for the internal security. Taking this into consideration, the main area of interest of this strategy will be

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<sup>4</sup> The development strategies have been prepared on the basis of Art. 9, sec. 3 of *the Act of December 6, 2006 on the Principles of Pursuing Development Policy* (Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 84, item 712, as amended).

<sup>5</sup> ***The Long-term National Development Strategy "Poland 2030. The Third Wave of Modernity"*** (LTNDS) [PL. *Długookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju „Polska 2030. Trzecia fala nowoczesności”*] (DSRK) indicates primary trends and challenges resulting from both internal development of the state and transformations in its external environment. It also presents comprehensive vision of socio-economic state in the perspective by 2030, taking regional and spatial dimension into consideration. Whereas ***the Mid-term National Development Strategy*** (MNDS) [PL. *Średniookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju (ŚSRK)*] is a leading development strategy defining fundamental conditions, goals and directions of the state development in the social, economic, regional and spatial dimension. MNDS defines areas of strategic intervention of domestic and superregional significance and also strategic investments which are subsequently accounted in other development strategies and programmes. Therefore, the integration of the spatial policy with the regional policy and concentration of national pro-growth operations in key thematic and spatial fields is provided. The effective MNDS is *the National Development Strategy 2020. Active Society, Competitive Economy, Efficient State* [PL. *Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2020. Aktywne społeczeństwo, konkurencyjna gospodarka, sprawne państwo*] adopted by the resolution No. 157 of the Council of Ministers of September 25, 2012 (Monitor Polski of 2012, item 882)

<sup>6</sup> LTNDS, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> MNDS, p. 54, 152.

<sup>8</sup> In connection with the necessity to harmonise the time horizon with the horizon of the executive documents of the area of defence planning (determined by the planning cycle of NATO), for this strategy the horizon by 2022 has been adopted.

<sup>9</sup> The remaining development strategies also concern various aspects of fields of national security, although to a smaller extent. They include *the Development Strategy of Transport, National Strategy of Regional Development - Regions - Cities - Rural Areas, Strategy for Sustainable Development of Rural Areas, Agriculture and Fisheries* [PL. *Strategia rozwoju transportu, Krajowa strategia rozwoju regionalnego – Regiony – miasta – obszary wiejskie, Strategia zrównoważonego rozwoju wsi, rolnictwa i rybactwa*] and *the Development Strategy of Human Capital*. Relations between SRSBN RP (*the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022*) and the remaining integrated development strategies are illustrated in Table 1.

directed towards external and military security. Integration of *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* with other development strategies allows to exclude from its thematic scope other areas of the national security, such as economic (including energy), civil, social or environmental security. Due to the necessity for specialisation and detailed specification of the development strategy and their mutual complementarity, the analysis of these fields of national security together with indication of their objectives and directions of intervention are to be found respectively in *the Strategy of Innovation and Efficiency of Economy* [PL. *Strategia innowacyjności i efektywności gospodarki*], *the Energy Security and Environment Strategy* [PL. *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne i środowisko*], *the Efficient State 2020* strategy and in *the Development Strategy of Social Capital* [PL. *Strategia rozwoju kapitału społecznego*]<sup>9</sup>.

*The National Security of the Republic of Poland* which was approved by the President of the Republic of Poland, remains the concept base<sup>10</sup> for *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* which was incorporated in the governmental system of managing national development. Both strategies are coherent in terms of the subject matter, whereas they differ in the level of detailed specification and methodological approach. Concurrently with coming into force of this strategy, *the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* [PL. *Strategia obronności Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*]<sup>11</sup> and *the Participation Strategy of the Polish Armed Forces in International Operations* [PL. *Strategia udziału Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w operacjach międzynarodowych*]<sup>12</sup> are no longer in force.

*The Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* is also correlated with the most important strategic documents of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union within the scope of security - NATO Strategic Concept and European Security Strategy<sup>13</sup>. The reformatory actions which concern strengthening of the state's defence capabilities are included in chapter III and are compatible with the *Primary directions of development of the Polish Armed Forces and their preparations for national defence for 2013 - 2022* [PL. *Główne kierunki rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz ich przygotowań do obrony państwa na lata 2013-2022*] adopted by the President of the Republic of Poland on November 8, 2011.

Directions of operating of this strategy will be orientated toward two main principles: **efficiency and cohesion** – therefore, its primary objective will be *Strengthening of Efficiency and Cohesion of the National Security System*. Efficiency will be achieved through increasing capabilities of essential elements of the national security system - it will be served by the fulfilment of the first objective: *Formation of Stable International Security Environment in Regional and Global Dimension*, the second objective: *Strengthening of National Defence Capabilities* and the third objective *Development of Resilience against Threats to National Security*. Thanks to the fulfilment of the fourth objective: *Increase of integration between public policies and the security policy* and the fifth: *Creation of conditions for development of*

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<sup>10</sup> The effective *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* was approved by the President of the Republic of Poland on November 13, 2007.


<sup>11</sup> *The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland Sector Strategy of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* [PL. *Strategia sektorowa do Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*] adopted by the Council of Ministers on December 23, 2009.

<sup>12</sup> Adopted by the Council of Ministers of January 13, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> *NATO Strategic Concept* (adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon, on November 19, 2010), *A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy* (adopted during the meeting of heads of governments in Brussels on December 12, 2003).

*the integrated national security system*, cohesion of the national security system will be provided (both externally and internally). The proposed actions within the scope of cohesion will be performed successively - firstly, they will be aimed at increasing cooperation and coordination, secondly - at integration. Objectives 1, 2 and 3 are therefore of operational (executive) nature, whereas objectives 4 and 5 are of systemic and coordination nature.

Picture 1. The position of *the Development Strategy of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland* in the hierarchy of strategic documents.



Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence

Table 1. Relation between *the Development Strategy of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland* and the other integrated development strategies

Development Strategy of National Security System of the Republic of Poland	The remaining integrated development strategies							
Objectives	Strategy of Innovation and Efficiency of Economy	Development Strategy of Human Capital	Development Strategy of Transport	Energy Security and Environment	Efficient State	Development Strategy of Social Capital	Domestic Strategy of Regional Development	Strategy for Sustainable Development of Rural Areas, Agriculture and Fisheries
Objective 1 Formation of stable international security environment in regional and global dimension								
Objective 2 Strengthening of national defence capabilities								
Objective 3 Development of resilience against threats to national security								
Objective 4 Increase of integration between public policies and the security policy								
Objective 5 Creation of conditions for development of the integrated national security system								

Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence

## Summary

Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022 (SRsBN RP) defines the conditions of functioning and methods of development of the national security system which increase its efficiency and cohesion in the mid-term perspective. In horizon of the document being in force, a strategic focus is put on establishment of the **integrated national security system** based on allied and bilateral securities and guarantees gradually developed own civil-military potential. It is an implementation of the postulate of the mid-term *National Development Strategy 2020* which in the strategic area *Efficient and Effective State* indicates the necessity to 'undertake and conclude fast works on the integrated national security system'.

SRsBN RP is a document of a new generation including requirements of the modern system of managing development of the state. For the first time, **the strategy from the area of national security has been drawn up in relation to the socio-economic policy of the state** and has been based on the methodology enabling to carry out its included intentions. The structure of SRsBN RP has been defined by the updated *Act of December 6, 2006 on the Principles of Development Policy*, whereas the scope pertaining to the content of the strategy has been indicated in the *Plan of Ordering the Development Strategies* adopted by the Council of Ministers. Therefore, SRsBN RP concentrates on external and military security - its integration with the remaining development strategies permitted to exclude it from its primary thematic scope of other areas of national security, such as economic (including energy), civil, social, food or environmental security.

**Diagnosis of the national security system** analyses external and internal conditions (chapter I). The evaluation of the security environment of Poland indicates good use of opportunities resulting from the membership of our state in international organisations. Whereas the issue requiring increased efforts is inter-sector and asymmetrical nature of contemporary threats and unpredictability of development of security environment. Actions of respective elements of the national security system were positively assessed, although the necessity for further improvements was indicated. A small amount of system solutions integrating the national security was considered as a serious limitation. It is still necessary to strengthen the role and significance of the strategy in our legal system and stray off the sector approach to the security issue.

On the basis of the diagnosis, there are presented **the challenges and the vision of development of the national security system of the Republic of Poland**. Optimisation of forces and means of national security will denote effective use of potentials hidden in the national defence system and in the crisis management system. The vision of development of the security system assumes that by 2020 Poland will be the state of a high security level, actively creating foreign policy, administering modern national defence and efficient intelligence agencies.

**Strengthening of efficiency and cohesion of the national security system** has been considered the main objective of SRsBN RP. The system should be capable of identifying and eliminating sources, symptoms and consequences of threats to national security. **Efficiency** will be achieved through improving capacity of primary elements of the national security system, **cohesion** - through increasing integration between public policies and the security policy and reinforcing cooperation and coordination and ultimately the achievement of integration inside the national security system.

Operational objectives constitute development of the main objective in the fields possessing key significance for security. **The first objective is formation of stable international security environment in regional and global dimension** through intensifying international cooperation, what serves strengthening of essential, from the Polish perspective, international institutions, developing friendly relations with neighbours and gaining prestige and international position of the country. Priority of objective 1 is to **increase efficiency of**



**implementing Polish priorities in NATO and the EU** and taking care of effectiveness of allied mechanisms. Actions for strengthening collective defence within NATO and intensifying the collaboration with partners from Eastern Europe within the EU and NATO will be the most fundamental in this area. Priority will be also to **increase efficiency of bilateral and multilateral cooperation**, particularly with the USA and in the formula of the Visegrad Group and the Weimar Triangle. Co-establishment of stable security environment will also require increased effectiveness of international law and international institutions and competent use of international instruments within the scope of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, control of armaments and disarmaments, confidence and security building measures or development aid.

The **second objective** is subject of the constitutional obligations and of the allied liabilities and concerns **strengthening of the national capacity for defence**. In recent years there have been many alterations in organisation of national defence resulting in its perception in wider categories. Changes in the security environment and in technological progress caused that today defence is understood as the sum of all military and non-military undertakings aiming at confronting political and military threats to national security. Implementation of priorities and carrying out directions of intervention of objective 2 will provide Poland with protection of vital national interests and strong position on the international arena and particularly in NATO and the EU. The continuation of building **professional and modern Polish Armed Forces** is of priority significance. It will be carried out through their technical modernisation and increasing training level as well as refining the organisational structure including the command and control system.

Efficient armed forces need support of the Civilian Sector which participates in defence preparations of the state. Top priority will be given to the **extended cooperation with Polish defence industry and scientific and research potential related with it** and their more active participation in international programmes and initiatives will be very significant. It will improve competitiveness and innovations for the domestic defence industry and its export capacity and, as a result, it will increase the level of modernity of Polish economy and provide new workplaces. In the context of providing continuity of the functioning of the state in conditions of external threat to security, it is important to improve non-military defence preparations. Operations of **civil and military intelligence agencies** will remain invariably important, directed at increasing their efficiency and cohesion, in particular in the area of reconnaissance of and protection against contemporary threats.

The **third objective** is directed at **development of resilience to threats to national security**, including extraordinary situations and unexpected events. It concerns this sphere of activity of the state which does not fit in the traditional classification of executive subsystems or in departments of the government administration. It is of intersector nature. The objective will be primarily fulfilled through the **strengthened protection of the critical infrastructure** and **construction of the system of strategic reserves**. Directions of intervention depicted in the strategy will improve the cooperation between operators of the critical infrastructure and public administration bodies and will increase effectiveness, adequacy and cohesion of the system of strategic reserves.

The area of interest of the **fourth objective** is the **increase of integration between public policies and the security policy**. The priorities and the directions of intervention grouped around the objective on the one hand present actions of the security sector to strengthen fulfilment of the targets of the development policy and on the other hand, they depict possibilities of using potential of the civil society for security. Therefore, it will be fundamental to strengthen connections between national security and the area of education, protection of national heritage, supporting employment and counteracting unemployment, environmental protection, infrastructure, spatial planning and regional development. Together with the increasing significance of the social capital for the state's functioning, it will be also important to support cooperation with civil organisations acting for national security and defence.

The **fifth objective**, the most crucial for successive consolidation of the national security potential, is directed at **creation of conditions for development of the integrated national security system**. The proposals of alterations presented in the objective are of the most broad and systemic character. The priority of the objective 5 is refinement of the management system of the national security. Development of the integrated national security system will also require more efficient use of potentials hidden in the national defence system and in the crisis management system. Therefore, the greater integration of the planning processes will be necessary together with the intensification of monitoring and evaluation of development of the national security system. Cyclic reviews of national security will serve this purpose. The challenges identified in the diagnosis and negative phenomena related thereto in cyberspace require implementation of strategies of protection of ICT resources of public and national administration proposed in the objective 5. Also Government Communication Network used for communication of authorised persons in the event of crisis situation will be developed.

**Strategy Implementation System** defines assignment areas of the primary entities responsible for realisation of a strategy and implementation documents. The system of indicators has been established as the supervision basis for fulfilling SRSBN RP objectives. The indicators will be used for analytical and evaluative operations enabling observation of occurring changes from the perspective of efficiency and effectiveness of interventions being carried out. Drawing up of cyclical reports and information presenting the degree of implementation of the strategy is anticipated. *The Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* will be subject to periodical actualisation at least once every 4 years. An important modification in the Polish security environment or new, significant solutions within the scope of developing the national security system, may constitute a basis for updating.

The Minister of National Defence is the coordinator of the strategy implementation and he acts on behalf of the Prime Minister. Each year, the coordinator shall submit the strategy implementation report for the previous year to the Minister of Regional Development. This report is a contribution to the information about fulfilment of MNDS objectives. The first report on SRSBN RP implementation will be presented in 2014.

The **financial framework** of the strategy depicts the scope of public resources assigned for fulfilment of objectives of the strategy. Financing of assignments within the scope of defence will be pursued through the use of resources from the national budget within the scope of function 11, supported by resources from the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund. In turn, actions for the stable international security environment will be financed within the scope of the function 15. of the national budget.

The strategy also includes Bibliography and List of abbreviations. *The Report on the Course of Social Consultations of the Strategy Project* is presented in the appendix.

# I. Diagnosis of the national security system

## 1. External conditions - security environment

### 1.1. Strategic context

The key factors determining the shape of current international relations are the **globalisation processes** manifesting themselves in permanent development of freedom of flow of ideas, goods, services, money and people. The consequences of these processes are of a dual nature. Globalisation contributes to the increase of the civilisation development level on a global scale, yet also to considerable intensification of developmental differences between states and inside societies. The compound net of economic, political and communication interconnections incline states and nations of the world to cooperate peacefully, yet creating new areas and possibilities of confrontation<sup>14</sup>.

The current level of integration of global economic life is the reason for sudden changes, breakdowns of economic situation and crises, taking place not only in the nearest surroundings of Poland but also in different regions of the world which may negatively influence stability of Polish economy and thereby the state's security. **Economic crisis** of the recent years considerably affected the global situation in the field of security, slowing down or levelling economic growth of numerous countries, including also close partners and allies of Poland.

**Transfer of the centre of global power balance** from the Euro-Atlantic region to the region of Asia and Pacific will be accompanied by the gradual evolution of significance and possibility of global impinging of China, India, Brazil and other rising powers. States of the 'West' are still leading in many fields, however the authoritarian model becomes, in the eyes of some countries and their leaders, an actual alternative to Western universalism.

The increasing **demand for energy resources** contributes to their use to put political pressure and more and more often they substitute military power in fulfilment of goals of a state's policy. Tensions produced by temporary limitations in gas delivery to some countries indicate weakness of energy market and negative influence of politics on economy. Depleting of resources of rare metals may become another crucial challenge of dynamic nature.

There are still other potential threats: increasing number of failing and failed states, tensions and conflicts in regions of diminished stability in the Euro-Atlantic region or in its neighbourhood, terrorism, international organised crime, negative phenomena in cyberspace and crisis situations in consequence of natural and man-made disasters.

Contemporary world does not remain defenceless against global challenges and threats. International community, including Poland, administers wide spectrum of possibilities of strengthening their security. One of the most important instruments forming the security environment is the **North Atlantic Alliance**. Historically, the Alliance owes its exceptional efficiency on one hand to the military potential and the wide spectrum of operational instruments, on the other to unity resulting from values shared by its members. The priority significance is possessed by provision of the appropriate balance in the hierarchy of assignments and activities of the Alliance between its original functions (collective defence, consultation forum) and the role of a stabiliser of international situation through the partner cooperation and non-Art. 5 operations. The condition of the above is to guarantee due credibility of alliance obligations, inter alia through diverse forms of strengthening collective defence (contingency plans, training, NATO Response Force, development of defence

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<sup>14</sup> For more, see *The European Security Strategy*, p. 2.

infrastructure). In this context, it is particularly crucial to fulfil the Alliance obligations resulting from the Art. 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty which directly orders to maintain and develop one's individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Development of the **European integration** is a factor of an enormous significance for strengthening security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Thanks to the unique nature of versatile cooperation in its framework, development of the European Union persistently improves European stability in all its dimensions. Development of the instruments of cooperation with partners' influences in a stabilising manner the neighbouring regions and contributes to the increase of mutual trust. The adoption of the *Treaty of Lisbon*<sup>15</sup> opens new possibilities of further advancing and compounding of integration processes and the complete use of its potential may in future result in establishment of the common defence of the EU and in provision of additional security guarantees for Poland.

The development of **regional security environment in Europe** advances still in the favourable direction from the Polish perspective. In the scale of the continent, the scope and intensity of international cooperation is constantly increasing. The North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and other regional and sub-regional structures provide solid institutional bases for this cooperation. The progress of processes of democratisation and economic transformation is still being achieved, especially in Southern Europe. In some countries in the region, maintaining a not fully democratic legal order, as well as periodical disclosing of confrontational positions in politics, prompt some worries. The maintaining of stability of regional security order in Europe is to a considerable degree dependent upon amendment of disciplines of armaments and disarmament control and confidence and security building measures, determined in the *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (CFE Treaty)<sup>16</sup>, the *Treaty on Open Skies*<sup>17</sup> and in the *Vienna Document 1999*<sup>18</sup>.

The analysis of characteristics of the contemporary international security environment indicates that in the next few years, the principal challenges and threats for Poland will be related to:

- dynamics of the relations within NATO and the EU and to the US engagement in European security;
- dynamics of changes in disciplines of armaments and disarmament control aiming at their increased efficiency;
- dynamics of bilateral and multilateral relations;
- provision of efficiency of international law;
- local conflicts affecting global security;
- international terrorism and international organised crime;
- progressing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery.

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<sup>15</sup> *The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*, OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, p. 1, as amended.

<sup>16</sup> *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 (Journal of Laws of 1995, No. 15, item 73).

<sup>17</sup> *Treaty on Open Skies* drawn up in Helsinki on March 24, 1992 (Journal of Laws of 2001, No. 103, item 1127).

<sup>18</sup> *Vienna Document 1999 of Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures* adopted in Istanbul on November 16, 1999.

## 1.2. Opportunities for security of Poland

The aforementioned processes and phenomena forming international security environment significantly influence security of Poland. In addition, security of our state is affected also by factors of a **regional** and **local** character.

**Membership of the Republic of Poland in the North Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union** constitutes the guarantee of security of the state and offers the possibility of multidimensional development and an increase of the role of Poland on the international arena. The opportunity for Polish security policy are also good **relations with neighbouring states** - with many of our neighbours and partners, we aim to establish and achieve strategic partnership.

States of Eastern Europe, with which we tighten relations within the scope of bilateral relations and the cooperation with NATO and the EU, remain the area of a special interest of Poland. It lies in the Polish interest to provide influence on evolution of NATO and European Union and to maintain and improve potential of these structures. The next opportunity for both Poland and the whole world should be sought in strengthening of **international law** and provision of its general respect, development of legal norms and executive mechanisms which will be efficient tools in fighting against new threats, especially related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organised crime and the phenomenon of failed states. The important form of cooperation enabling elimination of sources of many threats for international security is the **development aid**.

## 1.3. Threats to and challenges for security of Poland

The favourable shape of international security environment and Polish allied associations conduces towards the little probability of **conventional armed aggression** at present and in the nearest future. However, the occurrence near the border of the Republic of Poland of a situation when force is used or of a threat to use it, cannot be entirely excluded. Moreover, considering the incidence in the neighbourhood of Poland of military potentials, including the unconventional ones, Poland is going to maintain and develop capabilities enabling an efficient reaction to threats of such a kind. Simultaneously Poland will take care of maintaining openness, clarity and predictability of military activity, provided by the system of armament control and the regional confidence and security building measures.

The threat to security of Poland arises from questioning the efficiency of the international system of counteracting **proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**. **International terrorism**<sup>19</sup> is equally dangerous. Even though the terrorist threat in Poland remains on a low level, it frequently concerns Polish citizens staying in the unstable regions and above all soldiers participating in foreign military missions. The terrorists' attempts of carrying out a terrorist attack on territory of an EU member state also cannot be excluded. The constant threats to national security of Poland are also posed by **activities of foreign intelligence agencies** aiming at obtaining information within the scope of economic, political, scientific and technical intelligence.

**Differences in perception of challenges and threats to security and individual benefits by the NATO and EU members** in connection with unclear and unpredictable development of the security environment may constitute a serious defiance for this international community. The evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance which more and more frequently from the regional security organisation transforms into the alliance of a global impingement might evoke anxiety. This situation might result in the weakening of the allied obligations for

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<sup>19</sup> *The National Anti-terrorist Programme for the Republic of Poland 2012-2016* is dedicated to the issues of international terrorism. This document is the executive document of the *Efficient State 2020* strategy.

Poland. Concentration of the United States' interest in non-European<sup>20</sup> regions becomes a similar challenge.

Another challenge for Polish and European security policy is to define **the significance and location of European Union on the global scene**, in particular in the light of existent disproportions between the capabilities of the EU in the economic zone and the lack of actual instruments in the area of foreign and security policies. Even though, the *Treaty of Lisbon* provides it with the instruments enabling efficient affecting of global processes, the degree of their use is largely dependent upon the political will of member states.

**The weakness of the system of international organisations** (including the United Nations), as well as **international disciplines of armaments and disarmament control and non-proliferation** which does not demonstrate sufficient effectiveness, should be acknowledged as the challenge for the Polish security policy, as well as for the global one. For Europe, it is especially crucial to form a new discipline of conventional armaments control - the previous system, based on the *CFE Treaty*, was called into question by one of the countries being a participant of this treaty.

In recent years, challenges for energy security of Poland which influences the functioning of all sectors of domestic economy, are accumulating. The **energy sector**, considering its key significance for functioning of economy, directly influences also the capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces<sup>21</sup>. Dependence upon deliveries of natural gas and crude oil from one source and limited abilities of transporting and storing energy carriers noticeably decreases resilience of our state against crisis situations related to energy security and caused by the factor of political or technical nature.

A serious challenge for Poland remains counteracting and fighting against **negative phenomena in cyberspace**, international **organised crime**<sup>22</sup>, threats produced by **impingement of forces of nature** (flood, long-term droughts and local shortages of water, large fires, hurricane winds, landslips and mudslides or epidemic of infectious diseases) or **human activity** (technical failures, communication disasters).

The fundamental challenge for national security is to provide **food security** on the level guaranteeing even the minimal food self-sufficiency of the state for which maintaining of the appropriate production base in the agricultural and food sector is indispensable. Also food security, in terms of its quality, is becoming more significant together with the intensification of occurring of various health, phytosanitary and veterinary risks, closely relating to inter alia the increase of flows of commercial food goods<sup>23</sup>.

## 2. Internal Conditions

### 2.1. National Security System

Efficient fulfilment of goals of the security policy requires maintaining and developing by the Republic of Poland the national security system integrated with the allied security system through common operating procedures in crisis situations and in time of war and participation

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<sup>20</sup> The strategic defence guidance - *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defence*, Washington, January 2012.

<sup>21</sup> Based on A. Gradziuk, W. Lach, E. Posel-Częściak, K. Sochacka, *Co to jest bezpieczeństwo energetyczne państwa?*, Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, Z Series, No. 103-2002, p. 705-708.

<sup>22</sup> *The National Program for Counteracting and Combating Organised Crime for 2012-2016* is dedicated to the issues of organised crime. It is the executive programme of the Efficient State 2020 strategy.

<sup>23</sup> The issues of food security are discussed more in detail in *Strategy for Sustainable Development of Rural Areas, Agriculture and Fisheries*, adopted by the Council of Ministers on April 25, 2012.

in allied defence planning. The national security system aims to adequately prepare and use forces and means belonging to the state to counteract risks threatening survival of the nation and the state, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty, efficient functioning of national institutions and socio-economic development. It is the system encompassing both the elements of external and internal security, directed at provision of national security in connection with socio-economic development of the state<sup>24</sup>.

Integration processes in the field of security had become the guiding principle of the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* published in 2007. Pursuant to its content, the **national security system** is created by all bodies and institutions of legislature, executive power and the judiciary, responsible for security in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and competent acts, including the Parliament, President of the Republic of Poland, Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, central bodies of government administration and other central agencies and national institutions. The crucial elements are the armed forces and services and government institutions obliged to prevent and counteract external threats, provide public security, carry out rescue operations and secure population and property in extraordinary situations and also local government authorities and various legal entities including entrepreneurs creating an industrial defence potential and carrying out assignments within the scope of national defence<sup>25</sup>.

The aforementioned strategy specifies that the national security system consists of the national security management subsystem and of the executive subsystems. Bodies of public authority and directors of organisational units which carry out assignments related to national security and military command authorities of the Polish Armed Forces - all form the **management subsystem**. In turn, the **executive subsystems** create forces and means remaining in competence of ministers managing activities of the government administration, central bodies of the government administration, province governors, authorities of local government and other national institutions and entities responsible for carrying out the statutory determined assignments within the scope of national security.

Completing the analysis included in the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, an important part in providing national security is played by the **support systems of national security**<sup>26</sup> which do not fit in any traditional classification. They include i.a. protection of the critical infrastructure and the system of strategic reserves and also a range of additional detailed operational systems (for instance: the state border protection system, the flood protection system, the personal data protection system and the system of protection of classified information). Developing them does duty to obtain resilience against threats to national security, including extraordinary situations and unexpected events.

Polish law does not comprehensively regulate functioning of the national security system. The lack of regulations on organisation and functioning of the national security system in one legal act frequently results in sectoral and dispersed actions of entities responsible for the individual fields of national security. The previously carried out actions fulfilling the duty of integrating efforts of the entities responsible for national security were filling the most important gaps, however, they did not introduce systemic and comprehensive solutions in the scale of the entire state.

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<sup>24</sup> Means of the security policy, comprehended as resources and instruments, generated and used by the state and socio-economic development provides availability of these means. Therefore, strengthening national security positively influences and in some situations even determines further development of the state.

<sup>25</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* of November 2007, p. 21

<sup>26</sup> The support systems complete the executive subsystems established by forces and means remaining in competence of ministers managing activities of the government administration, central bodies of the government administration, province governors, local government authorities and different entities responsible for carrying out the statutorily determined assignments within the scope of national security.

In the legal sense, the national security system does not therefore constitute an independently functioning national structure. As the primary form of its organisation and activity remains the **national defence system** maintained to provide protection of vital national interests and especially sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and its right for territorial and border integrity. Its principal purpose is provision of **military security** and maintaining of the state's potential guaranteeing the ability to effectively respond to external political and military crises and - in the event of war - the capacity to quickly repel aggression. The process that integrates functioning of all elements of the national defence system is defence planning which enables to set and fulfil targets in the field of defence.

Apart from the national defence system, the **crisis management system**<sup>27</sup> plays a significant part in providing national security. This system is formed by the public administration bodies which establish crisis management centres (which are on twenty-four-hour call) and crisis management teams (advisory expert groups on a communal, district, provincial and governmental level). Crisis management is the element of the management system of the national security and consists of prevention of crisis situations, taking control over them in the manner of planned actions, responding in the event of occurrence of crisis situations and in reconstructing infrastructure or restoring its original form. On each level of administration, a plan for crisis management is drawn up. It encompasses the analysis of threats, the balance of needs, forces and own means and the procedure of receiving external aid.

Planning and preparation for the event of potential threats and also the appropriate coordination of the above-mentioned systems forming the national security system are of essential significance for increasing its efficiency and cohesion, without the necessity to considerably increase means assigned for provision of national security.

### **2.1.1. National Security Management Subsystem**

Managing national security belongs to the most crucial activities of the state aiming at provision of its existence and development in variable conditions of the security environment. Adopted in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the division of the executive power into two branches in the state may in some fields potentially generate challenges in efficient management of national security.

The power issues and related to them difficulties within the scope of managing security may result from the following conditions:

- interdependence of constitutional prerogatives of the President of the Republic of Poland and of the Council of Ministers in the area of national security and their frequently general nature may bring about various interpretations and sometimes hinder collaboration of the executive power bodies;
- the issues of national security are not systemically introduced into competences of Marshals of the Sejm and the Senate who are constitutionally potential successors of the President of Republic of Poland should he be not capable of performing his function;
- there is an insufficient number of systemic solutions integrating national security. Established in 2008, the Government Centre for Security<sup>28</sup>, due to formal and legal reasons, cannot be the institution integrating the activity for national security in the nationwide scale;

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<sup>27</sup> Structure and functioning of the crisis management system is defined in *the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management* (Journal of Laws, No. 89, item 590, as amended).

<sup>28</sup> *the Act of April 26, 2007 on Crisis Management* (Journal of Laws, No. 89, item 590, as amended).



- the national security system functions on the basis of the scattered legislation<sup>29</sup>;
- the management of national security is of an interdisciplinary character which encompasses regulated by the separate rules **crisis management** and **national defence management** - however, there are no legal provisions that would unite actions taken in both fields of national security into one coherent national security management system.

*The Act on Crisis Management* did not unambiguously resolve the crucial issues of managing national security. First and foremost, it did not precisely indicate the interrelations occurring between the organisation of the national security management subsystem and the organisation of management in crisis situations and it did not relate to assignments carried out outside the territory of the Republic of Poland (participation of civil and military contingents in missions abroad).

### 2.1.2. The Primary Executive Subsystems

Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Poland defined the executive subsystems of the national security system<sup>30</sup>. Owing to the indicated in the Introduction specialisation and complementarity of the integrated development strategies, the interest area of the *Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* was limited to three crucial executive subsystems - foreign affairs, national defence and special services.

#### A. Foreign Affairs

Foreign policy is one of the attributes of a state as a sovereign entity in international relations and constitutes the realisation of its interests on the international arena. The fundamental objectives of foreign policy are: sovereignty and independence protection and territorial integrity of the Polish state, provision of civil liberties and citizens' security, establishment of conditions for sustainable civilisation and economic development of the state, increase of well-being of the society, creation of a positive image of the state on the international arena, protection of national heritage, national identity and natural environment. These objectives are fulfilled in the sphere of foreign relations, on the bilateral and multilateral level.

In pursuit of its foreign policy, Poland aims at forming stable security environment in the global and regional dimension, strengthening its international position and at levelling and preventing emergence of crisis situations. Actions of the Republic of Poland on the international arena reflect values laid at the foundation of the Polish statehood, i.e. democracy, the rule of law, respecting human rights and solidarity. This target is fulfilled by shaping friendly surrounding of states and non-state entities. Diplomacy is the tool which enables a state to express and pursue its foreign policy. It includes, inter alia, legal basis, organisation, personnel, procedures and methods of operation.

The obligation of the Polish foreign and consular service is to provide all Polish citizens residing abroad with efficient consular protection. Each day, employees of consulates embody a gate to Poland, facilitate the resolution of daily difficulties of many thousands of compatriots as well as of foreigners who intend to come to Poland. To a great extent, the

<sup>29</sup> Insufficient proved to be the importance and the scope of the effective legal act of this area - *the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of April 27, 2007 on the preparation of the system of national security management* (Journal of Laws, No. 98, item 978).

<sup>30</sup> They include: foreign affairs; national defence; special services; public administration and internal affairs; informatisation and telecommunications; justice; sea economy; budget and public finances; the Treasury; transport; construction industry; spatial and housing economy; agriculture, development of rural areas and agricultural markets; health; science and higher education; school system and education; culture and national heritage protection; environment (including water management); local bodies of government administration and local government bodies.

image of the state depends upon efficiency and professionalism of work of consuls who for the majority of foreigners are the first representatives of the Polish state that they meet.

The international position of the state is also reflected in citizens employed in key international institutions. In the European Union, the general employment of Poles in April 2011 amounted to 2394, including 83 persons on middle and higher executive positions (cf. Table 3.)

**Table 2. Employment of Polish citizens in institutions of the European Union on executive positions of middle and higher level as of April 2011.**

<b>Executive positions</b>	
<b>European Commission</b>	
European Commissioner	1
Executive positions of a higher level	11
Executive positions of a middle level	43
<b>The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union</b>	
Executive positions of a higher level	1
Executive positions of a middle level	3
<b>European Parliament</b>	
Executive positions of a higher level	2
Executive positions of a middle level	3
<b>European External Action Service</b>	
Executive positions of a higher level	5
Executive positions of a middle level	2
<b>Office of the European Ombudsman</b>	
Executive positions of a middle level	1
<b>EC Court of Justice/Court</b>	
Judge of the Court of Justice of the EC	1
Judge of the Court	1
Judge of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal	1
Executive positions of a middle level	1
<b>Committee of the Regions</b>	
Executive positions of a middle level	1
<b>European Court of Auditors</b>	
Member of European Court of Auditors	1
Head of Polish Cabinet of the ECA	1
Executive positions of a middle level	1
<b>The European Central Bank</b>	
Member of the General Council of the European Central Bank	1
<b>The European Investment Bank</b>	
Member of the Board of Governors of the European Investment Bank	1
Executive positions of a higher level	1

Source: [http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska\\_w\\_ue/Zatrudnienie/Informacja\\_stan\\_zatrudnienia\\_KSE\\_I\\_polrocze\\_2011.doc](http://polskawue.gov.pl/files/polska_w_ue/Zatrudnienie/Informacja_stan_zatrudnienia_KSE_I_polrocze_2011.doc) - available on May 31, 2011

The largest union employer was the European Commission. During this period, the European Commission was employing 1415 Polish citizens. The newly established European External Action Service was a place of employment for 54 Polish citizens, including 3 on the executive level<sup>31</sup>. Pursuant to the data as of the end of 2010, in the NATO International Secretariat there were employed 23 Polish citizens. Pursuant to the data of November 2010, the total number of Polish citizens appointed to the United Nations Secretariat amounted to 74.

<sup>31</sup> Deputy Secretary General of EEAS and the Heads of the European Union Delegation in Jordan and South Korea.

Pursuant to the data of the end of December 2011, within the structure of OSCE, there were employed 84 Polish citizens.

The practice of Polish foreign policy has so far indicated the existence of **institutional memory** relating to foreign policy and security policy. The next governments were continuing the policy of their predecessors in these two fields. It is an exceptionally crucial feature that should distinguish foreign policy of a contemporary state under the rule of law.

Analysing efficiency of Polish diplomacy, it ought to be mentioned that thus far it has been completely fulfilling its role. However, considering the dynamic changes of the security environment, it should be perceived that global challenges will require increased activity on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although Polish diplomacy is a more and more efficient service, there is still room for its improvement in such areas as:

- strengthening of the coordinative role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the scope of international cooperation pursued by the Sejm, the Senate, other ministries and by local government as well;
- improvement of coordination of ministries' activeness within the scope of cooperation with their foreign counterparts and at the forum of the EU, NATO and other international organisations.

The opportunity of Polish foreign policy is to prepare modern, well-motivated and educated personnel. Carrying out the programme of modernisation of Polish Foreign Service planned for 2007-2014 ought to become a positive factor. The result of the modernisation will be creative personnel possessing skills that increase efficiency of implementing Polish priorities in NATO and the EU and taking care of efficiency of allied mechanisms and also complementarity of activity of both organisations. The potential of diplomacy of the Republic of Poland are persons who found employment in international institutions. Their experience gained during their work for the European Union, the North Atlantic Alliance or the United Nations cannot be negated. In a similar way one should see the possibility of Polish diplomats taking positions in the European External Action Service including primarily positions in the head office of EEAS in Brussels where key decisions concerning European foreign policy will be arrived at. The adopted by Member States draft decision on establishing EEAS and its record of close collaboration with diplomacy of Member States enables to treat the newly formed structure as an actual tool of Polish foreign policy despite the fact that the service of external actions is most of all to represent interest of the entire EU.

## **B. Defence**

Defence is the area of national security constituting the sum of all civilian and military undertakings aiming at prevention of and opposition to any potential threats of national security which may result in a political and military crisis. To satisfy defence requirements of Poland, the national defence system is organised and maintained. Its efficiency is determined by harmonious collaboration of the management subsystem which forms it and of the executive subsystems – both military and non-military.

### **Polish Armed Forces**

The Polish Armed Forces are an essential element of the national defence system. Their unique, on the national scale, capabilities decide of the armed forces being a multifunctional tool to perform broad spectrum of missions including: guaranteeing national defence and opposing aggression within the scope of allied obligations, participation in stabilising international situation and supporting internal security and providing assistance to the society.

The findings of public opinion polls indicate an invariably high level of social approval for army and high prestige of military service, both of which prove that the Polish Armed Forces are **one of the most significant institutions of public trust**. The strongest advantage of the Polish Armed Forces is well-educated personnel and experience gained in foreign operations, during the service in military structures and as a part of initiatives of NATO and the EU (the NATO Response Force, EU Battle Groups).

The reforms of the armed forces in recent years have been directed at increasing their modernity and efficiency. Implementation of the complete professionalization raised the **professionalisation effort** to a higher level<sup>32</sup>. In the first place it imposed upon the alteration of principal systems of armed forces - training, feeding, draft, mobilisation, logistics support, accommodation, armament and military equipment systems. The new model of training was implemented, recruitment for National Reserve Forces commenced, the proportion of operation units to support units was altered thus increasing combat potential of the army. The lowest level of military administration was limited and simplified<sup>33</sup> and the decision of liquidation of military districts was arrived at.

Also in the financial field positive changes have been observed. The adopted budgets for 2011 and 2012 were the source of the largest so far inflow of financial means for defence. A high level of capital expenditure indicates the priority treatment of technical modernisation. Continued are the processes and activities of long-term consequences for functioning and development of the Polish Armed Forces: gradual reducing of the contingent in Afghanistan, continuation of the informatisation strategy of the Ministry of National Defence, implementation of the performance budget and further economisation of functioning of the Ministry of National Defence and of the armed forces, disposing of the infrastructure which is unnecessary for the army<sup>34</sup>.

In 2011-2012, **the technical modernisation priorities of the Polish Armed Forces were identified** and focused on development of air defence, mobility of armed forces, information and unmanned systems. The strategic decision was made to **increase investments in Polish defence industry and the research sector related to it**. This characteristic 'Polonisation' of the industrial defence potential ought to become a pro-development action intensifying competitiveness and innovation of the domestic defence industry and its export capabilities and in consequence providing new workplaces. The works on a fundamental change of command and control structures on the central level commenced. They implement the idea of jointness into the command and control system of the Polish Armed Forces. The key decision was made to reform **uniform pensions and extend appropriate rights to veterans of operations abroad**. The commitment concerning **the stability of long-term financing of the national defence requirements was maintained**.

Requirements of the contemporary security environment, technological development and advancing modernisation of armed forces of neighbouring states and member states of NATO reveal increasing **challenges in functioning of the Polish Armed Forces**, to a great extent brought about by the insufficient quantity of modern armament and military equipment. Despite the fact of consolidating the systems of acquisition, utilisation and withdrawing of armament and military equipment of the Polish Armed Forces, the pace of supplies of new types of armament is frequently too slow due to capabilities of suppliers and

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<sup>32</sup> Performance of the governmental *Professionalization Programme of the Polish Armed Forces for 2008-2010*.

<sup>33</sup> The number of Military Recruitment Offices was reduced from 123 to 86 imparting a new character. Provincial Military Staffs were adapted to assignments relating to, inter alia, crisis management.

<sup>34</sup> Compiled on the basis of the material from *the Strategic Defence Review. Professional Polish Armed Forces in a Modern State* [PL. *Raport Strategicznego Przeglądu Obronnego. Profesjonalne Siły Zbrojne w nowoczesnym państwie*], Ministry of National Defence, Warsaw, April 2011.

the necessity of balanced, parallel financing of armament supplies in many areas. Both the system of training personnel reserves of the Polish army and the structure of commanding it require improvement. Allied obligations and social expectations also put a transformational pressure on the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. This pressure concerns the accelerated development of operational capabilities and increasing the proportion of combat units to support units.

The participation in international defence programmes, including European Defence Agency (EDA), offers opportunities to strengthen the Polish Armed Forces. Also intensified presence of the allied defence infrastructure on the territory of Poland will increase the interoperability of our forces. Outsourcing in the selected areas of functioning of the army (e.g. logistics support, command support) will enable to lower the costs of its operating and will enable its further professionalisation. The *Smart Defence*<sup>35</sup> and *Pooling & Sharing*<sup>36</sup> initiatives which are being implemented within the scope of NATO and the EU are the opportunity for further development of defence capabilities of Poland and its allies. Their objective is to maintain and strengthen defence capabilities together with improvement of their efficiency, interoperability and cost effectiveness.

The potential threat to the development of the Polish Armed Forces would be depriving their development and technical modernisation programme of stability of long-term financing, which would discredit the opportunity to eliminate deficiencies in operational capabilities. Close completion of armament and military equipment's life cycle may considerably widen the existing gaps. Low social interest in situation of army, decreasing armed forces competitiveness on the labour market and a lack of social acceptance for the Polish Armed Forces participation in military operations abroad may turn out to be the dangerous phenomena.

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<sup>35</sup> The speech by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Alliance during the annual Munich Security Conference, „*Smart Defence can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence*”, Munich 2010.

<sup>36</sup> The information material of the European Defence Agency, EDA's *Pooling & Sharing*, [www.eda.europa.eu](http://www.eda.europa.eu) and EGMONT Security Policy Brief No. 23, Sven Biscop, Jo Coelmont, *Pooling & Sharing: From slow march to quick march?*, Brussels, May 2010.

**Table 3. Comparison of defence expenditures in 2009 and 2010 - selected countries of EDA and the USA.**

State	Defence expenditures in millions of EUR		Change of defence expenditures in %	Defence expenditures as % of GDP		Defence expenditures as % of the entire budget of the state		Defence expenditures per capita in EUR	
	2009	2010	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010	2009	2010
the Czech Republic	2262	2016	-11	1.65	1.39	3.57	3.07	215	191
Finland	2686	2707	1	1.57	1.5	2.83	2.73	503	505
France	39190	39237	0	2.04	2.01	3.67	3.58	608	605
Germany	36108	33492	-7	1.5	1.34	3.15	2.88	441	410
Greece	6023	4756	-21	2.54	2.07	5.03	4.18	535	421
Hungary	1068	1022	-4	1.15	1.04	2.3	2.13	107	102
Italy	21946	21637	-1	1.44	1.4	2.78	2.77	364	358
Lithuania	289	246	-15	1.08	0.9	2.51	2.17	87	75
the Netherlands	8733	8472	-3	1.53	1.43	2.97	2.8	528	510
<b>Poland</b>	<b>5428</b>	<b>6392</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>1.75</b>	<b>1.81</b>	<b>3.93</b>	<b>3.95</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>167</b>
Romania	1609	1575	-2	1.39	1.29	3.44	3.17	75	74
Slovakia	967	853	-12	1.53	1.29	3.74	3.16	178	157
Spain	12196	11132	-9	1.16	1.05	2.53	2.33	264	242
Sweden	3510	4265	22	1.22	1.23	2.16	2.33	376	455
the United Kingdom	39596	43403	10	2.53	2.56	4.89	5.03	641	698
EDA states	193993	193540	0	1.67	1.61	3.31	3.2	392	390
USA	471000	520000	10	4.6	4.8	11.1	11.2	1533	1676

*Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence, based on Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010 and Europe and United States Defence Expenditure in 2010.*

## Administrative Structures

The public administration carries out assignments providing efficient and safe functioning of the state in conditions of external threat to national security and in time of war, establishing conditions of protection and survival of citizens, supplying the Polish Armed Forces and units responsible for internal security with human and material resources and also assignments resulting from the host nation obligations.

The strong point of the defence preparations which are conducted by the public administration are legal and organisational solutions. Operational planning which enables functioning of administrative structures in conditions of external threat to national security and in time of war encompasses all levels of public administration and selected institutions of the state administration (approximately 3000 entities). The defence training system and the control system of carrying out defence assignments functions relatively well.

Civil defence is a noticeable drawback in this area. Sustained for years, the lack of legal and systemic solutions regulating the cooperation of rescue systems, bodies and services performing tasks of protecting population impairs the preparations both in the field of national defence and crisis management. A small amount of national and regional defence training, directed at collaboration of civil and military elements, is also worrying. Challenges arise from a low level of defence competences in the society which results from insufficient education in the defence area, the lack of tools assessing these competences and modern means of education.

Considering the nature of contemporary and future operations requiring the comprehensive approach and taking into account protraction of the post-conflict phase, the role of non-military instruments and civil component in military operations is increasing. Poland possesses the low percentage of civil experts participating in crisis response operations abroad. The lack of formalised and standardised process of planning, preparation and participation of ministries other than the MOD and civilian employees in military operations prevents the comprehensive and coordinated use of government and non-government resources. The opportunity to improve this state of affairs will be to prepare and implement rules and procedures of involvement of civil departments and participation of civilian personnel.

## Economic structures

Strengthening of the state's capacity for defence, including provision of population survival, functioning of the state's structures and its armed forces, requires considerable involvement of its economic structures forming **the industrial defence potential**<sup>37</sup> and carrying out the economic and defence assignments.

Polish potential, which enables production of the definite armament and military equipment systems, constitutes one of the determinants of the state's sovereignty and mobilisation readiness of its structures. Domestic industry remains the key supply source of armament and military equipment for the Polish Armed Forces and Polish research and development centres are the important suppliers of technology and technical ideas within the scope of defence technologies. The interest of Polish economy (technological progress, workplaces,

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<sup>37</sup> The industrial defence potential is defined in *the regulation of the Council of Ministers of October 4, 2010 on the register of companies, state-owned enterprises and research and development units conducting activity for national security and defence, and of companies pursuing international trade of goods, technologies and services of a strategic significance for national security and maintaining international peace and security* (Journal of Laws, No. 198, item 1313).

trade with foreign partners, supporting the state's budget with incomes from taxes and fees) also appeals to maintaining and supporting the industrial defence potential.<sup>38</sup>

Completing the structure transformation process of the sector<sup>39</sup>, increasing expenditure on research and development works relating to national security and defence, consolidation of the R&D resources and more effective support and promotion of the sector will significantly affect the market position of the Polish industrial defence potential (ppo).

The conditions resulting from forming common European defence market require that integration of Polish scientific and industrial potential will be **directed at the states of European Union and NATO**. The works of the European Defence Agency exert the strongest influence on actions within the scope of EU cooperation in the area of defence market and industry<sup>40</sup>. Its activity contributes to competitiveness development on the European Defence Market and in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. On the way to effective inclusion of industrial defence potential in European collaboration, there are the following obstacles: economic barriers (and in some events also technological ones) limiting its abilities to integrate its technological capabilities with leading potentates of armaments industry of the European countries, a lack of strong representation of Polish armaments industry on markets, political and voluntary character of tools prevailing in the EU and difficulties in gaining consensus.

Within the scope of cooperation with NATO, Poland participates in carrying out multinational programmes of the considerable significance for strengthening its defence potential and participates in works of allied institutions responsible for acquiring modern equipment and armament. Active participation in functioning of these assemblies gives an opportunity to include the defence potential of our state in the armament system of the Alliance (the system is being collectively established). The participation also offers possibility to enter into cooperation or into shared programmes with other manufacturers. The more effective use by the national economic entities of the aforementioned areas of collaboration within the scope of NATO is necessary.

The significant element of the industrial defence potential is **the resource base responsible for research and development**. Coming into force of *the Act of April 30, 2010 on the Principles of Financing Science*<sup>41</sup> and of *the Act of April 30, 2010 on the National Research and Development Centre*<sup>42</sup>, significantly affected the research in the defence sector. New challenges were set for the military research institutes (WIB)<sup>43</sup>, related to more and more frequent participation in research in which many entities are involved. It ought to be aimed at tightening cooperation between research institutes, optimally using their abilities to increase capacity to compete on European and global market. In this context the works undertaken in Ministry of Defence on consolidation of the research and development base, adapted for current and perspective requirements of the Polish Armed Forces, were well-

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<sup>38</sup> Support Programme for Development of the Polish Defence Industry for 2013-2020 (project of 3/12/2012 drawn up by the Ministry of Economy).

<sup>39</sup> The direction of ownership changes of ppo's companies was defined by *the Strategy of Consolidation and Support of Development of Polish Defence Industry in 2007-2012*. Its successor will be *the Support Programme for Development of the Polish Defence Industry for 2013-2020*

<sup>40</sup> EDA is currently the most important European platform of countries impinging on the form of European defence market and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The works of Agency on long-term defence technology programmes and on forming of common market of defence products are the elements of globalisation process which is a challenge for all Member States, including Poland.

<sup>41</sup> Journal of Laws, No. 96, item 615, as amended.

<sup>42</sup> Journal of Laws, No. 96, item 616, as amended.

<sup>43</sup> Ministry of Defence supervises six institutions which objective is research and development work in the area of armament and military equipment.



grounded. It is also indispensable to carry out the assignment consolidation of the sector and most of all to establish following foreign solutions, the national capital group of the armaments industry in which proprietary rights should be exercised by the Treasury.

The significant impulse for improvement and streamlining of acquisition, utilisation and withdrawal of armament and military equipment was appointment of the Armaments Council as of the advisory body of the Ministry of Defence<sup>44</sup>. Equally crucial was the appointment of the National Armaments Director within the scope of international collaboration with NATO, the EU, countries and other international organisations in the field of armament, military equipment, research and development works for defence<sup>45</sup>.

The considerable development potential is present in the transfer of innovative technologies between the military and civil sectors. This is a two-way flow, although in Polish conditions the technology transfer from the civil sector to the military one dominates. Although the system of financing research and development adopted in Poland works and implementation works for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland are conducive to flow of knowledge to the civil sector<sup>46</sup>, barriers of the legal, organisational and cultural nature significantly limit the spectrum of possibilities of military technologies flow to the civil sector.

The economic structures participate in carrying out undertakings within the scope of national defence preparations which aim at provision of material basis for performance of defence tasks and population survival<sup>47</sup>.

### **C. Special services**

The characteristics of Polish security environment, as well as the comprehensive nature of contemporary challenges and threats result in special services playing a very significant part in realisation of national interests. Their elemental mission is to provide the state bodies responsible for national security with comprehensive, credible and leading information support. In the interest of these services remains information which may be significant for security and international position of Poland and its economic and defence potential. Their activities are mainly related to fighting against international terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, counterintelligence protection, national economic security and secret information protection. The important assignment of special services remains the security of Polish civil-military contingents taking part in operations abroad. Considering the advancing process of security globalisation and also the obligations resulting from membership of the Republic of Poland in NATO and the EU, special services must extend their ability to recognise situations in the regions of international tensions, conflicts and crises in the world.

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<sup>44</sup> *Decision No. 126/MON of the Minister of National Defence of April 14, 2011 on the Armaments Council* (Journal of Laws Ministry of National Defence of May 10, 2011, No. 8, item 101).

<sup>45</sup> *Decision No. 60/MON of the Minister of National Defence of February 23, 2010 on the National Armaments Director* (Journal of Laws Ministry of National Defence of March 26, 2010, No. 4, item 43).

<sup>46</sup> The minister competent for science is the holder of financial means allocated to this objective.

<sup>47</sup> The fundamental areas of defence preparations carried out with economic entities include: mobilisation of economy (maintaining production and repair capacity indispensable for carrying out the assignments included in the Economy Mobilisation Programme - PMG); militarisation; protection of objects particularly important to national security and defence; preparation, use and protection of transportation for national defence needs; preparation and use of public and non-public health service for national defence needs; preparation and use of communication systems for national defence needs; supplying civil defence with equipment, materials and resources; reconstruction of damaged infrastructure; distribution of medicinal products, medical devices and food; supplying population with food, water, energy carriers, medicine, means of protection and hygiene; supervision of economic potential within the scope of industry, agriculture, communication, transportation, power industry, forestry and health protection.

Increasing efficiency of special services' activity requires effective cooperation with different bodies and national services and participation in international intelligence and counterintelligence collaboration. Selection and training of officers ought to, above all, be based on provision of high quality personnel that is able to quickly and individually analyse an event, including crisis situations, and draw up information, facilitating in such a manner realisation of national interests of the Republic of Poland by national bodies. Appropriate equipping and financing also influences efficiency of Polish intelligence agencies in operating environment.

Particular attention in the functioning of intelligence agencies should be paid to the aspect of cyber-attack threats which may result in granting unauthorised entities (including foreign intelligence agencies or criminal and terrorist groups) access to classified information stored in electronic form and may also pose a threat of disorganisation to the most crucial information systems of government and public institutions and of spheres of public sector of great economic significance.

### **2.1.3 Development of resilience against threats to national security**

Aside from the executive subsystems, the important part in provision of national security is played by the national security support systems. These include, inter alia, critical infrastructure protection and the system of strategic reserves.

#### **A. Critical infrastructure protection**

Critical infrastructure protection is beginning to gain a dimension of national security and access to key services remains the measurable aspect of national security and the state's obligation to citizens<sup>48</sup>.

The issue of protecting critical infrastructure took on an international dimension as well. Both the European Union and NATO are attempting to find solutions which may help Member States to strengthen the level of this protection. The 2008/114/WE Directive of December 8, 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection<sup>49</sup> define the European Critical Infrastructure as the infrastructure which disruption of functioning may affect at least two Member States. Currently the European Critical Infrastructure is selected in two sectors: energy and transport, whereas NATO focuses on drawing up protection standards of energy critical infrastructure, treating this field as a key to support possible military activity of the Alliance.

In the past, the elements forming the critical infrastructure functioned as independent or only partially dependent systems. At present, in the age of advancing globalisation and technological development, the individual objects of critical infrastructure are more and more interdependent not only in the dimension of one state but on the regional, European and even world scale. The progress, apart from obvious benefits, brought about the increase of their sensitivity to potential threats including threats of new type - related to cyberspace.

For the critical infrastructure protection to be effective, it should constitute the common effort of both government administration, as well as operators and owners. Therefore, the critical infrastructure protection must be the assignment of its owner or operator, whereas the role of

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<sup>48</sup> Art. 3, item 2 of the Act of 26 April 2007 on Crisis Management (Journal of Laws, No. 89, item 590, as amended) defines the critical infrastructures as systems which include in them functional objects interrelated with themselves, encompassing construction objects, devices, installations, key services for security of the state and its citizens and for provision of efficient functioning of public administration bodies, and also of institutions and entrepreneurs.

<sup>49</sup> O. J. EU of 2008, No. 345, p. 75.

the state is limited to coordinating and supervising its function. Interventions are permitted in the event of a given element of critical infrastructure not being sufficiently protected or when liquidation of results of a crisis situation exceeds capacity of a given owner or operator.

The key document drawn up for the critical infrastructure protection system will be *the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme*. Also, integration of civil and military solutions in the area of critical infrastructure protection will strengthen the critical infrastructure protection. Increased awareness of significance of critical infrastructure security aspects for national security amongst its operators and public administration constitutes crucial opportunity for providing national security.

## **B. System of strategic reserves**

The fundamental aspect of correct functioning of the state and its economy, providing essential living necessities in time of disturbances of key goods' and products' supplies, is to possess the efficient system of strategic reserves. Existing of a competent, transparent and rational system of reserves supports carrying out of the assignments in the field of national security and defence, public order and health and of natural disasters or crisis situations. It supports reconstruction of critical infrastructure, eases disruptions in continuity of supplies used for functioning of economy and meet fundamental necessities of citizens, saving their lives and health and protecting fulfilment of international obligations of the Republic of Poland.

The weak part of the system of national reserves is the lack of precise legal foundations standardising the issue of liquidation of the reserves which could no longer be supported and the protracting procedure of releasing the assortment maintained under the restricted conditions which conduced towards the possibility of selling these products. The system of reserves which is being created after adopting *the Act on Strategic Reserves*<sup>50</sup> corresponds with international and macroeconomic conditions of Poland as a member of the European Union and NATO. It takes into consideration alterations of the state's security environment conditions, is capable of responding to changing economic situation and contributes to efficient maintaining, distributing and reconstructing of reserves. Bringing into effect of new legal regulations in the area of strategic reserves will enable to reduce bureaucratic difficulties relating to forming, liquidating and rendering available procedures and will permit to precisely define assignment of individual departments of government administration and entrepreneurs of this field. In prospect, a modern, clear and rational system will be established. Its essential element will be *the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves*<sup>51</sup>.

## **2.2. Integration between public policies and the security policy**

### **A. Integration of socio-economic development and national security<sup>52</sup>**

Activities from the area of national security and socio-economic development, in spite of their relative autonomy, are connected by the network of shared interrelations. Functioning of

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<sup>50</sup> *The Act of 29 October 2010 on Strategic Reserves* (Journal of Laws, No. 229, item 1496, as amended).

<sup>51</sup> The project of *the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves* is drawn up by the minister competent for economy in collaboration with the Minister of National Defence, the minister competent for internal affairs, the minister competent for agriculture, the minister competent for agricultural markets, the minister competent for justice, the minister competent for transport, the minister competent for health, Head of the Internal Security Agency and with other bodies of government administration carrying out assignments within the scope of national security and defence, crisis management and critical infrastructure protection and of public security, order and health.

<sup>52</sup> The fields presented in this part of the strategy are analysed only in the context of relations with national security and especially - defence. Different aspects of functioning of these fields are analysed in the 8 remaining integrated development strategies.

bodies and services responsible for national security influences the labour market, industry and services, education, natural environment, infrastructure development and the spatial structure of the state. Pursuing to strengthen socio-economic and territorial cohesion will be improving inner strength of the state and foundations of national security.

### **Regional development**

Military institutions may be one of the factors dynamising regional and local development. As they appear in the role of an employer, tax payer, party ordering products and party providing services within the scope of security.

Of the considerable significance for local communities is the army's ability to carry out assignments related to supporting the state's bodies in providing internal security and to assist institutions, government and self-government services with military aid and to assist society with responding to threats (natural and technical disasters). Localisation of the military unit in a given area strengthens sense of security of its residents, owing to forces ready to be of help to population in life-threatening situations and in health and property emergencies. Although presence of military complexes does not significantly influence individual regions, in the economic sphere the army affects diversity of the local labour market, stabilising demand and increase of local budget revenues from the property tax. Collaboration of the army with schools is of great importance. As a result, patriotic attitudes and values in young generation are formed<sup>53</sup>.

On the other hand, the reform of the Polish army carried out in recent years resulted in the reduction of army and of military entities' number. Although the alterations in dislocation of the units are rightly dictated by most of all national defence necessities and the necessity to rationalise all public expenses, in their aftermath, definite, frequently negative consequences for economies and communities, communes and districts appeared.

Activity of the defence sector may also have a negative influence on regional development resulting from the necessity of introducing specific limitations in the areas neighbouring on military objects<sup>54</sup>. Just like military complexes may restrict development and use of terrains surrounding them, the regional development may also force limitations of development and use of military areas. Therefore, there is a need for cooperation directed at minimising of potential conflicts. Good collaboration between military units and local government may be the source of mutual benefits. Analogically, its lack especially in the field of development planning and coordination of current activity may bring about measurable damages.

### **Planning and spatial development**

To provide national security and defence, the spatial policy must establish conditions to respect national defence and security requirements in all planning preparations within the scope of spatial development on the national, provincial and local level. The effect of pursuing the spatial policy should be, inter alia, the efficient and safe functioning of the armed forces as well as of institutions operating in the internal security sphere of the state. Simultaneously, the policy ought to use features of the areas of defence and national security for purposes of regional development.

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<sup>53</sup> Marzena Piotrowska-Trybull, *Powiązania jednostek wojskowych z samorządem terytorialnym w kontekście rozwoju lokalnego i regionalnego*, Zeszyty Naukowe – the quarterly journal of National Defence Academy No. 4(81), Warsaw 2010, p. 261, 270-271.

<sup>54</sup> The example of such a negative influence may be the location of the Missile Defence Base that will perhaps influence the economic zone neighbouring with the base (e.g. restrictions of height of buildings in the zone).

The serious issue in this area is the little interest of self-governments to carry out local plans of spatial development of areas neighbouring on army restricted areas. Due to the lack of appropriate legal means mobilising self-government authorities to carry out these plans, the matters of establishing protection zones for restricted areas requiring them, are being protracted. It limits the opportunity to undertake planning activities by military property administrators and results in spatial conflicts related to functioning of military complexes.

### **Infrastructure development**

Development of infrastructure and development of defence sector are mutually coupled. On one hand, construction of the modern transportation system, of public roads in particular, modernisation of railways, airports and inland waterways connected with introduction of modern transport means, constitutes one of the key fields in the defence preparations system and in national crisis management. It will contribute also to providing population with livelihoods, including ability to evacuate it, and to becoming an essential element of supporting the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and the allied forces in the event of crisis or an armed conflict. On the other hand, infrastructure development of the security sector affects development of infrastructure in the regions of functioning of this sector's objects. If possible, the spatial policy ought to strive in these areas for shared use of infrastructure both for defence and national security purposes and for regional development (co-use of military airports, sport facilities, common environmental investments, e.g. wastewater treatment plants).

To the available extent, military aviation uses the existing civil airports of public use or hands over the selected own airports for co-using. Also sport and recreational facilities of the defence sector are rendered available for the interested, taking into consideration present needs of a current user on the basis of binding regulations.

### **Environment protection**

The entities responsible for providing national external security undertake to abide and carry out assignments and obligations resulting from the national legal regulations relating to natural environment protection. As the structures carrying out assignments on the whole state territory, they play, within this scope, the significant part, both as direct environment users and as an actual force capable of undertaking pro-ecology actions on the local level. It succeeds also through raising environmental awareness of the military personnel.

Environment condition of the areas managed by the armed forces is mainly affected by:

- installations and devices of technical infrastructure, including used solid fuel boiler rooms, wastewater treatment plants in poor technical condition, outdated warehouses and petrol stations;
- waste, including inappropriate hazardous waste management ;
- sources of electromagnetic radiation and sources of noise;
- environment pollution resulting from the character and purpose of the armed forces.

For several years, the environment condition in the areas used by the Ministry of National Defence has been systematically improving. A great quantity of military areas possess high ecological and natural value and the established method of utilising space resulted in creation of specific habitats (including ones for rare and endangered species) on military training areas. Military training areas are often recognised as areas of little intensification of economic activity, high level of preserved natural value and of hampered access for civil population. As a result, the Polish Armed Forces are one of the entities occupying the highest percentage of land area in the borders of European Ecological Network Natura

2000<sup>55</sup>. In many cases, the presence of the army in the areas of high ecological and natural value, not only preserved them but also provided with good conditions for development.

### Counteracting unemployment

To increase attractiveness of the military service and to provide the appropriate support for professional soldiers in the process of returning to the civil labour market after their service termination, the personnel reconversion system functions within the Ministry of National Defence. Authorised for the reconversion aid are all professional soldiers (with few exceptions) and also in particular cases - members of their families. The system uses gradation of financial means allotted to improve or change professional qualifications aiming at encouraging to remain in the military service. The gradation also enables optimal preparation to take up employment after being released from the armed forces. Thanks to that, the possibility of efficient levelling of the risk of personnel professional inactivity and of counteracting negative effects of unemployment was gained.

The reconversion aid system encompasses, inter alia, activity within the scope of career counselling and employment services, retraining and apprenticeships and also information and advisory trainings conducted for individuals and groups. In addition, the structures of personnel reconversion in cooperation with different labour market entities undertake actions aimed at including soldiers, members of their families and also army employees into training programmes financed by the EU, aiming at improving professional qualifications.

### Education and higher education

Military schools constitute the didactic and R&D back-up facilities for the area of national security and defence. They train labour force within the army, defence industry and in the public administration sector - government and self-government. In the military education system, there are five **military schools**, i.e. public schools supervised by the Minister of National Defence<sup>56</sup>.

Since 2005 military schools are the rightful members of the common higher education system in Poland and their activity is subjugated by the regulations of training conduct, professional development and scientific research, compulsory to other schools, pursuant to assumptions of Bologna Process<sup>57</sup>. This activity is however in the first place subjugated and adopted for the needs of the Polish Armed Forces, while such needs are being modified due to the process of transformation. The transformation of military schools, conducted in recent years, indicated the impossibility of basing the recruitment of officer corps only on graduates of civil schools. It also confirmed that the military schools are an irreplaceable source of personnel for first service positions in the officer corps<sup>58</sup>. Military schools have considerably improved, including themselves in the national education system. They have improved fundamental employment indicators which, taking into account specificity of military schools activity, do not differ from the national average. The presence of civil students in military schools (they constitute almost 90% of all students) decides that military schools are effective and are able to maintain their potential and establish personnel, inter alia, for the National Reserve Forces.

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<sup>55</sup> It is estimated that 50% of military training areas are included in the Natura 2000 network.

<sup>56</sup> Academy of National Defence, Military University of Technology, Naval Academy, Military Academy of Land Forces, Polish Air Force Academy. The soldier training is also supported by the Medical University of Łódź.

<sup>57</sup> The schools were operating within the higher military education system, which was separate from the civil system and based on *the Act of 31 March 1965 on Higher Military Education* (Journal of Laws of 1992, No. 10, item 40, as amended.), repealed in 2005.

<sup>58</sup> The complete resignation from educating candidates for officers at Medical University of Łódź brought about serious shortages of personnel in military health care, amounting to hundreds of vacancies. The similar situation took place in the field of logistics services.

During the reorganisation of the military education system, new assignments were defined for integrated **non-commissioned officers' schools** and regulations of recruitment of candidates for the aforementioned schools. Preparation of non-commissioned officer personnel for the needs of the Polish Armed Forces is carried out on the basis of the non-commissioned officers' schools and by specialist centres in armed forces services and in components.

### **National heritage protection and development of cultural infrastructure**

The essential element of shaping national identity is to popularise tradition and history of the Polish military. The need to popularise the idea of defence in the context of professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces and intensified interest in the history of Polish arms as well as in modern combat forces justify the necessity to implement systemic solutions related to functioning of military museums. It encompasses museums of the status of a national institution of culture<sup>59</sup> and also numerous tradition halls being parts of military units. The essential obstacle to perform their function is the lack of appropriate infrastructure and consolidation of these units within one common programme of acquiring, maintaining and rendering available monuments of national culture related to history of the Polish army. The improvement of such condition will be achieved through stock-taking of dispersed collections and handing over of the most valuable exhibits for record of military museums - national institutions of culture. It will provide them with legal protection and financial means for conservation and maintenance.

## **B. Social base for national security**

### **Social perception of national security**

The progressing openness of Polish society and increasing influence of public opinion on political decisions require more and more effective social communication, efficiently presenting objectives of the Polish security policy. It is indispensable to acquire social understanding of these objectives and relatively high level of acceptance for them. The significant assignment is also to generate social capital based on the high level of citizen activity, social trust and shared national identity.

Security. Majority of Polish people regard Poland to be a safe state - both in the international and internal dimensions. More than a half positively assess the situation of Poland on the international arena (57%), and the unquestionable majority thinks that the independence of our country is not threatened (73%)<sup>60</sup>. To a large extent, these evaluations are dependent on Polish relations with its largest neighbours - Russia, Germany and Ukraine. The majority of Polish people think that friendly and partner relations with these states are possible<sup>61</sup>.

The Security policy. Despite the high sense of security and positive evaluation of Poland in the world, Polish people think that our state does not sufficiently take care of its interests in relations with other countries<sup>62</sup>. The worries regarding the Russian policy of intensifying its power and influence in the world have increased and a larger group of Polish people values more friendly relations with Russia than a close collaboration of states of the old CCCP<sup>63</sup>. Against the popular opinion of pro-American position of Polish people, Polish support for the

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<sup>59</sup> The museums of the status of a national institution of culture include the Polish Army Museum, the Naval Museum, the Land Forces Museum (appointed in the place of still functioning Pomeranian Military Museum and the Museum of the Air Force).

<sup>60</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research - Security of Poland on the International Arena, Warsaw, July 2009.

<sup>61</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research - Evaluation of Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Germany, Warsaw, July 2009.

<sup>62</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research - Security of Poland on the International Arena, Warsaw, July 2009.

<sup>63</sup> It does not interrupt Polish people to support the idea of Eastern Partnership (77%) Centre for Public Opinion Research - Evaluation of Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Germany, Warsaw, July 2009.

US and the policy of current Administration is considerably lower than the average in European states of NATO<sup>64</sup>. The international organisation of the highest level of trust of Polish people is the European Union<sup>65</sup> - 86% of Polish people support the European integration and 65% think that it will provide Poland with more benefits than costs.<sup>66</sup> Despite the little knowledge of the EU institutions, their image in Poland is positive and their recognition - quite common<sup>67</sup>. The significant approval for Polish membership in NATO (80%) may be collided with the sceptical evaluation of usefulness of the Alliance - only 51% of Polish people think that NATO is still needed and this number constitutes one of the lowest levels of support amongst all member states of the Alliance<sup>68</sup>. Even more negative position is presented by Polish people on military operations conducted by NATO in Afghanistan - 79% defies the participation of Polish soldiers in this operation.<sup>69</sup> The case of Afghan mission is not secluded - majority of the Polish society is generally negative towards military involvement of Poland in international military missions and assess them as too large in proportion to economic capacity and financial abilities of our state<sup>70</sup>.

The Polish Armed Forces. The Polish Army is invariably one of the leading institutions of public trust. The considerable majority of Polish people trust army and positively assess its activity (70%) - the army collects better opinions than different non-political public institutions.<sup>71</sup> Simultaneously only one third of Polish people (30%) is interested in the situation of the Polish Armed Forces. Polish people perceive the army also as the underinvested institution in terms of general and technical equipment (76%) and they think that the Government should not seek savings in the defence sphere.

### **Role of non-governmental organisations in providing national security**

The non-governmental organisations, including social emergency rescue organisations<sup>72</sup> are a very significant entity of the contemporary national security system, more specifically - of common security. On one hand, they function in the structures of the state as legal units which are independent and autonomous, on the other - the state entrusts them specific tasks to be fulfilled which without their aid might not be efficiently performed. In some fields of social life, the non-governmental organisations play a crucial part, adopting the obligation of public authorities to provide security to citizens. Social emergency rescue specialists are trained and prepared to provide fast and professional help, in particular in adverse conditions, where services supposed to provide help are not capable of responding as effectively. The specific location of social organisations in the Polish legal order provides them with possibility to earn a living and acquire financial means for current activity. The state, appreciating significance of the organisations for efficient functioning of voluntary rescue, order individual organisations to perform specified tasks, allotting for this objective funds from the state's budget. In addition, social rescue organisations, taking into

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<sup>64</sup> *Transatlantic Trends Research Key Findings 2010*, p. 27-28.

<sup>65</sup> The ever increasing trust for the EU in 2009 reached 74% (in comparison to trust for NATO, which is expressed by 65% of respondents and for the UN - 62%), Centre for Public Opinion Research, Research Announcement - Perception of the EU Institutions, Warsaw, April 2009.

<sup>66</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research - Six years of Poland in European Union, Warsaw, April 2010.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>68</sup> Only in Turkey there is a lower level - *Transatlantic Trends Research Key Findings 2011*, p. 23.

<sup>69</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research, Research Announcement - Polish Participation in NATO Operation in Afghanistan and its consequences, Warsaw, November 2010.

<sup>70</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research, Research Announcement - Poles about the Armed Forces - Warsaw, October 2009, p. 6.

<sup>71</sup> Centre for Public Opinion Research, Research Announcement - Evaluation of Public Institutions, September 2010.

<sup>72</sup> The most significant are: Volunteer Mountain Rescue Service (GOPR), Tatra Voluntary Rescue (TOPR) Voluntary Water Rescue (WOPR), Masurian Voluntary Water Rescue (MWOPR), Mazury Rescue Service (MSR) Volunteer Fire Department (OSP)



consideration their capacity of powers and means, level of rescuers' training, as well as possessing professional rescue equipment, are included in the provincial plans of crisis management as indispensable elements supporting actions of different services.

Also, strengthening of the national capability for defence requires close cooperation with non-governmental organisations and other social partners. It ought to be used for activation of society in the field of defence and construction of social back-up facilities for the Polish Armed Forces. Cooperation with non-governmental organisations conducting activities for defence possesses good legal and organisational instrumentation. The positive phenomenon observed in recent years is the increasing engagement and activity growth in non-governmental organisations in the sphere of defence and activity of the armed forces. Visible is also the development of collaboration between non-governmental organisations and individual military units. It is necessary for the armed forces to have greater recognition of potential of the organisations and treating them as partners in carrying out shared defence assignments. The other barrier affecting development of national capability for defence is the modest analytical potential for defence, which results in a little flow of knowledge to the defence sector. The reason for this situation is the little number of think tanks specialised in defence issues and perceiving the defence subject as hermetic.

**Table 4. SWOT Analysis of the national security system**

Strong points	Weak points
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- active participation of Poland in collective and regional security systems, including Polish membership in NATO and EU;</li> <li>- increase of effectiveness of Polish priorities within NATO and EU;</li> <li>- consequent development of professional armed forces, including development of National Reserve Forces;</li> <li>- well-educated and trained personnel of the armed forces gaining experience during foreign operations and serving in international military structures;</li> <li>- determination in modernising the armed forces and implementation of acquisition, operation and withdrawal of armament and military equipment ;</li> <li>- high level of social acceptance and increasing respect for military service;</li> <li>- common and efficient system of operational planning enabling functioning of public administration bodies and entrepreneurs in a situation of a national security threat and in time of war;</li> <li>- increase of interest and activity of non-governmental institutions within the scope of security and defence;</li> <li>- increase of awareness of factual significance of critical infrastructure and its protection for national security and security of citizens;</li> <li>- rational strategic reserves system.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- insufficient amount of systemic solutions integrating national security;</li> <li>- national security system functioning based on dispersed legislation;</li> <li>- insufficient amount of modern armament and military equipment within the Polish Armed Forces;</li> <li>- insufficient interoperability and compatibility of the Polish Armed Forces with the allied forces;</li> <li>- lack of formalised planning process, preparation and participation process of ministries other than the Ministry of Defence in crisis response operations abroad;</li> <li>- insufficient legal and organisational solutions regarding civil defence;</li> <li>- limited possibilities to modernise the Polish Armed Forces as provided by the European defence technologies base and by multiannual EDA programmes for defence;</li> <li>- insufficient experience of public administration bodies and operators of critical infrastructure in developing its protection system.</li> </ul>
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- confirmation in the new NATO Strategic Concept of collective defence priority and sustaining contingency plans, also for Poland;</li> <li>- increase of presence of allied defence infrastructure on the territory of the Republic of Poland;</li> <li>- development of the Common Security and Defence Policy and perspective of additional security guarantee for the Republic of Poland;</li> <li>- strengthening of cooperation with key partners of Poland within the scope of security and defence, as well as development of good neighbourly relations with neighbouring countries;</li> <li>- increase of efficiency of international law and international institutions, as well as increase of efficiency of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction instruments and their delivery, arms control and disarmament, security and confidence-building measures;</li> <li>- mutual involvement and active participation of public administration and private or state critical infrastructure operators in development of the critical infrastructure protection system;</li> <li>- increase of awareness of the necessity to integrate social and economic development with national security and to strengthen social scope of security;</li> <li>- constitution of conditions to develop integrated system of national security, including constitution and amendment of legal acts which shall improve organisation and functioning of the national security system;</li> <li>- regular monitoring and evaluation of the national security system, including annual strategic reviews of security and defence.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- insecurities, challenges and risks constantly present within the environment of international security;</li> <li>- possible deprivation of multiannual financing of development and technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces programme;</li> <li>- decreasing social acceptance for participation of the Polish Armed Forces in foreign military operations;</li> <li>- technological and economical restraints of sufficient cooperation of Polish defence industry within the scope of NATO and the EU;</li> <li>- effects of the critical infrastructure protection system will be visible after a long period.</li> </ul>

Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence.

## **II. Challenges, development trends and development vision of the national security system of the Republic of Poland**

In second decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century, national security will be formed by the dynamic process of risk identification, meeting challenges, defining goals and methods of their performance. New security quality shall be manifested in the following aspects: flow of information (availability of information influences society pressure to carry out appropriate assignments), asymmetry (in choosing forces and means), networking (international and national security organisations network), integration (advancing integration of civil-military efforts). Complex and multifaceted security of Poland - state as an institution and its citizens - requires close integration of its basic areas as follows: external and political security, military security, economic security, social and ecological security and others. Moreover, national security shall be related with economic and social development of the state. This approach fulfils philosophy of documentation developed within the scope of integrated development strategies.

Key factors shaping national security of the Republic of Poland are the following: the security policy, internal and external conditions, modern challenges and threats, national security system development.

### **Challenges and development trends**

In the last decade, the Polish security policy evolved systematically and extended the significance of security within subjective and objective scope, to transform steadily into the concept of integrated national security. This approach to national security is the condition of national development and simultaneously is its initial element. Objectives of the security policy evolved to a lesser degree, since they are directed at performance of national interests.

Key international conditions supporting security of Poland are memberships in NATO and the EU. Participation in NATO continues to provide allied guarantees for defence of national territory, which reinforces external security through the use of political and military means. Moreover, the EU membership creates opportunities for permanent, versatile and sustainable development and provides opportunity to strengthen international position, as well as to increase international influence of Poland.

In perspective of strategy appliance, the probability of a conventional armed attack against Poland is rather low. Yet, it cannot be completely excluded that situation of military threat or use of military forces might occur. Regarding proximity of significant military potentials to Poland, including non-conventional capacities, our country shall sustain capabilities enabling effective reaction to such threats. This approach is supported by the appointed in the long-term strategy for national development (LNDS) limited predictability of security environment development in a longer time perspective.

Key conditions increasing risk of conflicts that affect national security of Poland and as appointed in LNDS, are many hot spots worldwide as well as 'frozen' conflicts. As potential risk sources, including military threats, remain regions of lower stability within Euro Atlantic area or in its proximity, especially the Middle East, Caucasus, Middle Asia and Mediterranean. Although the accompanying threat of military conflicts remains low and should not involve a direct threat to the security of Poland, it might be the source of risk for our allies which will require to be neutralised with the use of our armed forces.

In the future, as well as nowadays, the most significant risk to the security of Poland, its allies and international stability as a whole, is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. However, in nearest future this shall not cause direct risks for the territory and citizens of Poland. Yet, in the perspective of strategy appliance, it might weaken international non-proliferation regimes and weapon control as well as destabilise international situation in some regions.

International terrorism will remain a threat to Polish security. The risk of terrorist attacks directed onto the territory of Poland may increase in the future, due to international activity of our state, especially one arising from our obligations towards our allies. This denotes a necessity of participation of our state, within the scope of Polish needs and capabilities, in the international war on terror.

The crucial challenge for national security will be activity of organised criminal groups, especially transnational ones. This phenomenon will increase together with popularity of Poland among such groups, because of the state's transit location, development of European integration, open borders and increase of citizens' wealth.

In the nearest future, the challenge for the Polish security policy will be diversification of energy sources, their suppliers and transmission channels, as well as increasing of state resilience to crisis situations.

Another challenge for national security remains the possibility of crisis situation occurring as a consequence of natural disasters, human activity or of various global processes and phenomena. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain the highest level of response capability for such kind of occurrences, fast minimisation of their consequences, as well as their prevention, if only possible. It is particularly significant to provide appropriate resilience of critical infrastructure to crisis situations.

The particular challenge for security of Poland, similarly to other highly developed countries including our allies and partners, will be the negative activity in cyberspace resulting either from wilful intent or inadvertent actions, brought about by malfunction or mishap causing interference of data communication networks.

### **Vision of development of the integrated national security system**

The ability of the state to take up challenges and to prevent risks including political , military and socio-economic threats shall be more strictly connected with socio-economic development of the state. This development will condition improvement of organisational efficiency of the state and delivery of resources and instruments to eliminate emerging risks.

Contemporary challenges and risks oblige to take long-term, expedient and preventive measures within the scope of national security. It is necessary to develop appropriate institutionalised mechanisms of actions which in the event of a direct threat will be effective, as well as to take measures minimising probability of occurrence of unwanted events. The objective of the national security system is to oppose in an integrated manner all national security risks, to undertake challenges and reduce risks with use of all national resources.

Forecasting development of the national security system in the mid-term perspective, it ought to be assumed that the system will be based on complex allied and bilateral security systems synergistically connected with its own,. gradually developed civil-military potential. All the aforementioned solutions shall be connected with socio-economic development and therefore form the integrated national security system. It shall be still developed based on two key elements: the **national defence system and the crisis management system**.

The idea of national security system development assumes that this system is based on hitherto model and consists of internally coordinated management and executive subsystems which are joint together by the goal of the mission carried out by them, which is providing national security.

The organisational structure of the **national security management subsystem**, established as a result of the combination of functional management with the actual structure of executive authority, will form a model of security management. In this model, function of the superior, political decisive entity is fulfilled by the President of the Republic of Poland together with the Council of Ministers, whose forum of political arrangements will be the

Cabinet Council<sup>73</sup>. The function of advisory body to the President of the Republic of Poland shall be served by the National Security Council<sup>74</sup> and the staff advisory body will be the National Security Bureau<sup>75</sup>. National security management ought to be performed at all levels of public administration: central, provincial, district, communal, emphasising unity and efficiency of actions. The subsystem of national security management includes commanding bodies of the Polish Armed Forces with the Commander-in-chief in the event of him being appointed. The element of national security management is and will remain crisis management, understood as an activity of public administration bodies which consists of preventing crisis situations, preparations to take control over them through planned undertakings, responding in the event of occurrence of a crisis situation, eliminating their results and of restoring resources and critical infrastructure.

The **executive subsystems** of the national security system will be constituted mainly by national forces and means specialised in the field of security, such as: diplomacy, armed forces, special forces and resources of security support. Among those, the leading role in achieving objectives shall be fulfilled by diplomacy and the Polish Armed Forces.

The acceptance to perform the catalogue of the Polish **foreign policy** priorities shall introduce to the policy strategic and operational thinking. In its development, the significant part will be played by analytic centres. The Polish foreign policy ought to be directed to various scopes of regional and global cooperation. The Republic of Poland will be a country with a considerable influence on development of new solutions and performance of the eastern policy of the European Union and of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Goals of the policy will be constituted by an active support for states undergoing political transformation and initiation of new forms of cooperation<sup>76</sup>.

In long-term perspective, Poland will possess **efficient, mobile and inter-operational Polish Armed Forces** which will systemically and proactively adapt their operational capabilities to the changes in the security environment. This will be performed through researching and introducing innovative changes and applying acquired knowledge and lessons learned<sup>77</sup>. The priority of the Polish Armed Forces' transformation in the strategy horizon will be improving the level of their operational capabilities and maintaining potential prepared to respond to current, new and unpredictable risks. The crucial element of preparations of the Polish Armed Forces to prevent modern threats will be increasing level of military and general training of soldiers. Until 2022, consolidation of higher military education and improvement of quality of didactic and scientific and research process in military schools will be achieved. This shall consider effective expenditure of public funds. Organisation of tactical components that achieve quick readiness to develop and act in variable combat environment will increase operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces. In this situation, it is significant to provide security for the troops in Polish military contingents.

To fulfil the aforementioned challenges, the armed forces should possess operational capabilities to act autonomously in any combat environment. The principal determinant of operational requirements is possession of weapons and military equipment capable of detecting, identifying, tracking and destroying means of adversary. Achieving of estimated operational abilities through providing (optimal) conditions to survive in the battlefield requires the systemic approach reflected in five main systems: command and control,

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<sup>73</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 141, section 1 "In matters of particular importance the President of the Republic of Poland is entitled to submit the Cabinet Council. The Cabinet Council is formed by the Council of Ministers debating headed by the President of the Republic of Poland".

<sup>74</sup> Ibidem, art. 135. „The advisory body of the President of the Republic of Poland within the scope of internal and external national security is the National Security Council”.

<sup>75</sup> The Act on Common Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland, Art. 11, section 1 states "The President of Republic of Poland performs tasks within the scope of security and defence with support of the National Security Bureau".

<sup>76</sup> *The Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy 2012-2016*.

<sup>77</sup> the material of *Strategic Defence Review*, Ministry of National Defence, April 2011

reconnaissance, engagement, survival and protection of the army and logistics support of undertakings.

Technical modernisation of the Polish army shall be based on **extended cooperation with national defence industry and connected scientific and research capacity**. Intensification of investments in this sector and increasing its participation in international programmes and initiatives shall correspond with increase of competitiveness and innovation of Polish defence industry, as well as of significant improvement of its export capacity. As a consequence the level of modernity of Polish economy will increase and this will develop new workplaces in the state.

The aforementioned national security system - methodically developed and improved shall provide: efficient functioning of authority and administration bodies in time of peace, crisis and war; monitoring and early risk warning system; prevention of all external and internal challenges and threats to national security; enabling to use instruments of the security policy (forces and means); coordination of state actions (especially diplomatic, economic, military and special) in national and allied scope (NATO, the EU), flow and distribution of information, analysis and synthetic evaluation of national security condition in its all aspects<sup>78</sup>.

Development of the modern, integrated national security system of the Republic of Poland by 2022 will require efforts within development of the critical infrastructure protection system, the strategic reserves system, the socio-cultural base for security and within integration of national security with socio-economic development. Undertaken actions will be directed to obtain efficiency and cohesion of functioning of the national security system. Synergistic influence of those factors and consequent carrying out of assignments resulting from them will bring about Poland becoming in 2022 a high security level state which will actively develop the common EU foreign and security policy. It will possess modern national defence with professional armed forces and with administrative and economy structures capable of crisis management and defence response, as well as efficient special services.

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<sup>78</sup> W. Kitler, Model zarządzania bezpieczeństwem narodowym, Kierowanie Bezpieczeństwem Narodowym (material from the conference edited by B. Zdrodowski, B. Wiśniewski), Warsaw 2008.

**Picture 2. Effects of implementation of the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland**



*Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence.*

### III. Objectives of the strategy and directions of intervention

#### 1. System of objectives

Considering conditions and challenges presented in the second and third chapter, the primary objective of this strategy will be:

#### **Strengthening efficiency and cohesion of the national security system**

The system, based on the synergy of efforts of particular authorities, institutions and public services responsible for national security, will be capable of identifying and eliminating sources, indications and effects of threats to national security. Development of such system requires a definite orientation of actions on its **efficiency and cohesion**. Efficiency will be achieved through raising the effectiveness of fundamental elements of the national security system; cohesion - through improving integration between public and security policies, through improving cooperation and coordination and ultimately by achieving integration inside the national security system.

Achieving the main objective will guarantee better realisation of national interests<sup>79</sup>. It will also contribute to establishing an appropriate capacity of the country, both in terms of quantity and quality, what will enable maintaining influence on international reality, course of internal processes and stimulation of positive evolutionary tendencies, both at home and abroad, especially in the regional dimension. Fulfilment of the main objective will be a total of achieved operational objectives.

**Operational objectives** will serve the achievement of the primary goal. They are an expansion of the main objective in the field of highest significance to national security and are aimed at the authorities of public administration, whereas the whole country is the subject of the strategy, including bodies of public administration and civil society. Operational objectives of *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* are as follows:

**Objective 1**  
**Formation of stable international security environment in regional and global dimension**

**Objective 2**  
**Strengthening of national defence capabilities**

**Objective 3**  
**Development of resilience against threats to national security**

**Objective 4**  
**Increase of integration between public policies and the security policy**

**Objective 5**  
**Creation of conditions for development of the integrated national security system**


<sup>79</sup> The national interests are defined in *the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*



Operational objectives will be based on two general rules indicated in the main objective: **efficiency and cohesion**. Efficiency is to be achieved through increasing capacity of essential elements of the national security system - it will be served by fulfilment of the first objective, namely *Formation of Stable International Security Environment in Regional and Global Dimension* and the second objective, namely Strengthening of National Capacity for Defence and the third objective *Development of resistance against threats to national security*.


Thanks to the fulfilment of the fourth objective - Increase of integration between public policies and the security policy, and the fifth - Creation of conditions for development of the integrated national security system, cohesion of national security system will be provided (outside and inside).

**Picture 3. System of objectives in relation to logical strategic axes**



Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence

## 2. Operational objectives and directions of interventions of their fulfilment



According to the analysis of external conditions included in the diagnosis of the national security system (chapter 1), security environment becomes increasingly complex and dynamic and is characterised by occurrence and diffusion of military and non-military threats, mainly of an asymmetric nature. Functioning in such a complicated and unpredictable environment motivates most of the countries to active participation in forming security environment and in developing cooperation between allies, partners, neighbours and other subjects of international relations. Poland is among these states with the objective to improve efficiency of own and common actions within NATO, the EU and other international organisations of bilateral and multilateral relations. Establishing a powerful international position of Poland and co-creating a stable security environment require improvement of effectiveness of international law and institutions and an efficient use of international instruments in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, armament and disarmament control, ways of confidence establishment and security and development aid.

Priorities and directions of intervention for Objective 1 include:

<b>1.1. Improvement of efficiency of fulfilling Polish priorities within NATO and the EU and attention to efficiency of allied mechanisms</b>
1.1.1. Strengthening collective defence within NATO
1.1.2. Development of EU capabilities to perform comprehensive actions in the field of crisis response
1.1.3. Development of cooperation with partners from Eastern Europe within NATO and the EU
1.1.4. Development of cooperation for energy security at the forum of NATO and the EU
1.1.5. Development of cooperation for cyber security at the forum of NATO and the EU
1.1.6. Support of effective mechanisms of cooperation between NATO and the EU
<b>1.2. Effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation</b>
1.2.1. Strengthening the strategic partnership with the USA
1.2.2. Allied cooperation aimed at developing strong relations with chief partners: France, Germany and Great Britain
1.2.3. Development of cooperation within the Weimar Triangle
1.2.4. Development of cooperation within The Visegrad Group
1.2.5. Development of cooperation within the Baltic Cooperation
1.2.6. Development of cooperation with eastern neighbours of Poland within bilateral and multilateral relations
1.2.7. Development of friendly relations with states from other regions of the world
<b>1.3. Increase of efficiency of international law and institutions</b>
1.3.1. Increase of efficiency of international law
1.3.2. Support of increase of UN efficiency
1.3.3. Actions for reinforcing the OSCE
<b>1.4. Strengthening international instruments in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery and global disarmament</b>
1.4.1. Support of initiatives for maintaining and developing international instruments in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including responding to possibility of its acquisition and use by terrorists
<b>1.5. Attention to efficiency and development of control of conventional armament, disarmament and measures of building confidence and security</b>
1.5.1. Proper execution of existing solutions and seeking new, effective solutions and means of cooperation for confidence establishment and security in Europe
1.5.2. Striving for maintaining multilateral mechanisms of control of armament and disarmament and their further development
1.5.3. Maintenance and improvement of international mechanisms of control of arms trade and export
<b>1.6. Reduction of development differences in the world, support of democracy and respect for human rights</b>
1.6. Increase of efficiency of the Polish development aid

Indicators for monitoring of Objective 1

Indicator	Unit	Value in base year 2010	Value in 2020	Value in target year 2022	Source
<b>Key indicators</b>					
Achieving full operational readiness by the base of American Ballistic Missile Defence System, capable of protecting the territory of the Republic of Poland and NATO	0-1	0	1	1	USA information (in the field of military readiness), jointly established plans

Indicator	Unit	Value in base year 2010	Value in 2020	Value in target year 2022	Source
<b>Key indicators</b>					
(Direction of intervention 1.2.1.)					of use of the ballistic missiles defence system (in the field of abilities and destination)
Number of EU battle groups with Polish contribution (until 2020) (Directions of intervention: 1.1.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4)	pcs.	1	2	2	Framework state report, drawn up after termination of EU Battle Group duty
Establishment of Polish-Ukrainian-Lithuanian Brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) (Direction of intervention 1.2.6.)	0-1	0	1	1	Agreement on Establishment of Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade

## Re 1.1. Improvement of efficiency of fulfilling Polish priorities in NATO and the EU and attention to efficiency of allied mechanisms

### 1.1.1. Strengthening collective defence within NATO

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Improving ability of NATO to carry out assignments in the area of collective defence is the most significant postulate lodged by Poland at the forum of the North Atlantic Alliance. Poland consistently espouses strengthening practical aspects related to collective defence, including especially maintenance and development of appropriate military tools. Most of all, maintenance of balance between developing capabilities for expeditionary operations and capabilities to defend the territory of the Alliance, is concerned. Poland emphasizes the necessity of consistent realisation of allied training connected with Art. 5 NAT, development of NATO Response Forces, regular inspection and of revision of contingency plans.

#### Main activities

- development of adequate capabilities crucial for performance of allied defence tasks;
- actions in favour of including Polish interests in executive documents constituting elements of the implementation process of the new Strategic Concept of NATO;
- continuation of the defence transformation of NATO, aimed at increasing its effectiveness in the fulfilment of the full spectrum of assignments;
- striving for organisation and participation in NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) whose scenarios include Art. 5 operations;
- preservation of current and acquisition of new NATO infrastructure on the territory of the Republic of Poland;
- works for maintaining internal cohesion of the Alliance and for consensus building;
- active participation of Poland in *the Smart Defence* initiative;
- continuation of participation in NATO development programmes of designated abilities such as: *Airborne Early Warning and Control* (NAEW&C), *Strategic Airlift Capability* (SAC); *Strategic Airlift Interim Solution* (SALIS), which will enable Poland to fulfil NATO requirements within the scope of air space control of low and very low altitudes, as well as to secure fundamental needs of the Polish Armed Forces on personnel strategic air transport, weapon and military equipment including oversize cargo; participation in

*Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)* which provides monitoring in the regions of possible military conflicts and sending information to ground command control, as well as managing of various command levels in real time;

- participation in *Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI)* within the Russia-NATO Council constituting an important support tool of fighting against air terrorism and of building mutual trust in NATO-Russia relations.

### **1.1.2. Development of the EU capabilities to perform comprehensive actions in the field of crisis response**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Harmonisation of the EU development abilities shall increase cooperation between civil and military components of member states. Proposed undertakings are part of conducted activities and ability development projects, and fulfil the obligations undertaken by Poland.

#### Main activities

- support of initiatives eliminating shortages in key military and civil crisis management capabilities, including Weimar Initiative within the scope of the Common Security and Defence Policy;
- active participation of Poland in *Pooling & Sharing* initiative;
- support of constitution of the EU platform enabling to acquire new defence abilities;
- stimulation of development of efficient institutional structure of the EU responsible for development of capabilities and crisis management in the spirit of Weimar Initiative and within the Common Security and Defence Policy;
- support for European Defence Agency development and strengthening its role as a coordination and planning forum for the EU military abilities development;
- development of EU capacity for rapid response through increasing readiness to use battle groups;
- strengthening of civil and military cooperation, including harmonisation of planning mechanisms, conduct of operations and capabilities development;
- increase in the number of Polish civil and military experts working in structures of the Common Security and Defence Policy (in institutions and participating in operations);
- increase of number of European armament projects and joint defence orders which ought to be conducted with Poland as an active participant;
- development of cooperation with non-EU states within the Common Security and Defence Policy and different international organisations (including NATO-EU and EU-OSCE cooperation);
- acquisition of full membership of the European Space Agency by Poland;
- compliance of Polish interest in works to create Single European Sky.

### **1.1.3. Development of cooperation with partners from Eastern Europe within NATO and the EU**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Poland supports the strengthening of political dialogue and factual cooperation within the scope of security between eastern European partner countries. Main instrument of tightening these relations is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) NATO programme. Within its scope, the priority is the cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. Cooperation with Russia is however very important for security of the whole Euro-Atlantic area. At the EU forum, our country promotes Polish-Swedish initiative of Eastern Partnership.

Having regard to the above, Poland supports tightening of military cooperation with partner countries.

#### Main activities

- development of relations with Ukraine through political dialogue and continuation of national security cooperation;
- forming political dialogue and practical NATO-Russia cooperation based on precise rules of mutual benefits and transparency;
- maintenance of the 'open door' policy for the Alliance;
- development of factual cooperation between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries within the scope of security and defence, what should supplement initiatives brought about within the eastern policy of the EU.

### **1.1.4 Development of cooperation for energy security on the forum of NATO and the EU**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Defining the role of NATO in energy security at the NATO summit in Bucharest (April 2008) proved adaptation of the Alliance to new security challenges. Poland was one of the main supporters of initiating works in this area. Since the Alliance is not being an organisation specialising in energy security, all action undertaken shall be considered as an added value and be coordinated with initiatives of other entities. This purpose will be served by the Expert Centre (NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security - ENSEC COE), transformed from the NATO Energy Security Centre in Lithuania, which will become conceptual and research back-up facilities for NATO within the scope of energy security, especially within critical infrastructure protection and routes of energy carriers transportation.

#### Main activities

- strengthening of NATO role and abilities within the scope of energy security policy, including the area of energy critical infrastructure protection;
- joint works to increase energy efficiency and to develop renewable energy;
- strengthening of energy solidarity clause;
- establishment of support instruments for development of the EU energy infrastructure;
- EU financial support for building interconnectors between energy networks;
- regulation of issues related to the external energy policy of the EU;
- conduct of activities promoting energy cooperation in Europe.

### **1.1.5. Development of cooperation for cyber security on the forum of NATO and the EU**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Cyber-attacks are an increasing threat to stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Certain countries possess capabilities to conduct cyber-attacks and whose level might be comparable to conventional armed attacks. For that reason both NATO and the EU have attached great importance to cyber security so that it is on a level considered by the highest political organizations. Security of NATO and EU critical infrastructure depends on their weakest link. It results in necessity of fulfilling standards and requirements of NATO and the EU by national infrastructure.

#### Main activities

- support of initiatives to reinforce NATO and the EU roles and capabilities within the cyber security policy and to equip both organizations with instruments providing aid to other member states (especially small and medium sized countries) which are in danger of cyber-attacks;
- support of actions for including issues of cyber security in current planning works of NATO;
- cooperation reinforcement between NATO and the EU within the scope of cyber security, especially in the field of critical infrastructure protection of civil sectors (such as communication, energy, transportation and finances);
- active participation of Poland in establishing and functioning of elements of cyber security structure of the EU and allied countries;
- improvement of rules and mechanisms of in-department and inter-departmental cooperation, including the Internal Security Agency and the Ministry of National Defence;
- inclusion of new elements arising from NATO and the EU works on the cyber security policy in the Cyberspace Security Policy of the Republic of Poland.

#### **1.1.6. Support of effective mechanisms of cooperation between NATO and the EU**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Cooperation of both organisations has been the subject of public discussions for a few years. Progress in this matter depends on the solution of other bilateral political disputes. In course of this discussion, Poland clearly supports cooperation reinforcement between NATO and the EU. Amongst the areas of possible relation improvement, Poland stresses the necessity to strengthen practical cooperation during missions conducted in the same theatre of activity.

#### Main activities

- support of political dialogue between the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General;
- development of the EU and NATO relations through strengthening of operational cooperation and through harmonisation and synchronisation of NATO defence planning and the EU defence capabilities.

### **Re 1.2. Effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation**

#### **1.2.1. Strengthening the strategic partnership with the USA**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Reinforcement and maintenance of already existing relations between the Republic of Poland and the United States of America within the scope of security result from issues the need of joint undertakings in individual and collective security, global peacekeeping and further development of security capabilities necessary to respond appropriately to security risks. The allied mutual position regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destructions and their means of delivery, including ballistic missiles, as a significant threat to world peace and international security resulted in a decision to develop NATO new defence capabilities, inter alia missile defence system. Close cooperation of Poland and the USA includes active participation in development of the aforementioned system and development of national air defence system including elements of the missile defence system. American support for troops of the Polish Armed Forces involved in international military missions is of great importance, especially considering strategic and logistic support. Subsequent element of

integration of the Polish Armed Forces with the Alliance shall be the contribution of the USA into development of the Special Forces and achievement by the Command of Special Forces of the status of the NATO Special Operations Command. Moreover, it is required to develop of relations between Poland and the US on the high level in order to sustain relationship dynamic, develop joint positions regarding key issues of the security policy and provide fulfilment of provisions of the Declaration of Strategic Cooperation<sup>80</sup>.

#### Main activities

- performance of agreements and declarations concluded between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the United States of America regarding the area of strategic cooperation;
- permanent presence of US military forces in Poland represented by the subdivision of US Air Force (AVDET);
- reaching of full operational readiness of the base of missile defence system (by 2018);
- soliciting US support for contingents of the Polish Armed Forces involved in international missions and for the Special Forces to fulfil the requirements;
- continuation of key forms of cooperation and political and military dialogue between Poland and the US, i.e. Strategic Dialogue, works within the scope of SCCG - Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group<sup>81</sup> and HLDG - High Level Defence Group<sup>82</sup>.

### **1.2.2. Allied cooperation aimed at developing strong relations with chief partners: France, Germany and Great Britain**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

One of the bilateral military cooperation priorities is to strengthen relations between leading European countries. The main goal is to strengthen European defence and international position of Poland.

#### Main activities

- continuation and intensification of defence cooperation;
- launching of bilateral and multilateral projects;
- seeking common grounds for defence industry business;
- establishment of mutual support of international forums (NATO and the EU);
- regular consultations between NATO and the EU Member States on delivery of conventional technologies to the non-NATO countries.

### **1.2.3. Development of cooperation within the Weimar Triangle**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Dialogue within the Weimar Triangle is directed to develop cooperation with key partners of Poland within the scope of defence. Conducting of planned initiatives ought to improve relations between NATO and the EU, as well as development of crisis response capabilities, improvement of civil and military cooperation and strengthening of cooperation with partners.

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<sup>80</sup> *The Declaration of Strategic Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Poland of August 20, 2008*

<sup>81</sup> SCCG shall complete the Strategic Dialogue and plan cooperation development in the strategic dimension. The meetings are held on average twice a year on the level of the Undersecretaries of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Department.

<sup>82</sup> Pursuant to provision of *the Polish-American Declaration of Strategic Cooperation of 2008*, HLDG is a forum where the directions and priorities of bilateral cooperation in the defence dimension are established. The sessions take place on average twice a year on the level of the Undersecretaries of State of the Ministry of National Defence and the US Department of Defence.

The significant element of cooperation is to include in the political dialogue the subject matter of Eastern Europe which will increase regional security.

#### Main activities

- development of joint positions in key issues of security;
- support of mutual initiatives of defence industries;
- conducting dialogue with the Eastern European states without institutionalised cooperation within the scope of the Weimar Triangle;
- support of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU through mutual initiatives such as establishing the Weimar Battle Group.

### **1.2.4. Development of cooperation within the Visegrad Group**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The Visegrad Group is an important cooperation and interoperability platform for Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in the region of Central Europe and within the European Union and NATO. The group unites countries that share similar challenges and interests, therefore the group possesses natural ability to create intra-EU coalitions to articulate solutions beneficial for the Group. Reinforcement of the Visegrad Group, especially its strength and unity, is, from the perspective of Poland, an important element of fulfilment of Polish national interest within Central Europe and in the wider scope of foreign policy. Hitherto meetings of the Visegrad Group indicate concurrence of opinions regarding functioning of NATO and the EU. Current cooperation is mostly political and concentrates on information and experience exchange within the scope of NATO and the EU. Military cooperation is restricted and includes joint military training, exchange of operational experiences, transforming initiatives and mutual support within multinational military units in NATO and the EU. Currently undertaken actions are directed to provide cooperation of the Visegrad Group with more practical scope. Another direction of the development is to open the Visegrad Group for cooperation with other countries (Eastern Europe, Baltic countries, South-Eastern Europe).

#### Main activities

- development of mutual positions represented on international forums;
- support of mutual initiatives of defence industries;
- maintenance of regular high-level contacts;
- sustaining dialogue with Eastern European partners (Russia and Ukraine) without institutionalising the cooperation framework within the Visegrad Group;
- cooperation to provide energy solidarity and stronger economic and energy connections;
- constitution of the Visegrad Battle Group and stronger operational cooperation of the armed forces;
- development of relations with Bulgaria and Romania.

### **1.2.5. Development of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Security situation in the Baltic Sea region remains stable. With exception of Russia, all states of the region are the EU Member States. Most of them simultaneously belong to NATO or cooperate closely with the Alliance what helps to preserve stability in the region. Problems existing in the Baltic Sea region concern mainly the non-military aspects of security. They involve energy, environmental and social issues connected with Schengen border.



#### Main activities

- development of regional cooperation within the Council of the Baltic Sea States;
- strengthening bonds of alliance and partnership with countries of the region;
- exchange of experiences in the field of energy and ecological security;
- tightening of military cooperation with countries of the region and respecting the specifics and different status of particular Baltic Sea region states.

#### **1.2.6. Development of cooperation with eastern neighbours of Poland within bilateral and multilateral relations**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

By virtue of its geographical location, Poland should maintain amity and partnership with its neighbours. Such cooperation is of our national interest and serves improvement of regional security. Establishing a partner cooperation with eastern neighbours of Poland is crucial for national security. The eastern border of Poland constitutes also the eastern border of NATO and the EU. Considering the above, development of military cooperation between Poland and member states of political and military alliances other than NATO contributes to increase of security, confidence and stability of our region.

#### Main activities

- establishment of relations strengthening the position of Poland in the region with reference to development of its strategy both in the Euro-Atlantic and eastern dimension;
- support of cooperation between Ukraine and European and Euro-Atlantic structures;
- development of mechanisms aimed at building mutual confidence between Poland and Belarus;
- establishment of multidimensional, partner cooperation with Russia, including development of mechanisms aimed at building mutual confidence between the Republic of Poland and Russia and cooperation within European and Euro-Atlantic mechanisms;
- development of cross-border cooperation with Russia and Belarus;
- promotion of new transparency rules in the arms trade, including exchange of information concerning armament purchase abroad and its delivery to regions of increased risk;
- establishment of a unit with participation of Eastern Partnership states available for international operations performed on the United Nations Security Council's mandate;

#### **1.2.7. Development of friendly relations with countries from other regions of the world**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

South Caucasus region gains an increasingly important strategic significance which manifests in growing political, military and economic engagement of the USA, Russia and other countries. Poland, as a member of NATO and the EU, ought to play an active part in strengthening of security and stability of the region. South Caucasus is also perceived as an alternative region in the field of acquiring fuels, what results in its being crucial for Polish and European energy security.

#### Main activities

- development of expert cooperation with South Caucasus states, increasing their involvement in European and Euro-Atlantic cooperation mechanisms, including continuation of projects practically supporting the transformation process of the

Georgian Armed Forces (i.a. internships within the scope of NATO programme of development of the civil service employed in Georgian security institutions);

- continuation and development of cooperation with Israel through Strategic Dialogue, Polish-Israeli Joint Commission for Defence Industries Cooperation, Polish-Israeli Work Group (Annual Meeting) and through activation of work subgroups for specific projects;
- conclusion of approximately 50 international agreements in the field of defence, especially with countries of Europe, Southeast Asia, Southern America and with international organisations as well as agreements on military and technical cooperation;
- development of cooperation with BRICS members<sup>83</sup>.

### **Re 1.3. Increase of efficiency of international law and institutions**

#### **1.3.1. Increase of efficiency of international law**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Dynamic development of military technology and types of weapons, both conventional and of mass destruction results in efforts to control this process. The end of the Cold War brought about intensification in this area. Such activities concern restriction of proliferation and prevention of consequences of weapons usage that may effect in excessive suffering of civil population (humanitarian law). Therefore, development of international law contributes to improvement of security, both in bilateral and multilateral relations. It also influences mollification of results of military actions in relation to civil population.

##### Main activities

- striving for development of legal norms on the international level;
- undertaking of actions aimed at provision of full universalisation of the established treaty and legal norms and agreements;
- introduction of international law acts into the internal legal order (establishment of adequate executive mechanisms at the national level).

#### **1.3.2. Support of increase of UN efficiency**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

The UN is the only organisation of global reach functioning to provide world peace and security. The United Nations Security Council is legitimised to exert political, military and economic pressure in case of threats to or violation of peace or in the event of aggression. A fundamental challenge to the UN is an effective reaction to modern threats from non-state entities, i.a. terrorism and international organised crime.

To enhance efficiency of the UN, it is crucial for the organisation to carry out a complex reform of its system, aimed at improving activity of the organisation, including revitalisation of the UN General Assembly and a reform of the UN Security Council. From the perspective of the Republic of Poland, it is crucial to support the process of tightening the EU-UN cooperation for security, above all in the field of crisis management, conflict prevention and improvement of effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Provision of efficient protection of civilians and implementation of the concept of *the Responsibility to Protect*<sup>84</sup> is crucial in this context. An indication of activity of Poland and the EU in this field is the Political and Security

<sup>83</sup> Association of states: Brazil, Russia, India, China, the Republic of South Africa.

<sup>84</sup> Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005, understood as readiness of the international community to take a general action through the Security Council, based on chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Committee's acceptance of the document concerning increase of effectiveness of the EU actions on the UN forum on international peace. Its most crucial element is provision of a better coordination of actions and improvement of information exchange between the EU structures and the representative offices in New York and Geneva.

#### Main activities

- support of initiatives for improving the role of the UN in the field of peacekeeping and international security and improving the role of the UN Security Council in the same field;
- participation in peacekeeping operations performed under the auspices of the UN;
- support of the efficiency of the UN in responding to threats resulting from economic underdevelopment, uneven distribution of goods and unresolved social problems;
- support of cooperation of the UN with NATO and with the EU, including striving to draw up a unified standpoint of the EU in the UN;

### **1.3.3. Actions for reinforcing the OSCE**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

OSCE is an important element of the European security system, on the forum of which a dialogue and discussion take place between 56 states on economic, political and military issues and on the human dimension (democratisation processes, the rule of law and human rights) which are the three dimensions of OSCE. It is a basis for solving conflicts in the area of OSCE states and for works on responding to new threats to security.

#### Main activities

- active engagement in current OSCE actions, suggesting initiatives and actions that Poland could undertake on the forum of the Organisation;
- undertaking activity aimed at maintaining the role of OSCE as an important element of European security system, maintaining active participation in actions connected with pursuing new vision of relations in the field of security of the Euro-Atlantic region and revitalisation of the Organisation as a key element of security in the field of preventing and solving conflicts (especially within realisation of agreements of the Summit in Astana);
- maintenance of a close cooperation with key partners in the EU and NATO, active participation in establishing common standpoints on matters of highest importance for the OSCE.

### **Re 1.4. Strengthening international instruments in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, means of their transportation and global disarmament**

#### **1.4.1. Support of initiatives for maintaining and developing international instruments in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of their delivery, including responding to possibility of its acquisition and use by terrorists**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Acquiring weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery by new states or non-state entities may have a negative influence on international security, both in regional and global dimension. In order to minimise the risk of proliferation of WMD, it is crucial to develop the discipline of non-proliferation of WMD and means of their transportation. The risk of its

proliferation results mainly from readiness of some states to produce crucial materials, technology and knowledge accessible to ineligible entities and also from insufficient protection of these materials and technologies which may consequently facilitate their illegal acquisition. The threat of possible use of WMD by terrorists is one of the greatest threats to international security and the results of a potential attack could contribute to destabilisation of international situation. Improvement of the rules of non-proliferation and active responding to proliferation of WMD is a priority for the international community in this field.

#### Main activities

- support of expansion of legal international base which will be a foundation for responding to proliferation of WMD in the international field;
- undertaking actions for improvement and universalisation of mechanisms aimed at preventing from proliferation of WMD and illegal transfer of materials and technologies of dual-use;
- striving for development of legal regulations and state executive mechanisms aimed at preventing from proliferation of WMD, means of their transportation, materials and technologies of dual-use;
- undertaking actions aimed at improving protection of materials and technologies that might be used to produce WMD;
- active participation in international organisations and institutions, especially the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE and bilateral cooperation with NATO and the EU partners and third countries;
- non-military actions (technical and development aid, cross-cultural and interfaith dialogue).

#### **Re 1.5. Attention to efficiency and development of control of conventional armament, disarmament and measures of confidence establishment and security**

The control regime of armament and means of confidence establishment and security in Europe, adopted in the second half of the last century and in force since early nineties, proved to be effective. Diplomatic actions from the end of the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century are aimed at adopting them to current international conditions. A discussion on their modernisation is currently in progress.

#### **1.5.1. Proper execution of existing solutions and seeking new, effective solutions and means of cooperation for confidence establishment and security in Europe**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Agreements on the control of conventional armaments, disarmament and means of building confidence and security in Europe are a crucial element of the system of security and cooperation between European states. Abiding by and full realisation of the hitherto accepted agreements remain a guarantee for maintaining stability and security in Europe in the field of inter-state relations. Discussions on the future of armament control regimes are presently in progress, what can conduce to their use on a regional and sub-regional scale and also outside Europe.

A key international document on measures of confidence establishment and security (CSBMs – *Confidence and Security Building Measures*) is *the Vienna Document* of 1999. Alongside with it, the CSBMs system was supplemented by *the Treaty on Open Skies* of 1992.

### Main activities

- abiding by commitments and regulations of restricting military actions established in *the Vienna Document of 1999*;
- organisation of broader observation of military actions performed in a scale under the limits obliging to introduce observers;
- thorough participation in exchange of information;
- comprehensive use of quota of active verification undertakings;
- active participation in negotiations on updating the catalogue of measures of building confidence and security and other OSCE documents in this field, including modernisation of *the Vienna Document of 1999* and of *the Code of Proceedings on Political and Military Aspects of Security*.

### **1.5.2. Striving for maintaining multilateral mechanisms of control of armament and disarmament and their further development**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Excessive accumulation of armament by countries results in destabilisation of security environment and may result in an outbreak of an armed conflict. Armament control enables maintaining the lowest possible level of the military potential, which, pursuant to the concept drawn up within the scope of the UN, is sufficient to protect border integrity, preserve internal order of the state and to participate in peacekeeping missions.

Disarmament mechanisms and control of armament established by *the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)* include quantitative restrictions of armament and equipment, as well as regulations of information exchange and verification procedures (CFE regime). They are supplemented by the rules of observation flights ought to be performed over territories of other countries, provided in the provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies. At the end of 2007, the Russian Federation introduced a unilateral moratorium concerning application of the provisions included in *the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)* and suggested concluding a new act of international law replacing the above mentioned moratorium. Treaty began the series of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic consultations aiming primarily at Russia's return to the CFE regime. The Republic of Poland is interested in maintaining the current regime as well as its amendment complying with the fundamental principles of *the CFE Treaty* which contains also the update mechanisms.

### Main activities

- active participation in dialogue regarding modernisation of the conventional armament control in Europe, in particular *the CFE Treaty*;
- complete use of quota of active verification projects, including observation flights conducted in accordance with the provisions of *the Treaty on Open Skies*;
- striving together with NATO member states to develop a mandate for negotiations enabling to undertake further works to restore functioning of *the CFE Treaty* or to adopt a new regime in the field of conventional armed forces in Europe;
- maintenance of existing armament control regimes, taking into consideration their necessity to be supplemented (since the Cold War the major need in the field of armament control has been to establish transparency and predictability of military activities and to regain trust between countries).

### **1.5.3 Maintenance and improvement of international mechanisms of control of arms trade and export**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The current international arms trade control mechanisms distinguish themselves generally by a regional and limited character. Their main feature is the regime of armament control and the technology of its production (Wassenaar Arrangement) concentrating 40 member states. The availability of weapons on international markets as well as the illegal trade of weapons, result in their vast accumulation. This situation is more possible to occur in the areas of ethnic, economic and ideological conflicts which do not have well-established and widely accepted cultural traditions. Taking that into consideration, the works aimed at adopting and approving the universal *Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)* have been commenced on the United Nations' forum. This treaty will maintain the existing state's rights, resulting from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and will introduce uniform evaluation criteria used in the international arms trade.

#### Main activities

- maintenance of activity of Polish control regimes at the highest possible level;
- assistance for Poland in the field of coordinated activities of the European Union in the process of negotiating *the Arms Treaty Control (ATT)*;
- maintenance of the national export control system at high quality level;
- participation in the international information and promotion programmes for third countries in the field of export control.

### **Re 1.6. Reduction of development differences in the world, support of democracy and respect for human rights**

#### **1.6.1 Increase of efficiency of the Polish development aid**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Eradication of poverty and implementation of the principles of sustainable development, in parallel with advancement of democracy and respect for human rights result from directions of the objectives of the Polish foreign policy complying with their political, economic and security interests. Poland, as a country with rich experience of the process of economic and political transformation, actively supports promotion of human rights. In addition, our country is committed to reduce development differences all over the world through implementation of *the Millennium Development Goals*. Poland accomplishes these objectives both in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with priority countries of Polish development cooperation. Poland is mainly focused on supporting development activities in priority countries where the execution of development co-operation takes place. Development cooperation is pursued in particular through bilateral aid which is granted by Poland to a country being a recipient of development aid and through multilateral aid which is granted via international agencies, institutions and funds.

##### Main activities

- providing support, care and security for victims of the armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disasters by giving them humanitarian assistance;
- achieving of *the Millennium Development Goals* as well as fulfilling international obligations in the field of increasing the volume of resources allocated for development cooperation;

- increase of efficiency of the development aid provided by Poland through coordination of major directions of development activities with other departments participating in the national system of development cooperation.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Objective 2</b> <b>Strengthening of national defence capabilities</b></p>
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The purpose of the Polish security policy, in particular the defence policy, is to develop the defence capabilities providing protection of national interests as well as cooperation with NATO and the EU Member States which aim at counteracting security threats within the Euro-Atlantic Region. Furthermore, it is also important to simultaneously maintain the proper balance between national defence necessities and allied commitments. To face this challenge, it is necessary to develop a modern understanding of national defence and effective forms of national self-involvement in stabilisation of the international situation.

Pursuant to the analysis regarding the external and internal conditions which is included in the diagnosis of the national security system, functioning of the country in a dynamic and complex security environment, where military and non-military threats occur, entails the need to possess and develop the efficient and effective system of national defence. Providing continuity of the country during a political and military crisis or in time of war and establishing a strong position of Poland on the international arena and particularly in NATO and the EU Member States, require professional and modern Polish Armed Forces as well as the effective method of using special services, administrative and economic structures as well as scientific and research potential<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> Provisions of this objective are included in *the Main Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and Preparation for National Defence for the Period 2013–2022* which were issued by the President of the Republic of Poland on November 8, 2011

Priorities and directions of intervention for Objective 2 include:

<b>2.1. Enhancement of capacity of the Polish Armed Forces to carry out mission assignments</b>
2.1.1. Provision of national capability to defend and to counteract aggression within the allied obligations
2.1.2. Participation of the Polish Armed Forces in stabilisation of international situation
2.1.3. Provision of military aid to government bodies during crisis situations of a non-military character
2.1.4. Increase of the potential of modern armament and military equipment including participation in various military programmes
2.1.5. Achievement of interoperability and compatibility by the Polish Armed Forces within NATO and the EU
<b>2.2. Development of organisational structures of the Polish Armed Forces (flexible and efficient organisation)</b>
2.2.1. Improvement of the command structure
2.2.2. Establishment of module structures
2.2.3. Achievement of standards in the field of manning and equipping commands and military units and increase of their availability
2.2.4 Establishment of a modern system of reserves (National Reserve Forces)
2.2.5 Optimisation of the logistic support
2.2.6 Improvement of military health service capacity to provide support for the Polish Armed Forces
2.2.7 Implementation of the Integrated Multilevel IT System in the Ministry of National Defence
<b>2.3. Improvement of the education level of the Polish Armed Forces</b>
2.3.1. Improvement of the educational and vocational training level of professional soldiers
2.3.2. Improvement of the military training and vocational development level of professional soldiers
2.3.3. Development and implementation of innovative concepts and doctrines
2.3.4. Implementation of the Lessons Learned System in the Polish Armed Forces
<b>2.4. Strengthening of national administration and economic structures to function in crisis situations and to support national defence</b>
2.4.1. Improvement of non-military defence preparations
2.4.2. Strengthening of the defence industry
2.4.3. Development of the Host Nation Support (HNS)
2.4.4. Strengthening of the civil and military co-operation (CIMIC)
2.4.5. Establishment of specific system solutions regulating the field of civil defence
<b>2.5. Modification of national defence planning</b>
2.5.1. Modification of defence planning at the strategic level
2.5.2. Modification of planning and programming of development of the Polish Armed Forces
<b>2.6. Efficient promotion of defence</b>
<b>2.7. Development of the modern and productive research and scientific capacity for defence</b>
2.7.1. Adaptation of the organisation and implementation system of scientific and research works to standards of the EU and NATO
2.7.2. Intensification of activities aimed at active participation of Polish research and industrial centres in international armament programmes
<b>2.8. Improvement of reconnaissance capabilities and the capacity to protect against national security threats</b>
2.8.1. Improvement of reconnaissance capabilities, prevention abilities and fighting against internal security threats of the country
2.8.2. Improvement of reconnaissance capabilities at all combat levels within the national, allied and coalition system



## Indicators for monitoring of Objective 2

Indicator	Unit	Value in base year 2010	Value in 2020	Value in target year 2022	Source
<b>Key indicators</b>					
Expenditure on defence expressed per single soldier with reference to average defence expenses per single soldier in European NATO countries (Priorities 2.1-2.3)	Number	0.57	0.7	0.75	<i>The Basic information on the Ministry of National Defence Budget for Next Year</i>
Level of public approval for military in the polls (Priorities 2.1-2.3)	%	70	75	80	The Cyclical Research of Centre for Public Opinion Research Evaluation of Public Institutions
Share of financial means allotted for research and development works in national defence and security regarding national expenses on defence in general (Priority 2.7)	%	1.3	1.8	2	1. <i>The Budget Act</i> 2. <i>The Technical Modernisation Plan for the Polish Armed Forces</i> 3. <i>The Plan of Scientific Researches, Development and Study Works in Ministry of Defence</i>
<b>Additional indicators</b>					
Indicator of NATO Targets carried out in accordance with the "Plan to accomplish NATO Targets for the Republic of Poland for the years 2009 – 2018" (Direction of intervention 2.5.1.)	%	69.1	75	80	<i>The Information on the Status of Accomplishment of NATO Armed Forces Objectives for the Republic of Poland, The Information on the Status of Accomplishment of the Development Programme of the Polish Armed Forces</i>
Number of soldiers of the National Reserve Forces and trained volunteers within the preparatory service, including inter alia preparatory service for the National Reserve Forces (Direction of intervention 2.2.4.)	Number	3,000 - 7,700	20.000 - 26.000	20.000 - 30.000	<i>The Programme of Professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces; The Information on Progress of the Development Programme of the Polish Armed Forces; The Report on Activity of the Military Recruitment Office and the Provincial Military Staff on Soldiers Recruitment to the National Reserve Forces; The Compilation of a Number of Soldiers Trained as Professional Soldiers, Students of in-service training courses and of preparatory service to the National Reserve Forces</i>
Share of financial means allotted for research in the field of defence techniques and technologies in international cooperation, for annual expenditure allocated for this purpose by state institutions (Priority 2.7)	%	13.5	18	20	1. <i>The Action Plan for Achievement of Objectives Provided For in the Strategy of National Defence Activities in Defence Research and Technology</i> 2. <i>The Plan of Scientific Researches, Development Works and Study Works in the Ministry of Defence</i>

<b>Re 2.1. Enhancement of capacity of the Polish Armed Forces to carry out mission assignments</b>
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### **2.1.1. Provision of national capability to defend and to counteract aggression within the allied obligations**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

In order to perform constitutional obligations and allied commitments, the Polish Armed Forces improve their capabilities for defence independence and for territorial integrity of the country and of the allied countries.

#### Main activities

- increase of combat efficiency indicators as a result of modern armament and military equipment implementation;
- restoring and sustaining military stocks and maintenance of mobile logistics;
- improvement of international collaboration within the scope of joint protection of land, air and sea borders;
- improvement of training level;
- improvement of procedures and doctrines.

### **2.1.2. Participation of the Polish Armed Forces in stabilisation of international situation**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Involvement in operations abroad is a tool of the national policy which directly influences forming of the position of Poland on the international arena. The level of the involvement is dependent on the country's abilities resulting principally from the possessed financial, human, physical and organisational resources. The level of military ambition of the Republic of Poland requires maintaining the capacity of the Polish Armed Forces on a quality and quantity level indispensable for efficient deterrence and guaranteeing Poland the defence credibility on the international arena, in particular amongst the allies. It also ought to include increasing expectations of the allies on the Polish contribution to strengthening of regional and global stability.

Experiences gained from participation in the operations abroad unambiguously indicate the increase of significance of non-military actions, including increased activity of non-governmental organisations and agencies, as well as of civil, economic and political instruments. Effective engagement in stabilising the international situation requires implementation of the concept of comprehensive approach to future operations, i.e. integration and achievement of the synergy of using all involved components. To establish conditions for more active and more versatile inclusion of Poland into resolving crisis situations, there are being drawn up *the Regulations and Procedures for Planning, Preparation and Participation of Polish Civil-Military Contingents in Crisis Response Operations Abroad*. Their implementation will contribute to systematisation of the national planning process on the political and inter-ministerial level and to development of legal and financial regulations relating to participation of Polish forces and means in operations abroad.

#### Main activities

- fulfilment of obligations accepted within the scope of NATO defence planning;
- legislative changes facilitating participation of employees and civil experts in missions abroad;

- development of *the Regulations and Procedures for Planning, Preparation and Participation of Polish Civil-Military Contingents in Crisis Response Operations Abroad*;
- focusing the development of the Polish Armed Forces on acquiring capabilities to deploy and sustain in the region of operation.

### **2.1.3. Provision of military aid to government bodies during crisis situations of a non-military character**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The Polish Armed Forces are one of the key elements of the national crisis management system that perform tasks related to supporting public administration institutions in the event of non-military crisis situations. Their experience in such activities and occurrence of new threats indicate a necessity for improvement.

#### Main activities

- provision of compatible means of communication for emergency services, order services and allotted troops/units of the Polish Armed Forces;
- authorisation of compensatory procedures brought about by the activity of the Polish Armed Forces in crisis situations;
- improvement of procedures of providing aid for the Police by troops of the Polish Armed Forces on the basis of *the Act on the Police*<sup>86</sup>, including acceleration of responding by the Polish Armed Forces to the request of providing help for the Police;
- pursuing simplification of procedures activating participation of the Polish Armed Forces in crisis situations;
- preparation and readiness to use means and powers to clear areas off explosives and other dangerous materials, perform ice breaking and flood management actions and liquidate the consequences of natural disasters;
- coordination in the field of cohesion and interoperability of functioning of the systems forming the national system of contamination detection and alerting;
- increasing the level of participation of public administration institutions and emergency services in training at the operational level, conducted by units and institutions of the Polish Armed Forces.

### **2.1.4. Increase of potential of modern armament and military equipment including participation in various military programmes**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Managing challenges and threats requires from the armed forces to be a combination of joint modular components. They must be mobile, network-centric and capable of performing missions in every environment. The ability to carry out any mission or assignment, to act immediately and to strike effectively and precisely will decide about their value. For this purpose, they should be equipped with technologically advanced, combat effective and resilient to threats from cyberspace, highly automated, robotic equipment and armament. To manage the aforementioned, operational capabilities will be developed in the field of: command and control, reconnaissance, engagement, survival and protection of troops, logistic support.

Moreover, school and training systems, as well as logistic ones, ought to be improved. Critical difficulties in acquiring the necessary defence capabilities by Poland reside in high costs of modern armament systems and military equipment as well as in limited capabilities of the national defence industry. The aforementioned factors result in the necessity to seek

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<sup>86</sup> Art. 18a. of *the Act of April 6, 1999 on Police* (Journal of Laws of 2011, No. 287, item 1687, as amended)

alternative methods for developing and obtaining deficit defence abilities, one of which is Polish participation in international programmes under the aegis of NATO and European Defence Agency. Another crucial element of effective modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces is an effective system of acquisition, utilisation and withdrawal of armament and military equipment of the Polish Armed Forces, enabling implementation of armament and military equipment fulfilling the operational requirements with rational management of financial means. Within the scope of managing this system, the Armament Inspectorate was established to carry out the process of acquiring armament and military equipment for the needs of the Polish Armed Forces.

#### Main activities

- acquisition and modernisation of armament and military equipment within the scope of operational and armament programmes;
- increase of contribution of the national industrial defence capabilities to the process of modernising the Polish Armed Forces and improving effectiveness of entities of Polish industrial defence capabilities on the international armament market;
- maximisation of profits gained from participation in international programmes, including financial benefits (reduced costs of acquisition of capabilities), technological benefits (development of R&D units and facilitated transfer of technologies) and, in consequence, industrial benefits (stimulation of economic development and local labour market);
- improvement of the system of acquisition, utilisation and withdrawal of armament and military equipment of the Polish Armed Forces, including: implementation of mechanisms providing more effective management of armament and military equipment life cycle, providing high standards of personnel managing programmes within the training and professional development system, implementation of modern methods of managing programmes and projects, consolidation of ministerial regulations.

### **2.1.5. Achievement of interoperability and compatibility by the Polish Armed Forces within NATO and the EU**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Acquiring interoperability and compatibility by the Polish Armed Forces within the scope of NATO and the EU is the fundamental condition for Poland to obtain credibility in the Alliance within the framework of the common security system.

Interoperability in international environment is achieved primarily through appropriate preparation of staff, troops and units, through achievement of inter-operational, organisational and functional structures capable of performing combined operations. Moreover, it is crucial to establish interoperability of automated command and control systems of means of warfare in the national and allied structure and to maintain and develop systems providing security on battlefields (combat identification, monitoring of troops position).

A practical tool of establishing interoperability is the implementation of NATO Standardisation Agreement (STANAG) which constitutes records of agreements between some or all of NATO member states on using the same or similar military equipment, ammunition, supplies and stock as well as operational, logistic and administrative procedures.

### Main activities

- ensuring a high level of units manning and equipment with armament and military equipment in order to acquire operational capability to undertake a complete spectrum of actions in a short period of time within the scope of a national or allied operation;
- rotational participation of units declared as capable of being deployable in allied training undertakings and subjecting them to the process of national and allied certification in order to achieve required standards;
- successive introduction of national command support systems to the Polish Armed Forces compatible with analogical allied systems within the framework of NATO and the EU;
- defining the conditions providing achievement of standards required by NATO and the EU in the documents containing requirements for armament and military equipment;
- increase of the implementation level of the Standardisation Agreement (STANAG).

<b>Re 2.2. Development of organisational structures of the Polish Armed Forces (flexible and efficient organisation)</b>
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### **2.2.1. Improvement of command and control structures**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Introduction of new combat forms and modern techniques requires a more sophisticated form of planning and supervising military activities. A matter of particular importance becomes efficiency of the system of commanding and controlling the Polish Armed Forces. Taking into account the fact that practically all modern military operations are performed with participation of different services of the Polish Armed Forces (joint operations), it is crucial to fully implement the modern concept of jointness to the command and control system of the Polish Armed Forces.

### Main activities

- formation of consolidated structures of command at the central (strategic) level based on three functions: strategic planning, general command and operational command;
- establishment of transparency of the structure of command authorities through reduction of their number and by shortening the chain of commanding line;
- establishment of an integrated command system compatible with allies and capable of operating in a network-centric environment;
- concentration and integration of organisational units functioning at the strategic and operational level and carrying out similar assignments;
- maximum assimilation of the structure of command and control bodies of the Polish Armed Forces in time of peace, crisis and war;
- implementation of modern methods of commanding and controlling and implementation of decision support systems;
- undertaking actions concentrated on 'quantity-to-quality' transformation (reduction of the number of structures, while investing in development, education and training of personnel and in their selection regarding competence and predisposition to accept specific service positions).

### **2.2.2. Establishment of the module structures**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Current world transformations, especially their pace and challenges for the Polish Armed Forces (preparing them for prompt responding and all types of intervention) result in the fact that it becomes highly desirable to possess units with universal organisational structures, efficiently commanded and supplied, ready to be immediately used in any region of activity.

In the course of alterations, actions will be undertaken, aimed at levelling the hierarchical structure with possibility for it to be supplemented with the elements treated as assignment structures to be formed immediately. Combat units with maximum degree of universalisation and unification will be established, fully prepared to execute autonomous activity and of high independence level.

Construction of such a system will be based on the modular elements providing flexibility and the ability to form groupings of diverse character. On the one hand, they will support a quick adaptation of structures for changing needs of the battlefield, on the other – collision-free and multivariate integration and formation of larger organisational structures. Operational use of units, dependant on the mission's mandate, assignment and local conditions will be capable of taking place partially (in autonomic modules) or as a whole.

#### Main activities

- introduction of modern reconnaissance systems;
- increase of mobility of the army;
- equipping the army with modern systems of command control and real-time battlefield imagery;
- adaptation of doctrines, training programmes and improvement of military training.

### **2.2.3. Achievement of standards in the field of manning and equipping commands and military units and increase of their availability**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

It is necessary for commands and operational units in time of peace to maintain the required indicators<sup>87</sup> of completion of personnel, armament and military equipment and properly placed stock of supplies. Level of completion of military units translates into specific periods of their availability for performance of tasks within the framework of allied operations (forces declared for NATO) and assignments resulting from operational needs of the Polish Armed Forces.

#### Main activities

- increase of the number of highly manned and equipped units (above 90%) capable of undertaking actions within a short period of time without the necessity of their mobilisation development;
- completion of the disposition process of the Polish Armed Forces.

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<sup>87</sup> Levels of these indicators are defined in *ACO Forces Standards – AFS*.

#### **2.2.4. Establishment of the modern system of reserves (National Reserve Forces)**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Reinforcement of the professional army ought be carried out by the reserve forces that may be quickly used in a situation of intensified, military or non-military, threats, related to the necessities of crisis management, including natural disasters and liquidation of their effects, antiterrorist actions, protection of property, search and rescuing or protecting human life and health. Trained reserve soldiers will reinforce the Polish Armed Forces through combining service duties and work obligations. This purpose shall be served by the selected voluntary reserve soldier resources remaining at disposal and with crisis response assignments for specific official positions in military units. The assignments were given as the result of voluntarily concluded contracts to perform military service in the army reserve. The resources are called National Reserve Forces (NRF).

The suspension of obligatory forms of military service reduced the intake of trained reserves. In order to assemble trained reserve soldiers resources, also for the needs of the NRF, the system of volunteer training was established within the scope of preparatory service.

##### Main activities

- recruitment of volunteers for preparatory service and service within the framework of the National Reserve Forces;
- introduction of the modern motivation system for possible volunteers for the NRF and their employers;
- provision of a proper level of training and equipment for the NRF soldiers.

#### **2.2.5. Optimisation of the logistic capacity**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Logistic potential of the Polish Armed Forces requires constant development and cooperation with international logistics and adaptations to the necessities of supported troops. Such optimisation will encompass alterations in the stationary system of logistics support (regional logistic bases and military economic units subjected to them) and logistic mobile capacity.

##### Main activities

- simplification of logistics command, rational use of infrastructure, introduction of modernisation solutions to the field of logistic supplies management and implementation of new technologies regarding supervision of the supplies and storing material means and munitions;
- formation of a modular structure and achievement of the ability of logistic units to perform autonomous operational actions and to support joint, multinational expeditionary operations and tactical development in all climate conditions;
- Entrusting resource management of military infrastructure in garrisons to economy branches;
- reduction of the size of logistic personnel in favour of 10-20 persons for teams of several persons equipped in proper instruments, procedures and funds, enabling more efficient protection of troops (including allied troops) and infrastructure management – performance through outsourcing.

## **2.2.6 Improvement of military health service capacity to provide support for the Polish Armed Forces**

### Description of the issue and justification for action

The mission of the military health service is to provide medical support of troops both at home and abroad. Long-term underfunding of the military health service has resulted in the situation of its possessing only a limited amount of equipment fulfilling the requirements of a modern battlefield and the requirements of NATO in the area of cooperation in multinational environment. Moreover, the shortage of manpower frequently disables performance of some tasks. In its current state, the military health service is not capable of providing troops with effective medical support.

### Main activities

- improvement of work benefits, especially among physicians and doctors, through introducing the system of inducements to remain in service and the training and professional development system which takes into consideration specificity of military;
- implementation of legal acts enabling operation of the military medical security system which takes into account specificity of medical security of the Polish Armed Forces on the territory of Poland and especially during military missions abroad;
- continuation of purchasing modern devices and equipment particularly concentrating on container-tent systems, specialist containers, armoured medevac vehicles (tracked and wheel chassis), new type of special vehicles and sanitary vehicles, new models of individual and collective first-aid-kits;
- combat first aid training for soldiers of combat units (according to the 10-1-2 rule: first aid should be applied within first 10 minutes since injury);
- adaptation of competences of medical personnel to factual tasks and skill levels (military paramedics);
- development of the aeromedical evacuation system at tactical and strategic levels;
- redundant health care potential ought to be transferred out of the Ministry of National Defence.

## **2.2.7. Implementation of the Integrated Multilevel IT System for the Ministry of National Defence**

### Description of the issue and justification for action

The Ministry of National Defence lacks the solutions enabling to obtain current and comprehensive information on resources which may be used by the Polish Armed Forces<sup>88</sup>. Lack of this knowledge impairs effective management of military resources and reaching optimal and rational decisions within the scope of ministry management and armed forces command. Establishment of an effective supply system (restoration of resources) without data on current status of any organisational element of the armed forces and availability of internal resources (within the Ministry of National Defence) and external resources is impossible.

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<sup>88</sup> The resources are understood as logistic, financial and human resources. Management of resources concerns the resources already being a part of the Ministry, planned to be acquired within the framework of performing plans to supply the armed forces and also concerns the resources of national economy planned to be acquired within the framework of mobilisation in crisis and war situations and also the resources acquired within the scope of NATO and the EU.



### Main activities

- establishment and implementation of the integrated, unified IT system supporting logistics, finance and human resources management and simultaneously providing activity standardisation as well as exchange and integration of data between organisational units of the Ministry of National Defence in these fields;
- construction of the mobile version of the Integrated Multilevel IT System for Ministry of National Defence supporting management during training, exercises and participation of the Polish Armed Forces in missions.

## **Re 2.3. Improvement of the education level of the Polish Armed Forces**

### **2.3.1 Improvement of the education and vocational training level of professional soldiers**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

In conditions of professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces, it is necessary to constantly increase the level of professional training for soldiers. Currently, it consists of two forms – postgraduate studies, qualifying courses (which prepare to access substantive higher rank office) and additional courses (preparing to render services in current office). The extremely important factor in professional improvement is increasing of language competence, in particular command of English as it is a basic communication tool in NATO and the EU.

#### Main activities

- continuation to implement undertakings as described in annual professional training schedules for professional soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces as well as undertakings described in schedules of foreign language training and examining in the Ministry of National Defence.

### **2.3.2. Improvement of the military training and vocational development level of professional soldiers**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Training of commanders, headquarter staff and the Polish Armed Forces, including National Reserve Forces, shall be directed at sustaining of required operational capabilities to perform national and allied defence tasks, participating in multinational and allied peacekeeping and stabilisation operations as well as fighting against terrorism and, in the event of non-military crisis situation, supporting public administration bodies in recovery.

Within the scope of exercises, various units of the armed forces are trained to participate in a national joint operations. Thus capabilities of the Operational Command of the Polish Armed Forces to command the forces in joined operations with participation of allied reinforcing force are exercised and improved. Part of training undertakings is the cooperation of the Polish Armed Forces and national non-military defence structures.

Preparation of command, headquarter staff and the Polish Armed Forces for assignment performance within the framework of NATO and the EU is implemented within the scope of allied and partner training undertakings.

#### Main activities

- acquisition of capability to command subordinated armed forces through the use of automated command and control systems;
- focusing the training of command organisations on training of combat systems;
- improvement of the new three-year Polish Armed Forces training model;

- acquisition and implementation of modern integrated training systems;
- development of components of the Polish Armed Forces assigned for NATO Response Force and the EU Battle groups;
- use of allied training centres and centres of excellence;
- improvement of training and methodology in training;
- improvement of collaboration of the Polish Armed Forces and national non-military defence entities, especially within the scope of crisis response and defence against terrorism;
- increase of training effectiveness through use of modern simulation equipment, including computer based training systems (e-learning) and development of training simulation centres;
- extending the use of simulators and other training devices based on modern technologies;
- preparation of command organisations to carry out assignments in network-centric environment;
- adaptation of structures and of education and training equipment within the scope of development requirements (implemented technology) to provide implementation of training through preservation of training realism and reasonability of costs;
- implementation into the Polish Armed Forces, together with new weapons and military equipment, of training packages providing complete security of didactic measures and designed to train and educate personnel of the Polish Armed Forces.

### **2.3.3. Development and implementation of innovative concepts and doctrines**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The national and allied operational standardisation area, which supports training process, is one of the principal elements ensuring the achievement and maintenance of expected force interoperability and capabilities necessary for joint activity within the scope of national, multinational and allied operations.

#### Main activities

- centralisation of the operational standardisation process and development of doctrines and doctrinal documentation within the scope of functioning of the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces;
- development of doctrine and doctrinal document drafts by the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces (following alterations in the Alliance and necessities of the Polish Armed Forces) and their implementation;
- participation in works of boards, groups and work panels of NATO HQ and of the EU in the field of operational standardisation;
- development of new concepts and ideas of conducting trainings and undertakings as well as their verification through experiments;
- cooperation of the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces with similar institutions of NATO, the EU, the Alliance member states and other countries.

### **2.3.4. Implementation of the Lessons Learned System in the Polish Armed Forces**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The Lessons Learned System in the Polish Armed Forces is a tool designed to support command and operational capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces as well as their functioning in

time of peace by introducing alterations and promoting the best solutions in a particular area<sup>89</sup>. The principal assignments are the following: obtaining and analysing of information referring to the operational capabilities gained during participation of the forces in operations, implementation of training process and other resulting from activity of the Polish Armed Forces; drawing up conclusions and recommending solutions and popularising the accepted changes; managing database information.

#### Main activities

- improvement of the Lessons Learned System in the Polish Armed Forces based on uniformed and universal process of a lesson learned system, permanent system structures (Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces) and professional education of personnel;
- development of process of learning lessons which encompasses stages of: identification and observation, analysis, improvement of corrective measures and appointment of tasks; implementation and monitoring, verification – determination of efficiency of corrective measures.
- development of specialist information system and appropriate conceptual apparatus supporting functioning of the Learning Lessons System in the Polish Armed Forces.

### **Re 2.4. Strengthening of national administration and economic structures to function in crisis situations and to support national defence**

#### **2.4.1. Improvement of non-military defence preparations**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Non-military defence preparations are necessary to provide survival and proper functioning of the state, including support of the Polish Armed Forces and the allied reinforcing force in the event of external national security threat and in the event of war. For this area, appropriate legal and organisational solutions were designed. Regarding the dynamic character of contemporary threats, variable economic conditions and professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces, this area requires constant improvement. Optimisation of non-military defence preparations shall be conducted to increase their effectiveness, adequacy, unity and coordination of actions.

#### Main activities

- improvement of logistic support and of the system of technical national security management through systematic increase of competence and abilities of the entities as well as through development of technical infrastructure of management system;
- establishment within administrative bodies and the Polish Armed Forces of the unified IT database on available defence resources accessible for the requirements of the allied reinforcing force;
- developing solutions to improve economy mobilisation through designing legal mechanisms enabling to adapt the scope of assignments, as described in the Economy Mobilisation Programme, to variable needs of the national defence system, moreover to develop procedures of fast acquiring of goods both on internal and international market and explicit distinction of authorisations and competences of state administrative bodies within the scope of economy mobilisation;
- improvement of functioning of the defence training system within the state, including provision of regularity and effectiveness of practical defence training, especially

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<sup>89</sup> The Guidelines of Deputy Chief of General Staff of The Polish Armed Forces of May 23, 2011 on Organisation and Functioning of the Lessons Learned System in the Polish Armed Forces.

national and regional trainings conducted jointly with the 'Anakonda' multilevel operational Polish Armed Force exercise. Moreover, increasing involvement of non-military structures in military defence exercise and training as well as increasing participation of persons on state executive posts in defence trainings within the framework of High Level Defence Courses;

- development of the audit formula of defence task performance extending them by practical elements in order to verify factual preparation of non-military structures in the event of external threat to national security and in time of war;
- development of the mechanism enabling collaboration of experts and entrepreneurs to conduct, in enterprise of the entrepreneurs, defence preparations allowing to obtain and maintain an expected level of production and services in time of war.

#### **2.4.2. Strengthening of the defence industry**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

In the package of factors supporting development of industrial defence capabilities, the support of manufacturing operations and exporting operations of that sector will be of great significance. This activity ought to establish conditions to increase competitiveness and innovative levels of industrial defence capabilities in an extent that provides satisfaction of all necessities of the national security sphere (in priority technological areas) as well as to enable to strengthen the position of national armament and military equipment providers on the international weapon market and enable to intensify their presence on the European defence equipment market.

In order to increase the research and development activities for national defence and security as well as to provide close cooperation between weapon and military equipment manufacturers and research institutes, the consolidated research and development base shall be constituted. Simultaneously, it is significant to increase funding for R&D in priority areas of military technology.

Regarding development of industrial defence capabilities and as specified in the diagnosis, it is most important to transfer innovative technologies between military and civil sectors. It is necessary to increase the use of development capacity of this flow, especially to undertake actions stimulating the flow of knowledge, human and equipment resources between military and civil sectors.

##### Main activities

To effectively support industrial defence, the consolidated structure of national industrial defence capabilities and reinforcement of supporting mechanisms and financial instruments ought to be developed. The following will be necessary to succeed:

- adaptation of production capacity as well as of research and development aspects of defence industry to the needs of national recipients and to the export opportunities;
- development and implementation of the weapon and military equipment acquisition system enabling foreseeable and stable ordering procedure from the Ministry of National Defence;
- coordination of the science and research policy and development works within the scope of weapon and military equipment;
- extension of product portfolio of industrial defence capabilities within the scope of modern weapon and military equipment;
- location of offset obligations in Polish defence industry to acquire necessary capabilities securing fulfilment of fundamental security and defence interests of the country;

- introduction to off-set agreements of obligations related to carrying out programmes important to national security and defence;
- introduction of Polish entities into creation of an innovative and competitive base of European defence technology and industry;
- defining institutional and legal framework enabling the transfer of military technologies to the civil sector and the activity limiting barriers for such transfer.

### **2.4.3. Development of the Host Nation Support (HNS)**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

In the event of a threat to external security, the Republic of Poland may rely on the support of the North Atlantic Alliance provided by the introduction of the allied reinforcing force. After their arrival in Poland, they will require a broadly understood support within the scope of: access to the infrastructure, transport, materiel resources, services and in many other fields inseparably related to an effective performance of a military mission by the armies stationing on the territory of our country. Moreover, while fulfilling the obligations resulting from the Article 5 NAT, the Polish Armed Forces of the Alliance may move throughout Poland's territory to carry out an operation on a territory of another NATO member state. Therefore, the actions undertaken to prepare Poland for carrying out tasks deriving from obligations of the host-nation (HNS) denote specific challenges for all the country's organisational structures, both in the civil and military dimension.

Effective cooperation between the Polish Armed Forces and the civil environment requires establishment of proper contacts (mutual relations) between them and development of rules for that cooperation.

#### Main activities

- asserting formal and legal solutions for carrying out tasks stemming from the host-nation's function and the necessity for coordination of civil and military actions;
- preparing infrastructure to secure hosting of the allied reinforcing force;
- introducing compatible electronic databases of the state's resources which may be assigned for the needs of the Allied Reinforcement Forces, including databases of civil experts;
- establishing HNS Points of Contact and implementing documents (guides, instructions) providing conditions for proper performance of HNS tasks.

### **2.4.4. Strengthening of the civil and military co-operation (CIMIC)**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

In time of peace, crisis and war, troops and units of the Polish Armed Forces will, while participating in the operations at home or abroad, be carrying out the assignments in a direct contact with the civil environment, understood as governmental, self-government and non-governmental organisations, international institutions and civil population of the region in which the operation is being executed. Successful operations highly depend on the capability to properly establish cooperation with the civil environment. The collaboration will concentrate on enabling to use civil resources to maintain the capability to continue the operations, supporting the civil environment in the critical fields and on mutual exchange of information.

#### Main activities

- continuous improvement of the structures responsible for civil-military cooperation;

- maintaining in readiness forces and means crucial for fulfilling the allied obligations, accepted within the scope of civil-military cooperation;
- establishing regulations of cooperation procedures.

#### **2.4.5. Establishment of specific system solutions regulating the field of civil defence**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

A significant area of national security is civil defence<sup>90</sup>, concentrated on protection of population, workplaces, public utility devices, cultural goods, rescuing and providing help to victims of wars. Former solutions of this area were inadequate<sup>91</sup> and not exhausting all of the assignment fields. The regulations do not unambiguously specify the tasks of civil defence, performed in time of peace, confining themselves exclusively to planning, organising and training activity and to disseminating knowledge on the subject. It was partly brought about by the revocation of the Article 140 of the *Act on Common Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland* which constituted the statutory delegation for the Council of Ministers to issue a regulation specifying obligations and rights of the authorities in civil defence, matters of formation of civil defence and signals of elementary warning and alerting. The revocation of the mentioned article and the lack of any new regulation as its substitute significantly limited the ability to perform the tasks within the scope of civil defence.

##### Main activities

- introducing solutions to maintain continuity of responsibility for protection of the population in any situation, including the state of war;
- precise regulation of civil defence actions and introducing new solutions in this field requires preparing adequate legislation amendments. A legal document ought to be drawn up and it would order competence and tasks of all bodies of public administration, public institutions, voluntary organisations and other entities obliged to carry out assignments in the field of civil defence.

### **Re 2.5. Modification of national defence planning**

Defence planning is a process of shaping national defence system enabling to set and achieve goals in the field of defence, encompassing stages of planning, programming and budgeting, the process of their supervision and evaluation as well as operational planning. National defence planning concerns the Polish Armed Force, administrative and economic structures and is harmonised with allied planning. Paying attention to the necessity of adapting the process to changing conditions, including correlation with the system of managing national development and NATO defence planning, is necessary to improve the national defence planning. It ought to be concentrated on enhancing its transparency and cohesion, above all, at the strategic level and with reference to the Polish Armed Forces.

#### **2.5.1. Modification of defence planning at the strategic level**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Defence planning on the strategic level is the initial stage of drawing up strategic solutions in the area of national defence. It is a long-term process requiring cohesion of objectives both in

<sup>90</sup> The subject of civil defence in the legal and international aspect is regulated by *the Additional Protocol (First) for Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 of Protection on International Victims of Armed Conflicts*, of which the official party since 19<sup>th</sup> September 1991 has been Poland.

<sup>91</sup> *The Act on Universal Obligation nie wstawiono : Common Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland and its Executive Acts*

the field of politics and in achieving expected defence capabilities by the elements of the national defence system, adequate to existing and anticipated threats resulting from dynamically changing security environment. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a uniform legal and creative ground for every undertaking related to defence planning and a necessity to undertake actions improving cohesion and efficiency of the planning process.

Important elements of defence planning are NATO Targets which are the basic tool in achieving the assumed level of ambition by the Alliance and in developing defence abilities by its member states. NATO Targets for the Republic of Poland are the collectively negotiated set of Poland's requirements and commitments, concerning development and gaining capabilities as well as allotting the forces to the common forces of NATO, predicted to be used in a given period of time. Its fulfilment is a Polish contribution to asserting capabilities of the Alliance to perform tasks of NATO and a practical tool in forming modern and professional Polish Armed Forces.

#### Main activities

- adopting the SRSBN RP as an initial document for national defence planning;
- limiting the number of binding defence planning documents of a strategic character;
- specifying the extent of competence of particular entities participating in the process of defence planning;
- improving the process of agreeing and achieving NATO Targets for the Republic of Poland;
- enhancing cohesion of military and non-military defence planning, i.a. by establishment of a mechanism providing a more efficient coordination of works related to specifying and updating the needs of the Polish Armed Forces and the allied forces satisfied by the non-military defence structures.

### **2.5.2. Modification of planning and programming of development of the Polish Armed Forces**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Planning development of the Polish Armed Forces encompasses a set of concept and planning activities undertaken to set the directions of forming and modernising the Polish Armed Forces identified with respect to achieving, maintaining and developing the required operational capabilities. Planning of the development of the Polish Armed Forces is concentrated on actions fundamental for gaining specific capabilities in the field of doctrines, organisational structure, training courses, technical modernisation, leadership, educating and training human resources, infrastructure and interoperability<sup>92</sup>. The need for improvement of both processes was identified in the course of work of the Ministry of Defence.

#### Main activities

- developing the procedures of defining priority needs of the Polish Armed Forces;
- concentrating the planning and programming of development of the Polish Armed Forces on achieving specific operational capabilities;
- using risk analyses when programming development of the Polish Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland;
- considering a long-term perspective in developing the Polish Armed Forces.

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<sup>92</sup> On the basis of the NATO DOTMLPFI concept (*Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability*).

## **Re 2.6. Efficient promotion of defence**

### Description of the issue and justification for action

The process of professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces and changes in the nature of assignments carried out by them, may result in loosening of bonds between army and society, or even, in a further perspective, in alienation of the army and in perceiving it as a closed, hierarchical business corporation. Therefore, both now and in future, it becomes highly important to present the Polish Armed Forces to large groups of receivers and to emphasize its missions, targets and assignments in the interest of the Republic of Poland and Polish citizens. Developing a positive image of the Polish Armed Forces as an organisation transforming into a modern and professional army needs to serve the purpose of establishing social acceptance for changes introduced in the Polish Armed Forces and to facilitate obtaining best candidates for the military service.

Changes in the media environment and development of technologies in the field of communication, require adaptation and enhancement of the used promotional tools. Global audience, interactivity, multimedia transmission and development of mobile technologies are becoming the attributes of new communicational processes. Possessing a wide spectrum of multimedia materials aimed at the most significant groups of receivers and having a system enabling an efficient promotional transmission of the Polish Armed Forces is crucial for developing the image and the brand of a 21st century army.

### Main activities

- promotional activity will include development of a positive image of Polish soldiers, the Polish Armed Forces and the Ministry of National Defence, both in the country and abroad;
- if promotional campaigns are necessary, they will be pursued to support the process of recruitment for the candidate service, preparatory service, professional military service and service within the National Reserve Forces. Such campaigns will deliver regular promotional actions. A crucial aspect for the promotion of defence is to establish the cooperation with social, media and institutional partners.

## **Re 2.7. Development of modern and productive research capacity for defence**

### **2.7.1. Adaptation of the national R&D organisation and implementation system to the EU and NATO standards**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The current model of acquiring armament and military equipment in the Ministry of National Defence respects the necessity for research in the field of defence technologies and techniques to a very small extent. A great challenge is to properly identify needs of future users. In most of the cases, the necessity for research stems directly from the R&D environment. Such attitude is not improper in principal, however it should possess a supplementary character for the needs defined by the users. Also the scale of financing individual projects and R&D programmes by the state-run institutions is insufficient as well as lack of adequate structures for managing the projects/programmes.



### Main activities

- introducing in Poland selected solutions, already implemented in other EU and NATO member states, in a manner which considers the personnel and financial capacity of Polish institutions;
- drawing up the regulations on using research outcomes in the process of acquiring armament and military equipment;
- establishing mechanisms facilitating implementation of elaborated technologies into production and into equipment of the Polish Armed Forces;
- close cooperation between producers and end-users ought to be guaranteed within the research performed in the field of defence technologies and techniques, what will provide concurrence between the outcome of the research and expectations;
- expenditure on the research and technologies should be increased to 2% of the means spent annually on defence and the number of programmes carried out within the scope of international cooperation to 20% of this amount, according to the provisions of *the European Defence Research and Technology Strategy*.

### **2.7.2. Intensification of activities aimed at active participation of Polish research and industrial centres in international armament programmes**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Polish scientific and industrial entities still involve themselves insufficiently in international programmes and R&D projects. This situation is gradually improving but an even greater engagement is necessary. Participation of representatives of Polish entities in projects carried out in the international formula enables to gain new knowledge and experience, reinforcing their potential and competitiveness at the same time. Involvement in the projects carried out within the international cooperation, such as the EU's *7. Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development*<sup>93</sup>, will reduce the technological gap between Polish entities and their European counterparts.

### Main activities

- establishing mechanisms enabling to increase engagement of Polish R&D and industrial entities in the projects carried out in international environment;
- optimising the use of different sources of financing the projects;
- increasing the level of co-financing of the projects by the entities engaged in their realisation, in particular by industrial entities.

## **Re 2.8. Improvement of reconnaissance capabilities and the capacity to protect against threats to national security**

### **2.8.1. Improvement of recognition abilities, prevention abilities and fighting threats to national security**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Reliable evaluation of the scale of threats by the state authorities and their undertaking of adequate actions to provide national security, require the chief national authorities to

<sup>93</sup> *7. Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development of the EU* is the fundamental instrument of achieving the strategic objective indicated by *the Lisbon Strategy - transformation of the EU into the most dynamic competitive and knowledge based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth*. Its budget for 2007-2014 amounts to EUR 54bn. The programme is a tool for supporting transnational R&D collaboration, i.a. in the thematic fields of: information and communication technologies; nanoscience, nanotechnologies, materials and new production technologies; transportation, including aeronautics; cosmic space; security.

possess credible data. Considering the character of the information, their obtaining remains mainly in the sole competence of the special security services, both civil (Internal Security Agency and Intelligence Agency) and military (Military Counterintelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service). Improvement of reconnaissance capabilities of recognition, prevention and fighting contemporary threats are carried out by diverse initiatives at the operational, organizational and even legal level. These are usually applicable to the current procedures of conduct, structural changes within special services or participation in the law and rulemaking process regarding national security of the Republic of Poland. Cooperation with national and international partners is a significant element.

#### Main activities

- developing new methods of monitoring, detecting and fighting threats to national security and new methods of fighting them;
- cooperation with partners within the scope of prevention against threats to internal security;
- systematic improvement of coordination mechanisms of functioning of state agencies responsible for detection and fighting threats to national security.

### **2.8.2. Improvement of reconnaissance capabilities at all command levels within the national, allied and coalition system**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The Polish Armed Forces develop the capability to obtain information about enemy and operational environment. Those activities are aimed at collecting, analysing, accessing, visualising and exchanging data on all command levels.

#### Main activities

- development and technical modernisation of defence reconnaissance system;
- integration of services reconnaissance systems with command and weapon systems on all command levels;
- standardisation of reconnaissance procedures in accordance with ratified and implemented standardised documents of the EU and NATO;
- preparation and participation of reconnaissance units in allied and coalition training, research and development undertakings and more.

<b>Objective 3</b> <b>Development of resilience against threats to national security</b>
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The diagnosis of national security system proved the necessity of critical infrastructure protection and of establishment of modern system of strategic reserves. Intervention priorities and directions grouped around objective 3 are oriented to increase efficiency in this area so as to improve national resilience to military and non-military threats, including emergency situations and unpredictable events.

Priorities and directions of intervention for Objective 3 include:

<b>3.1. Increase of critical infrastructure resilience</b>
3.1.1. Implementation and update of <i>the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme</i>
3.1.2. Implementation of national cooperation mechanism between participants of the critical infrastructure protection system.
3.1.3. Providing security of nuclear power system in Poland
<b>3.2. Optimisation of strategic reserves</b>
3.2.1. Establishment of the strategic reserves system

Indicators for monitoring Objective 3

Indicator	Unit	Value in base year 2009	Value in 2020	Value in target year 2022	Source
Percentage of critical infrastructure protection plans consistent with the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme (Direction of intervention 3.1.1.)	%	0	100	100	Information provided by the Government Security Centre based on the Regulation on Critical Infrastructure Plans

### Re 3.1. Increase of critical infrastructure resilience

#### 3.1.1. Implementation and update of *the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme*

Description of the issue and justification for action

Based upon experience in protection of structures subject to obligatory protection as described in *the Act on Protection of Persons and Property of 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1997*<sup>94</sup> and those subject to special protection as in *the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 24<sup>th</sup> June 2003 on the Objects Particularly Important for Security and National Defence and on their Special Protection*, it proved necessary to supplement the scope of critical infrastructure protection not only with physical protection but also with elements which shall provide its uninterrupted functioning, i.e. technical protection, personal protection, ICT protection and legal protection. Moreover, it indicated weakness of the method used to impose obligations on critical infrastructure operators by acts or regulations, as there is no possibility either to conduct the audit or in any other manner to control fulfilment of those obligations. Regarding the above, critical infrastructure protection shall to a greater extent involve entities that manage the critical infrastructure, yet not through obligations but conscious participation in undertakings aiming at improving safety of systems significant to proper society functioning, by intensification of cooperation between private and public sector within that scope.

<sup>94</sup> Journal of Laws of 2005, No. 145, item 1221, as amended.

### Main activities

- in order to overcome the weaknesses of critical infrastructure protection, the concept described in the *National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme* (NCIPP) ought to be carried out<sup>95</sup>;
- as a primary rule of development of the NCIPP (and of the critical infrastructure protection system), the rule of joint responsibility<sup>96</sup> of public administration bodies and critical infrastructure operators will be adopted. The rule may contribute to increase of efficiency of undertaken actions.
- NCIPP is the element uniting critical infrastructure protection efforts and providing aid to all operators of critical infrastructure and to administration, as it includes the vision of goals and standards of critical infrastructure protection, as well as goals of and standards for cooperation between entities and bodies performing that task.

### **3.1.2. Implementation of national cooperation mechanism between participants of the critical infrastructure protection system.**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Mechanisms of cooperation between participants of the critical infrastructure protection system are decisive of effectiveness and value of the NCIPP. No mechanisms of cooperation between owners of structures significant to national security have existed so far. Implementation and functioning of the cooperation mechanism between participants of the critical infrastructure protection system shall be the practical indication of public and private partnership in this scope. The mechanism is aimed at providing exchange of information between public and private sectors regarding threats against critical infrastructure and support of activity coordination in the event of damage or disturbance in functioning of critical infrastructure. Significant element of the cooperation mechanism is the **Critical Infrastructure Protection Forum**. Its objective is to identify key issues within the scope of critical infrastructure protection and to develop solution proposals. Participants of the forum are representatives of owners and holders of structures, installations and critical infrastructure equipment as well as representatives of public administration.

### Main activities

- strengthening of the cooperation mechanism through intensifying working contacts of the Government Security Centre with representatives appointed by the owners and holders of structures, installations and critical infrastructure equipment – those should be recognised as the so-called points of contact;
- improvement of mechanisms of information exchange and cooperation between public administration bodies, including services, formations and other entities responsible for security and owners and holders of critical infrastructure systems;
- working contacts between the representatives of public administration and the owners and holders of structures, installations or critical infrastructure equipment shall be directed at:
  - coordination support of actions undertaken by public administration, owners and holders of structures, installations or critical infrastructure equipment in the event of damage or disturbance in infrastructure functioning;
  - providing essential support (such as consultancy, training for operators) by public administration entities within the scope of physical and information technology

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<sup>95</sup> Leading institution to develop and implement the *National Critical Infrastructure Protection Program* is the Government Security Centre.

<sup>96</sup> Joint liability shall be understood as joint (shared) pursuit to improve security of critical infrastructure resulting from joint sense of liability for infrastructure and awareness of its significance to functioning of society, economy and in consequence - the state.

protection of structures (entities such as the Internal Security Agency, the Police, the Government Protection Bureau) and within the scope of functions of critical infrastructure internal mechanisms protection and crisis management (the Government Security Centre);

- participation in exercises within the scope of critical infrastructure protection.

### **3.1.3. Providing security of nuclear power system in Poland**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Nuclear facility (installation, power plant, waste depot of nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel, nuclear fuel cycle facilities and others) and occurring in those facilities processes and close environment are subject to requirements of nuclear safety and radiation protection, as well as to requirements of physical protection and safety.

Between physical protection of structures, nuclear materials and nuclear safety and radiation protection must be synergy which shall result from the use of appropriate measures such as: supervision and control within the scope of nuclear safety and radiation protection; design rules; construction, start-up, operation and liquidation of nuclear facility; integrated management system and nuclear materials transportation regulations. Those measures should not collide with the nuclear safety norms. Physical protection includes prevention of theft of nuclear materials and prevention of sabotage threats. In relation to nuclear power plants it denotes securing them from ionising radiation release and from unauthorised leakage of nuclear material, as well as emergency prevention and damage reduction. Nuclear safety requirements at nuclear power plants have been considered of highest importance since the beginning of commercial nuclear power engineering and very frequently more important than economic considerations. Being aware of human unreliability and fortuitous possible breakdowns of installations and nuclear devices, the rule of "in-depth defence" was introduced. Its aim is to design the proper margin of safety, construct from the best available materials in compliance with the highest quality type and performance, to introduce new systems preventing from hazardous deflection of nominal operating parameters and in the event of such deflection - prevention from failure expansion and provision of safe automatic shutdown of a nuclear power station.

#### Main activities

- for *the Polish Nuclear Power Programme* to be effective, secondary legislation to the acts of law introducing the programme ought to be fully implemented;
- revision of the valid nuclear law provides priority of the nuclear facilities security. Therefore, it is necessary to enforce the execution of activities involving exposure to ionising radiation upon compliance by the investor/operator of requirements of nuclear safety, radiation protection, physical protection, security and emergency response, as defined in the implementing regulations, separate regulations and permits issued by the entity performing the nuclear supervision;
- it is also necessary to monitor the alterations associated with the resolution of problems of nuclear safety, including the European Commission conducted tests of existing nuclear installations and properly apply their conclusions in *the Polish Nuclear Power Programme*;
- continuing the transformation of the National Atomic Energy Agency within the scope of functioning of the Polish nuclear power.

## Re 3.2. Optimisation of strategic reserves system

### 3.2.1. Establishment of the strategic reserves system

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Since the entry into force of *the Act on Strategic Reserves*<sup>97</sup>, the classification of reserves and the regulations of functioning of the reserve system have been changed. The new law introduces one type of reserves, which means that the already existing mobilisation reserves designed for fulfilling defence and national security tasks, especially those that satisfied the needs of the armed forces and their exclusive nature, would not function as a separate class of reserves – they would become strategic reserves without dedication for individual ministries.

#### Main activities

- to continue the implementation of a modern system of strategic reserves based on one type of reserves;
- optimisation of the strategic reserve system will be aimed at improving its efficiency, relevance, consistency, and coordination of activities.

#### **Objective 4** **Increase of integration between public policies and the security policy**

The diagnosis of the national security system indicates the presence of numerous interdependencies between national security and socio-economic development. Simultaneously, the activities carried out in these areas are often characterised by insufficient level of correlation and coordination which diminishes their efficiency and cohesion. The aim of this strategy is therefore to increase the integration of public policies with the security policy. The priorities and directions for intervention on the one hand present activities of the security sector, especially defence, aimed at implementation of development policy objectives, on the other hand, they show the possibility to use civil society potential for security<sup>98</sup>.

#### Priorities and directions of intervention for Objective 4 include:

<b>4.1. Integration of socio-economic development and national security</b>
4.1.1. Strengthening of relations between regional development of the country and defence policy
4.1.2. Coordination of activities and procedures of spatial planning respecting requirements of national defence and security
4.1.3. Support for infrastructure development provided by the security sector
4.1.4. Support for environmental protection provided by the security sector
4.1.5. Employment support and unemployment prevention in the security sector
4.1.6. Increasing the quality of education in security sector and integrating higher education of security sector with national and European education systems
4.1.7 National heritage protection and development of cultural infrastructure
<b>4.2. Development of social dimension of national security</b>

<sup>97</sup> The leading institution for development of *the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves* is the Ministry of Economy.

<sup>98</sup> Activity presented in this section refers to the contact strategy of national security and socio-economic development, whereas other aspects of the identified areas of socio-economic development are included in the remaining eight integrated development strategies

4.2.1. Development of civil support for the Polish Armed Forces
4.2.2 Development of social capital for security

#### Indicators for monitoring Objective 4

Indicator	Unit	Value in base year 2010	Value in 2020	Value in target year 2022	Source
<b>Key indicators</b>					
Number of agreements for cooperation with social partners, concluded between the Minister of National Defence and directors of independent organisational entities of the Ministry of National Defence (Direction of intervention 4.2.1)	pcs.	495	600	600	Annual information on the cooperation of the Polish Armed Forces with social partners
<b>Additional Indicators</b>					
Number of ventures for defence, made by social partners, supported substantially and logistically by military entities (Direction of intervention 4.2.1)	pcs.	4478	5000	5000	Annual information on the cooperation of the Polish Armed Forces with social partners
Number of visitors of military museums (Direction of intervention 4.1.7.)	Number	269154	350000	370000	Reports on activities of museums supervised by the Minister of National Defence

### Re 4.1. Integration of socio-economic development and national security

#### 4.1.1. Strengthening of relations between regional development of the country and defence policy

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Lack of mutual understanding, in regard to the needs of the defence sector within the regional development of the state has resulted from lack of both relevant and unified legislation within this scope and mutually defined interests and relations. National security needs at the local level may often be perceived as a factor inhibiting development of a region. Local communities are not aware of how important is functioning of the areas designated for realisation of national defence and security tasks until the garrisons are decided to be removed. On the other hand, while locating defence investments, a possible impact on development of a whole region is rarely taken into consideration what may result in conflicts. Also the level of cooperation for revitalisation and re-cultivation of post-military areas which require mutual cooperation of different ministries (i.a. the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Regional Development, the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, the Ministry of Environment) and public administration units, seems to be insufficient. Works on integrated development strategies, conducted by the government, go towards fixing this situation. *The National Strategy for Regional Development 2010-2020 Regions - Towns - Rural Areas (NSRD) [PL. Krajowa Strategia Rozwoju Regionalnego 2010-2020]*<sup>99</sup> and this strategy present activities aimed at increasing coordination of defence and regional policies.

<sup>99</sup> The NSRD suggests i.a. support of comprehensive revitalisation programmes (direction of activities 2.3 Restructuring and revitalisation of towns and other areas that lose their social and economic functions).

#### Main activities

- obtaining expert opinions on mutual relations between regional development of the state and defence policy (i.a. within the scope of impact of military units disposition on social and economic development of regions), and taking advantage of conclusions arising from such expert opinions;
- appointing an inter-ministerial team responsible for proposals within the subject area and implementing its recommendations;
- increasing the contribution of the Ministry of National Defence to the process of preparing development strategy for provinces;
- participation of representatives of the Military Property Agency in designing selected comprehensive revitalisation programmes.

#### **4.1.2. Coordination of activities and procedures of spatial planning respecting requirements of national defence and security**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Because of the need to provide appropriate conditions for carrying out the defence tasks and the need to provide the spatial order, areas designated for national defence and security require integration of their space with the surrounding area. Therefore, it is necessary to establish in planning standards of spatial development the buffer zones around them which will require the appropriate reflection in local spatial development plans. On the one hand these zones must safeguard defence functions of these areas, on the other hand, as far as possible, use their features for proper development of the area surrounding them. This requires proper coordination of spatial development between the competent authorities of the security sector and the relevant local authorities.

#### Main activities

- creating formal and legal conditions for appropriate coordination of activities within the scope of spatial development on the area which surrounds the confined space (including protection zones and limited use areas);
- coordinating spatial policy in a way to ensure protection of fundamental function of confined space related to defence and national security, and simultaneously to use features of confined space in development of a region;
- initiating legislative actions aimed at improving procedures concerning national defence needs, particularly within the scope of establishing protection zones for confined space and location of investment of defence significance, i.a. indicating coordination of these activities in the process of spatial planning.

#### **4.1.3 Support for infrastructure development provided by the security sector**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

If possible, it is necessary to aim towards joint use of infrastructure for defence and national security purposes and region development, i.a. by co-using military airports, sports & leisure facilities or joint investments in environment, e.g. sewage treatment plants.

#### Main activities

- using military airports or parts of them in order to establish or extend a local, regional or national civil airport of public use or a civil landing ground, under *the Act of 30<sup>th</sup> May 1996 on the Management of Certain Assets of the State Treasury* and on the Military Property Agency<sup>100</sup>;

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<sup>100</sup> Journal of Laws of 2004, no. 163 item 1711, as amended



- implementation of the provisions of *the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure as of 15<sup>th</sup> November 2004 on Conditions and Principles for Use of Military Airports by Civil Aviation and on Responsibilities of Persons Managing Such Airports*<sup>101</sup>;
- implementation of *the provisions of the Act of 21<sup>st</sup> August 1997 on Property Management*<sup>102</sup>;
- integration of infrastructural military networks with civil networks, especially with water and sewer one;
- aiming, if possible, at joint use of infrastructure for defence and national security purposes as well as for a region, e.g. sports & leisure facilities, cultural centres.

#### **4.1.4. Support for environmental protection provided by the security sector**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Support for environmental protection as well as initiating actions for water management by the security sector result from the necessity of mitigating the effects of functioning of infrastructure within this sector, in particular the effects of functioning of military facilities upon the area. It is necessary to continue the activities aimed at maximum use of technology and environmentally friendly solutions, and to meet the minimum standards of the EU within the scope of air protection, protection against noise and vibrations, waste management, providing drinking water of high quality, re-cultivation of degraded land, flood prevention and increasing forest resources as well.

##### Main activities

- promoting environmentally friendly solutions within the investment activities of the Ministry of National Defence;
- participating in the process of planning and establishing Natura 2000 [*ENG. Nature 2000*], the European Ecological Network and in the process of designing a plan of protection tasks and of protection of Natura 2000 areas;
- respecting the requirements for protection of plants and animals in planning and organising military exercises;
- modernising liquid fuel stations and bases and also sewage treatment plants used by the Polish Armed Forces;
- removing and neutralising asbestos, replacing ozone-depleting substances with alternative and environmentally friendly ones.

#### **4.1.5. Employment support and unemployment prevention in the security sector**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Assistance in employment support, just like other privileges resulting from the performance of professional military service, increases attractiveness of this occupation. These activities help soldiers to leave the military labour market and enter the civilian one, what significantly reduces the risk of economic inactivity and negative effects resulting from unemployment. At the same time, while the economic situation in Poland is still changing, the army will have to compete on the labour market with other employers to provide the Polish Armed Forces with necessary specialists and offer the incentives for employment. One of such incentives is the opportunity to raise or change professional qualifications thanks to the assistance from the Ministry of National Defence provided to maintain professional activity during the service and after its termination<sup>103</sup>.

<sup>101</sup> Journal of Laws, no. 254 item 2552.

<sup>102</sup> Journal of Laws of 2010, no. 102 item 651, as amended

<sup>103</sup> Some of the aforementioned solutions could be amended due to the alterations in uniform service pensions.

#### Main activities

- military conversion for all professional soldiers;
- phased military conversion - from career counselling, through retraining, traineeship programmes and job placement, to the employment itself;
- making career counselling available for contract soldiers after 3 years of service - this solution will allow to plan individual career paths during the service, what is especially important in case when soldiers are military specialists whose areas of expertise are rare on the civil labour market;
- making retraining available for soldiers 2 years before planned retirement and 2 years after retirement;
- applying gradation of the amount of financial assistance depending on duration of military service.

#### **4.1.6. Increasing the quality of security sector education and integrating higher education of security sector with national and European education systems**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

The mission of military higher education assumes training and constant improvement of professionalism of military and civil human resources in order to face contemporary and future challenges for national and international security; this is a key element that shapes the quality of the officer corps of the Polish Armed Forces. Realisation of the main assumptions of the Bologna Declaration made military universities part of the national and European education system. However, the military education, especially training and professional development of privates and non-commissioned officers has not been fully integrated with that national education system.

Involvement of the Ministry of National Defence in works aimed at restructuring the national education system based on *the Polish Qualification Framework* is particularly important for the development of the Polish Armed Forces and expectations of candidates for military service related to improvement of professional skills and acquisition of new ones, recognised on the civil labour market, during the service, as well as certifying skills acquired in a non-formalised way. Tailoring military skills to civilian occupations will result in increased attractiveness of military service, will improve the image of a reserve soldier on the labour market and will increase the level of confidence in the quality of qualifications acquired in the Polish Armed Forces.

#### Main activities

- improvement of design of education tasks in order to provide accuracy and stability of the needs of the army and to make education more practical;
- continuation of development of the effective evaluation system used by the Polish Armed Forces to assess usefulness and efficiency of the actions adopted and undertaken by universities, regarding the assumed and agreed educational goals;
- expanding the role of universities as the laboratory and expert background of the Ministry of National Defence in the process of identification of operational needs, development of doctrines concerning the contemporary battlefield and gaining new defensive capabilities;
- subordinating the activities of military universities to the common rules of education, professional development and scientific research, in accordance with the national and international tendencies, in particular with the assumptions of the Bologna Process, including the adaptation of the educational system to the requirements of the National Qualification Framework;

- strengthening the position of the leading scientific institutions within the scope of defence techniques and technologies, and within the scope of national security and defence, aimed at the needs of the national economy, including the needs of the Polish Armed Forces as the priority;
- increasing the activity in the international military cooperation, i.a. through development of the education offering for foreigners, including soldiers, within studies and other forms of further education.

#### **4.1.7. National heritage protection and development of cultural infrastructure**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

An important element of shaping national identity through activity of national and military museums is promotion of the tradition and the history of the Polish army. Such promotion aims towards satisfying the needs of young generation to discover historical roots and making people aware of the continuity of history, generations and territory of the Republic of Poland. The need of popularisation of the idea of defence in the context of professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces, as well as an intensified interest in history of the Polish army and the contemporary Polish Armed Forces justify the necessity of implementation of system solutions regarding operating of military museums, including establishment of new museums. All the more that the collections of great historical importance gathered in the halls of tradition are poorly available (they are located within military bases) and dispersed. Moreover, they lack common and nationwide information on their content and cannot be digitalised in order to be published in Internet. Therefore, it is necessary to take actions aimed at gathering, stocktaking and digitalisation of the collections of history of the Polish army. These activities will allow for making the collections available to the whole society, as well as for promotion of the Polish military service history. They will also facilitate international contacts, cooperation and exchange of exhibits.

##### Main activities

- institutional and organisational restructuring of military museums which involves implementation of *the Concept of Development of Military Museums in 2009-2018*, adopted in 2009 which provides for the Polish Army Museum as the main programming centre and 3 force services museums;
- improvement of infrastructure of military museums;
- creating formal and legal conditions for acquisition of financial resources out of the budget of the Ministry of National Defence, for investment and statutory activities of museums;
- extending the educational offering of military museums and improving its quality.

### **Re 4.2. Development of social dimension of national security**

#### **4.2.1. Development of civil support for the Polish Armed Forces**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

The society is one of the fundamental resources on which the organisation of national security is based. Building active society in regard to national defence is based on planning, coordination and monitoring of cooperation of the Ministry of National Defence with non-governmental organisations and other social partners, including schools, universities, museums, local government authorities and church organisations. Especially in case of full professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces and concurrent social events, it is necessary to engage non-governmental organisations and other social partners in actions aimed at acquiring and improving defence skills of all citizens.

### Main activities

- planning, organisational and logistics support of activities of social partners, aimed at national defence through different forms of assistance for non-governmental sector and through providing social partners with tools which allow to conduct their own activities in the field of defence;
- increasing the activity of citizens in defence and patriotic education, especially in promoting modern forms of defence education (preparing the youth for the professional military service);
- inspiring social partners to promote knowledge of defence duties of citizens;
- keeping good relations with war veterans, veterans who took part in overseas missions and with former soldiers;
- support of associations representing soldiers of reserves in international organisations and undertakings

Support for defence education of society should be provided by improving the existing forms of cooperation with social partners and initiating new ones, i.a. through:

- subcontracting public tasks in the field of national defence and the Polish Armed Forces' activities to non-governmental organisations;
- providing social partners with logistics support through gratuitous transfer of movable property of the State Treasury considered to be not necessary to the Polish Armed Forces;
- providing logistics and organisational assistance to social partners in undertakings in the field of defence;
- concluding and performing agreements for cooperation with different social entities, particularly with non-governmental organisations, local government authorities and schools which run innovative and extended security education programmes;
- supervision of foundations which have indicated the Minister of National Defence as "the relevant minister" due to their statutory goals in the field of defence and due to the scope of activities of the said minister.

### **4.2.2. Development of social capital for security purposes**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Participation of non-governmental organisations in activities related to ensuring national security is constantly increasing. Government administration and local government bodies may help crisis-affected people more efficiently and more effectively, provided that they are professionally supported by the third sector. Efficiency of government organisations (the armed forces, the Police, guards, inspectorates) mostly depends on proper specialist support from non-governmental organisations being capable of helping in different areas of national security on a par with government bodies. Non-governmental organisations are capable of social monitoring of non-military threats, especially in the field of detection, warning and alerting. Preparation of the non-governmental sector in case of disasters denotes preparedness to predict, prevent from, mitigate and cope with effects of the threats or disasters.

### Main activities

- development of cooperation with non-governmental organisations for increasing involvement of the non-governmental sector in public administration activities in the field of national security;
- creating, together with the non-governmental sector, a list of possible threats which may occur on the activity area of a given organisation and methods of protection against them.

**Objective 5**  
**Creation of conditions for development of the integrated national security system**

As it has been presented in the diagnostic part of the strategy, the complexity and dynamics of changes in the security environment force development and unification of the sphere of national security. Public authorities possess a duty to establish legal and organisational conditions which will make national security system a coherent, integrated and properly working mechanism. It is particularly important to initiate integration processes in the field of national security management because the organisation and operation of this field are not perfect. It is necessary to take all the efforts to develop coherent mechanisms of coordination and cooperation of the entities operating in the area of national security and to ensure that their activities have an appropriate level of security of information and telecommunications. Objective 5 will require close cooperation between the most important bodies of national executive authority.

Priorities and directions of intervention for Objective 5 include:

<b>5.1. Improvement of the national security management system</b>
5.1.1. Determining the role of Government Security Centre in the national security system
5.1.2. Improvement of cooperation of organisational structures relevant to crisis management and defence reaction matters operating in time of peace, crisis and war
<b>5.2. Development of mechanisms of coordination and cooperation of authorities, entities and organisational structures of the national security system, including the armed forces</b>
5.2.1 Actions undertaken to provide cohesion of processes of defence planning and crisis management
5.2.2. Intensification of monitoring and assessment of development/integration of the national security system, i.a. through periodical strategic reviews of national security
<b>5.3. Provision of the security of information and telecommunications in the context of the integrated national security system</b>
5.3.1. Increase of the security level of IT resources of public and state administration, including protection against Internet threats and cyber-terrorism
5.3.2. Development of the Computer Emergency Response System
5.3.3. Development of the Government Communications Network

Indicators for monitoring Objective 5

Indicator	Unit	Value in base year 2010	Value in 2020	Value in target year 2022	Source
Number of information channels used by the Computer Emergency Response System to communicate with other CERT organisations (Direction of intervention 5.3.2.)	number	5	10	All the computer emergency response teams operating in the country and abroad	Report on status of IT network security of the Ministry of National Defence

## 5.1. Improvement of the national security management system

### 5.1.1. Determining a role of the Government Security Centre in the national security system

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Currently, under Art. 11 of *the Crisis Management Act*, the Government Security Centre performs numerous tasks related to crisis management, including supporting the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, Government Crisis Management Team or the relevant minister of internal affairs. The Government Security Centre is also responsible for civil planning, coordinates preparation of *the Report on National Security Threats*, cooperates with organisational entities, sections and units of NATO and the EU, as well as other international organisations responsible for crisis management and critical infrastructure protection, cooperates with the head of the Internal Security Agency in the scope of prevention, neutralisation and elimination of effects of the events of terrorism. The Centre informs the European Commission and Member States of the EU about measures taken in a crisis situation in order to properly secure the public telecommunication network and broadcasting and receiving stations used to provide safety in the field of communication systems and data communication systems.

With numerous assignments, the currently adopted legal and organisational solutions do not allow to precisely determine the position of the Government Security Centre in the administration structure and its role in the national security system. *The Crisis Management Act* defines the Government Security Centre as a state budget unit subordinated to the Prime Minister.

#### Main activities

- redefining and specifying the role of the Government Security Centre in the national security system by legal means.

### 5.1.2. Improvement of cooperation of organisational structures relevant to crisis management and defence reaction matters operating in time of peace, crisis and war

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Having regard to operating of the national security system, there is assumed complexity and cohesion of actions undertaken in order to effectively face any threats. There is also assumed effective integration of military potential with administration, economy and society. As no element of the national security system is capable of performing tasks related to national security individually, this requires cooperation of organisational structures relevant to crisis management and defence response which operate in time of peace, crisis and war, at each level of management. The principles of cooperation shall be precise, comprehensive, perpetual, flexible and consistent.

In *the Crisis Management Act*, there were indicated and appointed the relevant organisational entities and structures of central (government and ministerial level) and local (provincial level) levels, responsible for performing tasks related to crisis management.<sup>104</sup> These structures have to operate and carry out the aforementioned assignments in every possible crisis situation, including an increased defence readiness condition in the state and a relevant state of emergency.

<sup>104</sup> The issue of improvement of crisis management is elaborated on in *the Efficient State* strategy.

In the *Crisis Management Act* it is assumed that organisational structures established under *the Crisis Management Act* will be a part of the organisational structures of a particular management post of public administration bodies. This complies with the principle of avoidance of copying solutions in the field of national security management, separately for a crisis situation and for external national security threats. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the level of integration of existing structures and structures planned to be established. The aforementioned requirements regarding improvement of cooperation have to be applied at national, provincial and local-government level.

#### Main activities

- it is necessary to improve the principles of cooperation in the field of national security management through adopting coherent solutions and improving cooperation mechanisms at all organisational levels of the state;
- precise assignment of tasks to all the participants and establishment of rules of cooperation within the national security management system will require adaptation of legal regulations.

### **5.2. Development of mechanisms of coordination and cooperation of authorities, entities and organisational structures of the national security system, including the armed forces**

#### **5.2.1 Actions undertaken to provide cohesion of processes of defence planning and crisis management**

##### Description of the issue and justification for action

Tasks and functions assigned to the Government Crisis Management Team and the Government Security Centre under the Crisis Management Act are not limited to problems related to occurrence of a crisis situation. In accordance with the Act, crisis management is an element of national security management which operates during states of emergency and during war as well. This relates in particular to:

- tasks performed within the scope of civil planning and relating to a period of time after introduction of states of emergency and during war;
- support for the activities of the Polish Armed Forces and allied armies through non-military defensive structures during an external threat to national security and during war;
- substantive content of crisis management plans which defines crisis management procedures during states of emergency and war.

Hence, it is necessary to ensure cohesion of the existing solutions in crisis management and defence response. The aforementioned actions should apply mainly to the planning sphere which comprises planning of actions to be taken during the raising of national defence readiness and in the event of states of emergency. It is also necessary to develop methods of security planning, common for defence planning and crisis management based on the uniform evaluation of national security threats and joint planning procedures. Uniform principles and procedures of national security planning will improve efficiency of national security management and will ensure better use of forces and resources for the purpose of national security and defence.

#### Main activities

- providing cohesion and identity of actions described in *the Defence Reaction Plan of the Republic of Poland*, operational plan of use of the Polish Armed Forces, *the National Plan for Crisis Management* and of undertakings described in *the Manual of Undertakings and Procedures of the Crisis Management System*, as well as in the

plans and documents prepared at lower levels of public administration and by entrepreneurs.

### **5.2.2. Intensification of monitoring and assessment of development/integration of the national security system, i.a. through periodical, strategic reviews of national security**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Changes taking place in contemporary security environment extort the need for a comprehensive look at all aspects going beyond the traditional perception of national security through the prism of defence. In this regard, a very useful tool, and of increasing use by other countries, is a comprehensive review of national security. The Strategic Review of National Security (SPBN)<sup>105</sup> in Poland was initiated by the President of the Republic of Poland in 2010. The purpose of the review was to make a diagnosis and prognosis of developments in key areas of Polish security over the years. The Strategic Review of National Security is the necessary element of the idea of integrated approach to security and ought to be performed in a cyclic way.

*The Act on Crisis Management and the Regulation of Council of Ministers on the Report on the Threats to National Security* provide a mechanism for cyclic review of national security. It is implemented by ministers, heads of central agencies and provincial governors through drawing up every two years a report on threats to national security. The process is coordinated by the Government Security Centre. The report defines the key threats to national security and courses of action aimed at counteracting these threats. The report on national security threats will constitute, next to the Strategic Review of National Security, the basis of monitoring process and evaluation of the national security system.

#### Main activities

- SPBN results, summarised in the form of the SPBN Report, will be a significant help in arriving at decisions related to national security. They will be used to update *the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland and the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland*;
- on the basis of the SPBN Report, *the National Security White Paper* will be published, informing the public about the current state of security and the proposed path of government action in this area. In addition, publication of this document should help to initiate a public debate on national security of Poland.

### **Re 5.3. Provision of the security of information and telecommunications in the context of the integrated national security system**

### **5.3.1. Increase of the security level of IT resources of public and state administration, including protection against Internet threats and terrorism**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Cyber-terrorism is currently one of the major threats to ICT security of states, including Poland. It results from the increasing number of Internet users, small costs of a cyber-terrorist attack as well as possibility to preserve anonymity of persons or entities responsible for it. In order to increase the degree of ICT protection against the Internet threats, there are necessary comprehensive and coordinated activities of all government entities which through carrying out a risk analysis will implement safeguards appropriate to the likelihood of threats. A coordinated action appropriate to the risks of all government entities will enable a radical

<sup>105</sup> Order No. 4 of the President of the Republic of Poland of November 24, 2010 on the conduct of the Strategic Review of National Security.



increase in the degree of protection including minimisation of costs. Proper activity will also be undertaken in response to the risks associated with cyber-intelligence.

#### Main activities

- adoption of Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland<sup>106</sup>
- strengthening of coordination and cooperation at the national level thanks to activities of the Committee of the Council of Ministers for Digitisation;
- increase of coverage of the ARAKIS.GOV<sup>107</sup> system through implementation of the system into all offices and state institutions;
- conducting of scientific works in the field of computer emergency response within the scope of the Information Management Security System.

### **5.3.2. Development of the Computer Emergency Response System**

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

The dynamic development of ICT networks of the Ministry of National Defence of different clauses and their more extensive use for data transfer, as well as for command and control, necessitated the provision of security for these networks and for information they send. Thus, there was established - in analogy to CERT.GOV.PL functioning for government administration in the civil sphere – the Computer Emergency Response System [*PL.. System Reagowania na Incydynty Komputerowe (SRniK)*]<sup>108</sup>, which main objective is to provide implementation and coordination of prevention, detection and response to computer emergencies for ICT systems and networks of the Ministry of National Defence as well as cooperation in the field of cyber-attacks prevention with the Government Computer Emergency Response Team CERT.GOV.PL and CERT-POLAND.

Increase of threats in cyberspace requires customisation and continuous development of existing structures of the response system. Therefore, one of the main assignments in the coming years will be continuation of the upgrading process established under SRniK MIL-CERT team and acquisition of new competence to implement technologically advanced features, including computer forensics and active response to cyber-attacks. This will be pursued in a manner associated with the development of the Government Computer Emergency Response Team and building of strategic coordination competence of the Ministry of Administration and Digitisation, appropriate for communication and computerisation departments.

#### Main activities

- further expansion of collaboration with other national teams and international organisations, consolidation of the structure of CERT, including the newly established EU CERT;
- establishment of the National Computer Emergency Response System enabling a fast response to threats from Internet;
- possession of strong, equipped with advanced technologies, computer emergency response teams (including Rapid Reaction Team) by the Internal Security Agency and the Ministry of National Defence will facilitate implementation of international cooperation and will acquire new operational abilities within the scope of assignments to respond to computer security incidents and to command and control in cyberspace.

<sup>106</sup> The document adopted by the Committee of the Council of Ministers for Digitisation on 28/11/2012.

<sup>107</sup> ARAKIS Aggregation, Analysis and Classification of Network Incidents (Project by CERT of NASK) [*PL. Agregacja, Analiza i Klasyfikacja Incydentów Sieciowych (Projekt Zespołu CERT, działającego w ramach NASK)*].

<sup>108</sup> Decision No. 357/MON of the Ministry of National Defence of July 29, 2008 on Organisation and Functioning of the Computer Emergency Response System in the Ministry of National Defence.

### 5.3.3. Development of the Government Communications Network

#### Description of the issue and justification for action

Entities involved in the process of national security management require enhanced security of communication systems and IT support. To provide information protection against unauthorised disclosure during phone calls and video conferencing as well as during data transmission, in particular against the loss of confidentiality, availability and integrity, there will be developed the Government Communications Network [*PL. Sieć Łączności Rządowej (SŁR)*]. It will provide a link between authorised persons in the event of emergencies.

SŁR plays a significant part in providing separate communications for Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, Chancelleries of the Sejm and the Senate, government and other entities, both in current operations, as well as in emergency situations. It is a telecommunications network that provides telecommunication services, in particular voice communication, video conferencing, based on data transmission and other services within the defined needs. Its operational range includes provincial cities and Warsaw agglomeration.

Currently, the Internal Security Agency has been carrying out the process of modernisation and construction of classified SŁR system which enables processing of classified information up to 'CONFIDENTIAL' clause inclusively. In addition, since 2011, the new mobile confidential communication system includes more than 2000 stations (equipped with phones or laptops) and provides a 24h separate, secure, encrypted communication between persons most important for national security - including the President, the Prime Minister, ministers, heads of services and their local units.

#### Main activities

- modernisation of SŁR through fixing approximately 140 encrypted telephone devices, both in the SŁR central network, as well as in provincial zone and through migration to the modern technology used in the mobile part;
- further development of the SŁR classified mobile system, i.a. for applications dedicated to the Ministry of National Defence;
- target SŁR migration to IP technology (Internet Protocol).

## **IV. Strategy implementation system**

### **1. Entities responsible for implementation and monitoring of the strategy realisation and for its evaluation**

In implementation of *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* all the parties responsible for strengthening of national security will be involved, in particular, ministers, heads of central offices, governors, local government bodies.

Moreover, it is stipulated that the President of the Republic of Poland will participate in implementation of the strategy, under authority and competence of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and laws of general application in the following areas:

- establishment of mechanisms of monitoring national security and handling issues of national security and defence affecting the country;
- effective promotion of national security and defence.

Specific assignments related to implementation of the strategy are presented in Table 5.

No.	Entity responsible	Assignment fields of strategy implementation
1.	<b>Minister competent for foreign affairs and membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– maintaining relations of the Republic of Poland with other states and international organisations:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ activities aiming at maintaining the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as the effective defence alliance;</li> <li>○ activities aiming at strengthening of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union;</li> <li>○ activities aiming at strengthening strategic dialogue and other cooperation forms with the key partners and allies of the Republic of Poland;</li> <li>○ support of activities aiming at strengthening the role of the UN in the field of peacekeeping and international security;</li> <li>○ support of activities aiming at strengthening OSCE as a form of strategic dialogue with non-member states of the EU and NATO;</li> <li>○ support of activities aiming at strengthening mechanisms of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and control instruments of weapon trade and of dual-use technologies</li> </ul> </li> <li>– coordination of foreign policy of the Republic of Poland, including activities of government bodies and their subordinate units through:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ annual drawing up, agreeing and bringing into consideration of the Council of Ministers the government document defining directions and goals of the Polish foreign policy and of promotion of the Republic of Poland's interests for the next year, and drawing up and submitting to the Council of Ministers long-term strategies in the field of foreign affairs;</li> <li>○ expressing opinions regarding compliance with the aforementioned document and submitting opinions on the subject of annual and long-term plans of foreign cooperation with ministers to the Prime Minister;</li> <li>○ participation in international relations essential for interests of the Republic of Poland;</li> </ul> </li> <li>– creation of the international image of the Republic of Poland;</li> <li>– issues related to international cooperation for development and humanitarian aid;</li> <li>– participation of government administration bodies in works of the EU bodies, in particular developing strategies for the Republic of Poland's policy within the scope of the EU and initiating and drawing up the government documents concerning participation in works of the EU or expressing opinions on them in respect of compliance with this strategy.</li> </ul>
2.	<b>Minister of National Defence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– providing the Polish Armed Forces with conditions to improve defence skills and fulfil obligations towards allies and to participate in international missions;</li> <li>– improving procedures of supporting public authorities by the Polish Armed Forces in critical situations;</li> <li>– improving strategic defence planning;</li> <li>– improving procedures of supporting public authorities by the Polish Armed Forces in critical situations;</li> <li>– improving procedures of command and control of the Polish Armed Forces taking into consideration allied and international solutions, the character of potential activities and of use of the experience from previous operations of the Polish Armed Forces;</li> <li>– proceeding with the process of acquisition and modernisation of armament and military equipment with use of the national defence industry and participation in international programmes;</li> <li>– improving the utilisation system of military equipment and armament and its withdrawal from use;</li> <li>– continuation of the process of professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces and implementation of the new functional and organisational solutions regarding human resources and logistics;</li> <li>– improving the system of higher military education, increasing level of education of professional soldiers and of military training, fulfilling the necessities of the Polish Armed Forces and the necessities of achieving by them defence abilities, simultaneously guaranteeing development of military universities, military training centres and of their research and teaching;</li> <li>– coordination of planning and of carrying out the tasks related to preparation of non-military defence of the country, including undertakings fulfilling the needs of the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces;</li> <li>– coordination of the tasks included in <i>the Economy Mobilisation Programme</i>;</li> <li>– implementation of projects related to formation of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>;</li> </ul>

No.	Entity responsible	Assignment fields of strategy implementation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– improving organisational and functional solutions concerning CIMIC and HNS;</li> <li>– improving abilities of recognition and protection against national security threats;</li> <li>– integration of processes of defence planning and crisis management through providing cohesion and identity of undertaken actions included in crisis management plans and in operational plans of functioning of the public administration, and operational plans of use of the Polish Armed Forces;</li> <li>– integration of communication systems and information technology support of the process of national security management and data exchange;</li> <li>– establishing the ministerial, integrated information system supporting the decision-making process;</li> <li>– development of the responding capacity to computer incidents;</li> <li>– undertaking actions for the benefit of coordination of organisational and dislocation plans of the Polish Armed Forces with agreements of the documents concerning regional development, planning and spatial planning, environmental and culture protection as well as national heritage protection, including improvement of the process of transferring former military facilities and areas to administration of local authorities;</li> <li>– developing a positive image and positive public perception of the issues related to the Polish Armed Forces, the defence system and a closer cooperation with non-governmental organisations and other social entities in promotion of defence and of activities for the benefit of defence.</li> </ul>
3.	<b>Minister competent for internal affairs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– development and implementation of system solutions regulating the area of civil protection and civil defence;</li> <li>– improving support and protection condition of the needs of the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces through subordinate structures and organisational units;</li> <li>– improving activities of organisational entities and structures responsible for crisis management and defensive response to function in time of peace, crisis and war;</li> <li>– implementation of projects related to formation of the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves;</li> </ul>
4.	<b>Minister competent for public administration, informatisation and communication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– actions aimed at implementation of recommendations and decisions of 'Concept of Organisation of the Communication System for Public Administration, National Security, Security and Public Order Management System and for Needs of Rescue';</li> <li>– improving strategies to support the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces through subordinate structures and organisational units as well as through entrepreneurs and postal operators, in the period of national security being under external threats and in time of war;</li> <li>– developing <i>the Cyberspace Security Policy of the Republic of Poland</i>;</li> <li>– developing <i>the Computer Security Incident Response System</i>;</li> </ul>
5.	<b>Minister competent for economy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– supporting international initiatives concerning the defence industry as well as acquisition and delivery of new technologies;</li> <li>– implementing the idea of energy solidarity and strengthening of international cooperation in the field of energy security, including development of fuel and energy competitiveness;</li> <li>– establishing organisational and functional conditions guaranteeing safe utilisation of nuclear facilities, systems, installations and storage of nuclear materials in the context of <i>the Polish Nuclear Power Programme</i>;</li> <li>– establishing legal and organisational conditions conducive to development of the defence industry and its supervision;</li> <li>– providing effective implementation of the offset obligations;</li> </ul>

No.	Entity responsible	Assignment fields of strategy implementation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– determining opportunities of safeguarding the living needs of population in the area of fuels, electricity, gas and coal, as well as maintenance of productive and repair capacity necessary to perform the tasks resulting from <i>the Economy Mobilisation Programme</i>;</li> <li>– establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>.</li> </ul>
6.	<b>Minister competent for the Treasury</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– maintaining the shares of the Treasury in the key companies of energy security sector, including companies dealing with energy transfer;</li> <li>– respecting national security aspects in privatisation processes and ownership conversions in strategic sectors of the state functioning;</li> <li>– exercising corporate governance of entrepreneurs providing energy supplies for industry and population;</li> <li>– implementation of projects regarding establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>.</li> </ul>
7.	<b>Minister competent for transport, maritime industry, construction industry, local planning, site planning and housing industry</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– increasing the security level in transport and increasing transport infrastructure resilience to terrorist threats;</li> <li>– improving preparation level and readiness of the national transport infrastructure;</li> <li>– preparation of vehicles for the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces;</li> <li>– improving the support and security system of the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces through subordinate structures, organisational units as well as entrepreneurs carrying out defence assignments in the period of national security being under external threats and in time of war;</li> <li>– implementation of projects related to establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>;</li> <li>– undertaking actions to integrate requirements of national defence and security in the documents related to local planning and spatial planning.</li> </ul>
8.	<b>Minister competent for regional development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– cooperation with the Ministry of Defence for considering requirements of national defence and security in the documents related to planning and spatial planning on national and regional levels.</li> </ul>
9.	<b>Minister competent for health</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– defining the possibilities to safeguard medical needs of the Polish Armed Forces and other agencies of ministries and offices included in <i>the Economy Mobilisation Programme</i>;</li> <li>– implementation of projects regarding development of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>;</li> <li>– preparing medicinal bodies for the state defence purposes;</li> <li>– development of cooperation with the military health care system in the field of functioning of the health care system and crisis management.</li> </ul>
10.	<b>Minister competent for agriculture, agricultural markets, rural</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– providing population with livelihoods and survival measures in the field of food availability and security, maintenance of agricultural production, strengthening its resilience to risks of natural disasters, terrorist threats, contaminations and infections, food quality control as well as food and agricultural products, food production and stabilisation of agricultural markets;</li> <li>– improving collaboration with other ministries and different bodies responsible for supervision of the condition of natural environment, detecting threats to food security in time of peace, crisis and war;</li> <li>– implementation of projects related to establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>;</li> <li>– identifying opportunities to fulfil the basic living needs of population in the field of groceries within the scope of assignment resulting from</li> </ul>

No.	Entity responsible	Assignment fields of strategy implementation
	<b>development and fishery</b>	<i>the Economy Mobilisation Programme.</i>
<b>11.</b>	<b>Minister competent for environment and water management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– establishing formal and legal conditions for functioning of facilities and systems of security sector, taking into consideration the requirements related to protection of natural environment, water and environmental security;</li> <li>– developing collaboration with other ministries and bodies responsible for supervising protection of natural environment, detecting contaminations and alarming, as well as enhancing cooperation between appropriate structures and subordinate executive systems;</li> <li>– support and protection of the needs of the Polish Armed Forces and allied forces through subordinate structures, organisational units and entrepreneurs performing defence assignments during the period when national security is exposed to external threats as well as in time of war;</li> <li>– development of <i>the National Water Security Plan</i> as well as its implementation and supervision.</li> </ul>
<b>12.</b>	<b>Minister competent for science and higher education</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– coordinating scientific researches and developmental works for national defence and security through establishment of strategic research programmes in this field, and by managing its implementation through the National Centre for Research and Development;</li> <li>– intensification of actions supporting and activating participation of Polish scientific and industrial centres in international military programmes;</li> <li>– encouraging universities to include the issues concerning national security in their programmes and fields of studies;</li> <li>– cooperation between agencies of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, other entities and organisational units in the area of construction and development of <i>the Computer Security Incident Response System</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>13.</b>	<b>Other ministers, heads of central offices and other national institutions and central offices</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– implementation of tasks related to preparation of national non-military defence and crisis management;</li> <li>– coordination of the tasks included in <i>the Economy Mobilisation Programme</i>;</li> <li>– improving organisational and functional solutions concerning CIMIC and HNS;</li> <li>– improving abilities of recognition of and protection against national security threats;</li> <li>– implementation of projects regarding establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>.</li> </ul>
<b>14.</b>	<b>Head of the Internal Security Agency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– improvement of recognition abilities and defence system to protect against threats to national security, including terrorist threats and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery as well as materials and technologies of dual-use;</li> <li>– enhancing principles and mechanisms of cooperation with relevant entities to provide cyber security;</li> <li>– developing <i>the Computer Security Incident Response System</i>;</li> <li>– implementation of projects related to establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>;</li> </ul>
<b>15.</b>	<b>Head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– protection against external threats to national security, including threats of international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery as well as materials and technologies of dual-use;</li> <li>– identifying and analysing risks occurring in the areas of tensions, conflicts and in areas of activity of Polish civil-military contingents;</li> <li>– enhancing principles and mechanisms of cooperation with relevant entities and structures for identification and exchange of information about national security threats.</li> </ul>

No.	Entity responsible	Assignment fields of strategy implementation
16.	<b>Director of the Government Security Centre</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– improving activities of the entities and organisational structures competent for crisis management and defensive response to function in time of peace, crisis and war, including i.a. adopting of consistent solutions and mechanisms of cooperation between government and public administration and different entities in case any critical situation related to national security threats occurs;</li> <li>– providing coherence in processes of defence planning and crisis management, and improving quality of strategic planning;</li> <li>– implementation of projects within the scope of civil emergency planning, especially during a period of increased national defence readiness and after introduction of a state of emergency;</li> <li>– implementation and update of <i>the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme, the National Crisis Management Plan and the Report on Threats to National Security</i> in cooperation with relevant ministries and other bodies;</li> <li>– introducing and enhancing implementation mechanisms of enterprises and procedures for crisis management system having regard to the obligations resulting from membership in NATO and the EU;</li> <li>– providing coherence and identity of the undertaken actions included in crisis management plans and operational plans of functioning of public administration, operational plans of use of the Polish Armed Forces in time of external threats to national security and in time of war;</li> <li>– development and improvement of supporting mechanisms of public administration by the Polish Armed Forces in crisis situations;</li> <li>– cooperation with national entities and bodies as well as with international authorities for providing cyber security;</li> <li>– implementation of projects within the scope of civil emergency planning, including a period of increased national defence readiness and after introduction of a state of emergency.</li> </ul>
17.	<b>Province governors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– improvement of collaboration rules of all government and self-government administration bodies functioning in the area of a province and related to preventing, detecting and monitoring threats to national security and to counteracting and liquidation of effects in the event of a crisis situation.</li> <li>– coordination of undertakings related to defence preparations in the area of a province, including improvement of procedures of cooperation of government administration bodies and structures at the provincial level, bodies of self-government, entrepreneurs and other entities;</li> <li>– coordination of planning and performing defence tasks related to securing needs of the armed and allied forces;</li> <li>– improvement of rules and procedures of supporting public administration bodies by units and subunits of the Polish Armed Forces in the event of occurrence of a crisis situation in a province;</li> <li>– provision of participation of appropriate provincial and self-government structures in military and defence training with participation of the Polish Armed Forces mobilised in the province;</li> <li>– including needs and requirements for defence and security in documents relating to: regional development, spatial planning and development, natural environment and cultural assets protection, as well as national heritage protection;</li> <li>– implementation of projects related to establishment of <i>the Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves</i>;</li> <li>– implementation and carrying out of assignments of securing the living needs of population, including water supply, population protection and civil defence in the event of a crisis situation.</li> </ul>
18.	<b>Bodies of local government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– detecting, preventing and monitoring of threats to national security in administered areas and counteracting and liquidation of effects in the event of a crisis situation;</li> <li>– coordination of undertakings related to defence in the administered area;</li> <li>– implementation and carrying out of assignments of securing the living needs of population, including water supply, population protection and civil defence in the event of a crisis situation.</li> <li>– including needs and requirements of defence and security in documents relating to: regional development, spatial planning and development, natural environment protection and cultural assets, as well as national heritage protection.</li> <li>– coordination of planning and performing defence tasks related to securing needs of the armed and allied forces;</li> </ul>

Source: material owned by the Ministry of Defence.



## 2. Implementation documents of the strategy

Table 6 Register of SRSBN RP implementation documents.

No.	Document	Entity Receiving a Document, Date of Receipt	Operational Objective
1.	Guidelines of the Council of Ministers for programming defence preparations for 2013 - 2022 (draft)	Council of Ministers after having adopted SRSBN RP	2*
2.	Main Directions of Development of the Polish Armed Forces and Preparation for Defence of the State in the Period 2013–2022	President of the Republic of Poland November 8, 2011	2
3.	Detailed directions for reconstruction and modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces for 2013 – 2018	Prime Minister September 25, 2012	2
4.	Development Programme for the Polish Armed Forces for 2013 - 2022	Minister of National Defence November 7, 2012	2
5.	Non-military Defence Preparation Programme for 2013 - 2022 (draft)	Prime Minister first half of 2013	2
6.	Economy Mobilisation Programme for 2013 - 2022 (draft)	Council of Ministers first half of 2013	2
7.	Civil Defence Improvement Programme 2013 - 2021 (draft)	Chief of National Civil Defence 2013	2
8.	National Crisis Management Plan	Council of Ministers March 6, 2012	3
9.	National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme (draft)	Council of Ministers first half of 2013	3
10.	Governmental Programme of Strategic Reserves (drawn up for a period of 5 years with the possibility of an annual update) (draft)	Council of Ministers 2013	3
11.	Plan of cooperation of the organisational units included in the Uniform National System of Contamination Warning	Minister of National Defence May 4, 2011	3
12.	Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland	Council of Ministers 2013	5
13.	Long-term Programme of Development Cooperation for 2012 – 2015	Council of Ministers March 20, 2012	1

Source: material owned by the Ministry of National Defence.

\*Because of its classified nature, the implementation documents of the objective 2 will be excluded from the requirement of compliance with the provisions of the Act on Principles of Development Policy [PL. Ustawa o zasadach prowadzenia polityki rozwoju].

## 3. Monitoring and evaluation of the strategy implementation, mechanisms of cooperation of the involved entities

The Minister of National Defence is the coordinator of the strategy implementation and he acts on behalf of the Prime Minister. Each year, the coordinator shall convey **the strategy implementation report for the previous year** to the Minister of Regional Development. This report is a contribution to the information about fulfilment of MNDS goals. The report will be drawn up using the information received from ministries, central agencies and provinces involved in the strategy implementation. These contributions will encompass description and evaluation of actions performed within the framework of detailed targets and directions of the strategy intervention and also included in the documents of the strategy implementation. The first strategy implementation report will be presented in 2014.

*The Development Strategy of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* will be updated periodically, at least once every 4 years. An important modification in the

Polish security environment or new, significant solutions within the scope of developing the national security system may constitute a basis for updating.

The coordinator will consult with other entities responsible for particular thematic areas, i.e. with the Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior Affairs, the Minister of Administration and Digitisation, the Minister of Economy, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Minister of Environment, Minister of Transport, Building and Maritime Economy, the Minister of Science and Higher Education, the Minister of Regional Development, the Minister of State Treasury, the Director of the Government Centre for Security, the Head of the Internal Security Agency and the Intelligence Agency of Poland. The coordinators and the co-executors of SRSBN RP operational objectives are presented in the chart below.

**Picture 4. Register of the ministerial leaders implementing SRSBN RP.**

AREA OF THE STRATEGY	Ministry responsible	Cooperation (ministries, institutions)
<b>Objective 1</b> Formation of stable international security environment in regional and global dimension	<b>MSZ</b>	<b>MON, MSW, MAiC, AW</b>
<b>Objective 2</b> Strengthening of national capacity for defence	<b>MON</b>	<b>MON, MSW, MAiC, BBN, ABW, AW, MG, MTBiGM</b>
<b>Objective 3</b> Development of resilience against threats to national security	<b>MSW</b>	<b>MON, MSW, MAiC, MG, MTBiGM, MSP, RCB, ABW</b>
<b>Objective 4</b> Increase of integration between public policies and the security policy	<b>MON</b>	<b>MRR, MSW, MAiC, MG, MNiSW, MS</b>
<b>Objective 5</b> Creation of conditions for development of the integrated national security system	<b>MON</b>	<b>MSW, MAiC, MTBiGM, MNiSW, MSP, RCB, ABW</b>

- \*- coordination of works in the particular area,
- reporting for Ministry of National Defence and for the Council of Ministers (Ministry of Regional Development, Public Relations Coordinating Committee)

Source: own material by the Ministry of National Defence

\*\*MSZ – Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 MON – Ministry of National Defence  
 MSW – Ministry of Interior  
 MAiC – Ministry of Administration and Digitisation  
 AW – Intelligence Agency  
 BBN – National Security Bureau  
 ABW – Internal Security Agency  
 MG – Ministry of Economy  
 MTBiGM - Ministry of Transport, Building and Maritime Economy  
 MSP – Ministry of State Treasury  
 RCB – Government Centre for Security  
 MRR - Ministry of Regional Development  
 MNiSW – Ministry of Science and Higher Education  
 MS - Ministry of Justice

Supervision of *the Development Strategy of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* will be based on the system of indicators included in SRSBN RP and on the

strategy implementation reports. This process will be directed at observing the progress of fulfilling the strategy targets concerning efficiency and productivity of the implemented interventions. Results of analyses and their consequent conclusions will be used i.a. to prepare periodical reports, information presenting a degree of realisation of the strategy and defining new directions for actions to be taken.

A comprehensive report concerning the socio-economic, regional and spatial development will be an essential element of evaluation of realisation of the strategy supporting the process of evaluation of the MNDS realisation. It will be drawn up every three years. Upon actual needs, a report on implementation and evaluation of SRSBN RP shall be submitted.

## V. Financial framework of the strategy

In compliance with Article 14d of *the Act of December 6, 2006 on the Principles of the Development Policy*<sup>109</sup>, the principles of the long-term financing of the development policy implementation are determined by the regulations on public finance. Pursuant to Article 136, section 1 and 2 of *the Act of August 27, 2009 on Public Finance*<sup>110</sup> the budget act may determine, within the scope of expense limits for a financial year, the expense limits for long-term programmes, whereas section 2 determines that long-term programmes are established by the Council of Ministers in order to implement the strategies adopted by the Council of Ministers.

Through the Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 71 of 8<sup>th</sup> May 2012, published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Poland [*PL. Monitor Polski*], item 292, *the Long-term Financial Plan for 2012-2015* [*PL. Wieloletni Plan Finansowy Państwa na lata 2012-2015 (WPFP)*] was passed. The fundamental role of this plan in the Polish public finance system consists in associating the directions of spending the budget assets with the state's objectives defined in the strategic documents. In compliance with the regulations of the Public Finance Act, WPFP is a document being drawn up in the format encompassing the state's functions.

Planning the scale of expenses for the particular functions within the scope of WPFP and determining the primary objectives of the performance structure of the state's budget, enables to translate these amounts or limits for particular objectives, areas or programmes resulting from the development strategies. According to the proposal of allocating the budget tasks to the development strategies, *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* is financed within the scope of two permanent state's functions: function 11. - external security and border integrity; function 15. - foreign policy<sup>111</sup>.

**Table 7. Performance budget (according to classification for 2013) and assignment of functions and tasks within *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022***

Function	Assignment
<b>Function 11. External security and border integrity</b>	
11.1	Maintenance and development of the Polish Armed Forces' operational capabilities
11.2	Intelligence and counterintelligence support
11.3	Fulfilment of allied and international obligations and participation in activities in order to establish peace and international stabilisation
11.4	Readiness of administrative and economic structures for state defence
<b>Function 15. Foreign policy</b>	
15.1	Provision of conducive development conditions for Poland
15.2	National security provision
15.3	Representation and protection of Polish international interests and its citizens abroad
15.4	Development of the international image of the Republic of Poland
15.5	Support of democracy development and participation in development cooperation and in international humanitarian aid.
15.6	Formation and coordination of foreign policy

Source: own material based on the project of the Planning and Programming Methodology of the Polish Armed Forces Development for 2013-2022 (in the area of function 11) – as of 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2011) and on the document by the Ministry of Finance No. RF-3/199/SJI/2010/307 of May 24, 2010.

<sup>109</sup> Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 84, item 712, as amended.

<sup>110</sup> Journal of Laws, No. 157, item 1240, as amended.

<sup>111</sup> *The Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 71 of May 8, 2012, regarding the update of the Long-term Financial Plan for 2012-2015* (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland of 2012, item 292).

In compliance with WPPF, function 11 comprises state's area responsible for state's defence and the Polish Armed Forces, and also Poland's participation in military undertakings of international organisations and in the scope of fulfilling military obligations resulting from international agreements.

Financing of the assignments in the scope of defence, resulting from *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022*, will be pursued with the use of assets from the government budget, supported by the assets from *the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund*. The development programmes will constitute the documents implementing decisions of SRSBN RP with fundamental assumptions for division of the assets for particular objectives defined in the strategy, especially: *the Development Programme of the Polish Armed Forces for 2013-2022*, *the Non-military Defence Preparation Programme for 2013-2022* and *the Economy Mobilisation Programme for 2013-2022*.

Financial framework for carrying out the aforementioned programmes will be defined in WPPF for 4-year-periods updated annually with simultaneous extension of the planning horizon for a year.

In turn, function 15 comprises i.a. representation and protection of Polish interests abroad, acting for the benefit of world peace, democracy, world development and development of a positive image of Poland in the world which are financed by the promotion activities. The activities for coordination of foreign policy of the Republic of Poland will be realised concurrently.

In compliance with macroeconomic forecasts, adopted in *the National Development Strategy 2020*, it is assumed that the scope of public financial assets allocated for development objectives of *the Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland* will amount, according to COFOG classification, to PLN 1.2 billion. The forecasted assets include only the expenditure for R&D. Whereas, the expenses defined in the financial framework of SRSBN RP encompass also other expenses provided for carrying out the directions of interventions applying to the state's defence needs, for financing of which, under the applicable law, no less than 1.95% of GDP from the previous year should be allocated annually<sup>112</sup>.

The amount of expenditure for implementation of SRSBN RP in the entire realisation period of the strategy (from 2022 onwards) will be to a great extent dependent on the state's economic situation.

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<sup>112</sup> *The Act of May 25, 2001 on Reconstruction, Technical Modernisation and Financing of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland* (Journal of Laws of 2009, No. 67, item 570, as amended.)

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## Abbreviations

<b>AFS</b>	–	ACO Forces Standards;
<b>AGS</b>	–	Alliance Ground Surveillance;
<b>ARAKIS</b>	–	Aggregation, Analysis and Classification of Network Incidents (Project by CERT of NASK) [ <i>PL. Agregacja, Analiza i Klasyfikacja Incydentów Sieciowych (Projekt Zespołu CERT, działającego w ramach NASK)</i> ];
<b>ARM</b>	–	The Material Reserves Agency [ <i>PL. Agencja Rezerw Materiałowych</i> ];
<b>ATT</b>	–	Arms Trade Treaty;
<b>WMD</b>	–	weapons of mass destruction;
<b>BBN</b>	–	National Security Bureau [ <i>PL. Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego</i> ];
<b>R&amp;D</b>	–	research and development;
<b>CAI</b>	–	Cooperative Airspace Initiative;
<b>CBOS</b>	–	Centre for Public Opinion Research [ <i>PL. Centrum Badania Opinii Publicznej</i> ];
<b>CSBMs</b>	–	Confidence and Security Building Measures;
<b>CERT</b>	–	Computer Emergency Response Team
<b>CFE</b>	–	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty;
<b>CIMIC</b>	–	Civil-Military Cooperation;
<b>CMX</b>	–	Crisis Management Exercise;
<b>LNDS</b>	–	Long-term National Development Strategy [ <i>PL. Długookresowa Strategia Rozwoju Kraju (DSRK)</i> ]
<b>DOTMLPFI</b>	–	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability;
<b>EDA</b>	–	European Defence Agency;
<b>ENSEC COE</b>	–	NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence;
<b>EEAS</b>	–	<i>European External Action Service</i>
<b>V4</b>	–	The Visegrad Group;
<b>HLDG</b>	–	High Level Defence Group;
<b>HNS</b>	–	Host Nation Support;
<b>CI</b>	–	Critical Infrastructure;
<b>KPZK</b>	–	National <i>Spatial Development Concept</i> [ <i>PL. Koncepcja Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju</i> ];
<b>KSRR</b>	–	National Strategy of Regional Development [ <i>PL. Krajowa Strategia Rozwoju Regionalnego</i> ];
<b>NATO HQ</b>	–	NATO Headquarters;
<b>EUMC</b>	–	European Union Military Committee;
<b>IAEA</b>	–	International Atomic Energy Agency;
<b>NAEW&amp;C</b>	–	NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control;
<b>NCBiR</b>	–	National Research and Development Centre [ <i>PL. Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju</i> ];
<b>NCIPP</b>	–	National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme;
<b>NRF</b>	–	National Reserve Forces;
<b>OSCE</b>	–	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe;
<b>CIP</b>	–	Critical Infrastructure Protection;
<b>PfP</b>	–	Partnership for Peace;
<b>ppo</b>	–	industrial defence potential [ <i>PL. przemysłowy potencjał obronny</i> ];
<b>PSC</b>	–	Political and Security Committee;
<b>RCB</b>	–	Government Security Centre [ <i>PL. Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa</i> ];
<b>RZZK</b>	–	Government Crisis Management Team [ <i>PL. Rządowy Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego</i> ];

- SAC** – Strategic Airlift Capability;
- SALIS** – Strategic Airlift Interim Solution;
- SCCG** – Strategic Cooperation Consultative Group;
- SOP** – National Defence System [*PL. System Obrony Państwa*];
- SPBN** – Strategic Review of National Security [*PL. Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego*];
- SPZOZ** – Independent Public Health Care Centre [*PL. Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Ochrony Zdrowia*];
- SRSBN RP** – Strategy of Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022 [*PL. Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP 2022*];
- SRnIK** – Computer Security Incident Response System [*PL. System Reagowania na Incydenty Komputerowe*];
- MNDS** – Mid-Term National Development Strategy; [*PL. Średniookresowa Strategia Rozwoju Kraju (ŚSRK)*];
- STANAG** – Standardisation Agreement [*PL. Porozumienie Standaryzacyjne NATO*];
- TFUE** – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
- NAT** – North Atlantic Treaty;
- UiSW** – armament and military equipment [*PL. uzbrojenie i sprzęt wojskowy*];
- EC** – European Community;
- WIB** – military research institutes [*PL. wojskowe instytuty badawcze*];
- WKU** – Military Recruitment Office [*PL. Wojskowa Komenda Uzupełnień*];
- CSDP** – Common Security and Defence Policy;
- WPFP** – Long-term Financial Plan [*PL. Wieloletni Plan Finansowy Państwa*];
- WSzW** – Provincial Military Staff [*PL. Wojewódzki Sztab Wojskowy*].