Taiwan

Defence

Since the formal establishment of Sino-US diplomatic ties in 1979 and the break of the official relations between USA and the RoC, the relations of the RoC with the PRC enter a new phase. During this period that lasted till 1987 the then President of the RoC adopted the policy of the “Three Noes” which was “no contact, no compromise and no negotiation”.

This policy started to change when in 1987 the Government of the RoC decided to allow visits of the citizens of the country to PRC. In 1988 PRC approved 22-point regulation to encourage without any obstacles, tariffs investments from the RoC in the PRC. At that time both countries did not recognize the other side’s legitimacy.

Both countries supported the policy of the “One China” but under their own perspective and interests. Beijing was hoping to unify China with the annexation of Taiwan and Taipei was hoping to retake mainland China from the communist PRC through the Project National Glory. In order to negotiate with the PRC on operational issue without compromising its position the RoC decided to establish the “Straits Exchange Foundation” (SEF) a nominally non-governmental institution led by the Mainland Affairs Council.

The PRC responded to this initiative with the establishment of the “Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits” (ARATS) led by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC. The two organizations reach to a Consensus in 1992 (the 1992 Consensus) under which both sides agreed to deliberate ambiguity on questions of sovereignty in order to go ahead about issues of common interest.

Although the two sides seemed to want to reach to a common ground of understanding, the President of the RoC Lee Tung-hui Kuomintang political party (KMT)) started to promote the policy of an independent RoC. As a result, to this development, the Government of the country shifted away from its commitment to the “One China” policy towards to a separate political identity for the RoC.

Several year later, in 1996 the relationship of the two countries reached to a dead end. At that year (1996) the RoC held its national elections and the Navy of the People’s Liberation Army attempted to influence them by conducting a missile exercise in order to warn the Pan-Green pro-independence political Coalition.

The third Taiwan Straits Crisis (the first two took place between 3/9/1954 – 1/5/1955 and between 23/8– 22/9/1958 respectively) resulted to the pause of the semi-official bilateral talks. The pro-Taiwan formal independence policy was followed also by the new President of the RoC, President Chen Shui-bian (Democratic Progressive Party - DPP) who was elected in 2000. Despite the crisis of 1996 and the pause of the semi-official bilateral talks in 1998, the RoC lifted the 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with the PRC.

Three years later in 2003, Hu Jintao became the new President of the PRC. Hu Jintao insisted that the talks between the two countries can only proceed under an agreement based on the “One China” principle while making threats of military action against the RoC incase Taipei declares its independence or if the Beijing considers that any possibility for peaceful unification is exhausted. In 2004 Chen Shui-bian (Democratic Progressive Party – DPP), was re-elected as the President of the RoC.

This new development effected the policy of the PRC towards the RoC. Under the new policy the Government of the PRC continued the no-contact policy towards the government of the RoC, the international diplomatic isolation of the country and maintained its military build-up campaign against Taiwan.  

Furthermore in 2005 the National People’s Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law formalizing the use of “non-peaceful means” as an option of response in case the RoC declares its independence.During this period the PRC pursued contacts with apolitical or non-independence leaning political groups of the RoC, committed to negotiations, based on equal status between the two sides and refrained from the “One China” policy as a precondition for the talks. On March of 2008 Kuomintang political party won the elections and Ma Ying-jeou was elected as the new President of the RoC.

During the Spring of 2008, the President of the PRC met with the Vice President of the RoC Vincent Siew and later this Spring with the former chairman of the Kuomintang political party Wu Po-hsiung in China, during the Boao Forum for Asia. Wu Po-hsiung agreed that both sides should start again the semi-official dialogue and committed his political party against the independence of Taiwan, but he stressed that a “Taiwan identity” did not equate to “Taiwanese Independence”. 

The two Presidents Hu Jintao (PRC) and Ma Ying-jeou (RoC) agreed to start the bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.In June 2008 the PRC and the RoC reopened their bilateral dialogue through their semi-official organisations ARATS and SEF respectively, since neither Beijing nor Taipei recognizes the other side as a legitimate state entity. In Spring 2009 the Government of the RoC announced that Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan’s money markets under specific restrictions.   But not everybody shared the same optimistic opinion about the future of the relations of the two sides.

According to the 2010 report, submitted by the RoC’s Ministry of National Defense to the Parliament of the country, Beijing has launched a "charming offensive" against Taiwan and is only being accommodating on issues that do not undermine its claim to Taiwan.“Beijing has never let up in its efforts to block the U.S.' sale of arms to Taiwan” the report said, and “would go to great lengths to strengthen its ability to invade Taiwan, despite warming ties across the Taiwan Strait”. According to the report, If Taiwan pushes for permanent independence from the PRC, acquires weapons of mass destruction, or erupts into civil chaos, the PRC could decide to attack the island state.

The report of the Ministry of National Defense of the RoC, did not seem to effect the Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council Wang Yu-chi (RoC) who agreed in February 2014 with and the Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office Zhang Zhijun (PRC) on establishing a direct and regular communication channel between the two sides, under the 1992 Consensus.  

Nine months later in November 2015, the President of the RoC, Ma Ying-jeou met with the new President of the PRC Xi Jinping in Singapore. It was the first time that the leaders of the two sides met since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The two leaders agreed to establish a hotline connecting the Ministers of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Taiwan Affairs Office.

The elections of 2016 in the RoC changed dramatically the relations of the two sides. The new President Tsai Ing-wen and her party DPP refused to accept the “1992 Consensus” provoking the reaction of the President of the PRC. The new President of the RoC was elected because the Taiwanese voters did not approve the policy for closer economic ties to the PRC that the previous President Ma Ying-jeou was promoting. In 2017 the new President of the RoC expressed her hope that both sides would restart their cross-strait relations after the conclusion of the 19^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

During the Congress the President of the PRC, Xi Jinping warned the RoC about the consequences in case Taipei decides to declare its independence but also offered the chance for open talks with Taiwan if Taipei accepts the “1992 Consensus”.  According to Taiwanese analysts, the speech of Xi Jinping showed no significant goodwill nor major malice.

In 2018 the President of the RoC accused the PRC of spreading fake news via social media to create divisions in the society of Taiwan and help candidates sympathetic to Beijing in order to affect the result of the local elections.  The election of President Tsai Ing-wen resulted to the change of the Defence Policy of the country. President’s Ma Defence Policy relied on the concept of deterrence by punishment according to which a possible PRC invasion to the RoC, would result in a costly protracted struggle.

President Tsai Ing-wen policy instead relies on sending a clear message to the PRC that the Armed Forces of the RoC will be equipped to withstand and push back an attack from the PRC.  Taiwan’s previous defence strategy focused on fighting the invading force across the entire Taiwan Straits and defeating the enemy thought attrition.

The long-term armament program of the PRC Navy and Air Force, altered the existing defence plans of the RoC and led to the new “Overall Defence Concept” that was proposed in 2017 by Admiral Lee His-ming then Taiwan’s Chief of the General Staff, and adopted in December 2017, one year after the election of President Tsai Ing-wen. According to Taiwanese and American defence analysts, over the last 15 years the PRC has invested huge amount of money to the modernization of its Navy, ballistic missiles forces, Air Force and cyberwarfare capabilities. The PRC Navy metamorphosized from a coastal-defence force, into a modern naval service according to U.S defence analysts.

Furthermore, the Air Force of the PRC has more 4^th generation fighter jets than the entire aircraft fleet of the RoC Air Force. It has also 250 bombers and 600 fighter jets stationed in southern and eastern PRC within range of Taiwan, while PRC’s specialized missile force has more than 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan.  These missiles, many of them with high accuracy, could destroy Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, particularly airports and Air Force bases, even straight stretches of highway, before the Taiwanese fighter jets manage to take off.

PRC’s determination to invade and recapture Taiwan was mentioned clearly during the speech of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of PRC Xi Jinping in July 2021.

During his speech at Tiananmen Square to mark the 100^th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party the General Secretary reiterated the party’s commitment to what he called “reunification” with Taiwan. General Secretary Xi Jinping made explicit that “We make no promise to abandon the use of force and retain the option of taking all necessary measures”.

The following year on September 14^th, 2022, the Senate passed the “Taiwan Policy Act 2022” sending a message of support to Taiwan against the PRC threats. The “Taiwan Policy Act 2022” proposes to the U.S to provide to Taiwan around US$4.5 billion over a period of four years in order to accelerate the modernization of Taiwan’s Armed Forces. In the fifth year, the U.S will give Taiwan additional US$2 billion in military loans with non-repayable military assistance in terms of supply and stockpiling of ammunitions.

The “Taiwan Policy Act 2022” proposes that the U.S treat Taiwan “as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally” a clear message to Peijing about the importance of Taiwan to the U.S.A. The “Taiwan Policy Act 2022” includes sections dedicated to “deterrence measures” against PRC and “countering PRC’s coercion and influence campaigns”.   

The new Concept the Defence Operations of Taiwan

The new President of the RoC Tsai Ing-wen, endorsed a more tough policy regarding the defence of the country, compared to her predecessor President Ma Ying-jeou, who followed an completely different policy, trying to establish closer economic ties with Beijing and the reduction of the defense budget.  The new “Overall Defence Concept” was adopted in December 2017 by the newly elected Government of the RoC and according to the Taiwanese Vice Minister of National Defence Chang Guan-chung, the new approach adopts affordable, effective defence systems in order to protect military personnel and facilities, defend littoral zones and counter beach-landing operations.

There are three areas that the “Overall Defence Concept” prioritizes: (a) preservation of warfighting capability, (b) pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area and (c) annihilating the enemy on the beaches of Taiwan. As a preemptive strategy, the RoC has begun gradually under the new administration to lessen its emphasis on big costly and easily targeted weapon systems such as, fighter jets and frigates. Instead, the Government of the RoC decided to move towards a more “asymmetric” approach, utilizing multitudes of low-cost mobile defence systems such as, land mines, sea mines for shallow and deep-water, mobile missile launchers, swarms of low-cost dispersible and automated weapons systems, new submarines and small stealth fast attack missiles boats. 

This new policy does not mean that the Armed Forces of the country will not replace in the long term the obsolete large weapon systems they use such as Destroyers, Frigates and fighter jets with new ones. On the contrary, the country has initiated several new procurement and development programs for the Navy and the Air Force, that include the construction of new high-tech Frigates and Destroyers, as well as the procurement of new fighter jets from USA.

The defence policy shift of President Tsai Ing-wen is based on the following principals:

(a) Deterrence to protect Taiwan from a mainland attack,

(b) Domestic politics and not strategic considerations will dominate defence planning

(c) Innovative strategic and building asymmetric capabilities such as sea mines, supersonic cruise missiles, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities,

(d) Increase the Defence Budget to at least 3% of the GDP,

(e) The construction of a self-sufficient defence industry as one of the five major national industries,

(f) Boosting primarily the capabilities of the Air Force and the Navy     

According to the new Concept, the Defence Operations of Taiwan are divided to two phases both closer to the shores of the island, where the armed forces of the country can benefit from land-based air denial systems and better surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. The first phase refers to the military operations that will take place in an area extending up to 100 km from the shores of the island. At this zone, the Armed Forces of the RoC will use a combination of weapon systems and warships.

The RoC Navy will employ its fleet of large surface warships which is consisted of, 4 Kidd-class destroyers (each one equipped with 8 RGM-84 Harpoon AShM), 6 La Fayette-class frigates (each one equipped with 8 Exocet MM40 Block II AShM), 6 Knox-class frigates (each one equipped with 8 RGM-84 Harpoon AShM) and 8 O.H. Perry-class frigates (each one equipped with Taiwanese made 4 Hsiung Feng II AShM (160 km range) and 4 Hsiung Feng III supersonic AShM (1,500 km range).

These vessels will be escorted as a secondary force by 11 Ching Chiang-class patrol ships/corvettes, each one of them carrying four Hsiung Feng III supersonic AShM and 4 (plus 8 more to be built) Tuo Chiang-class corvette equipped with 8 Hsiung Feng II and 8 Hsiung Feng III AShM.  Furthermore, layers of minefields is another mean to deter a PRC Navy invasion force to cross the straits.

The entire strait is on Asia's continental shelf which is almost entirely less than 150 m deep. 

The biggest challenge of the Navy of the RoC is the replacement of many obsolete “First class” frigates with displacement ranging from around 3.600-ton to 4.200-ton (6 Knox-class frigates and 10 O.H. Perry-class frigates). The country initiated in 2016 the “Next Generation Guided Missiles Frigate Development Program” which included the construction of a single new class of 4,500-ton guided missile frigates.

However, the plan was suspended in 2021 in favor of a lighter 2,500-ton frigate program. The new frigates, called “Second-class ships,” will act as the navy’s “workhorse” and will mostly perform day-to-day patrols. The frigates will fill the gap between the big displacement frigates and the third-class ships, comprising smaller corvettes and missile boats. The new Light frigate class will be built in two versions, the Anti-Aircraft Warfare (AAW) and the Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) version.

In total 12 vessels will be built with the first one to be delivered in 2026. Furthermore, the Navy of the RoC has two more ambitious naval programs underway, the development and construction of the Yushan-class Landing Platform Dock (LPD) and the Hai Kun-class submarine. In total the Navy of the RoC will receive 4 Yushan-class Landing Platform Dock and 8 Hai Kun-class submarines. The first Yushan-class LPD was commissioned in 2023 while the first Hai Kun-class submarine will be commissioned in 2025.       

Finally, the new Concept of the Defence Operations of Taiwan includes the development of Hsiung Feng III long-rage (1,500 km) mobile supersonic ramjet engine anti-ship missiles.

The second phase of the new Concept of the Defence Operations of Taiwan seeks to annihilate the enemy at the beach area of Taiwan which extends approximately 40 km outwards from the shores of the island. 

The Armed Forces of the RoC will use at this phase, a combination of different type of weapon systems.

• First, sea mines laid in deep and shallow waters off the 14 suspected landing beaches of the island
• Secondly, swarm of small fast attack boats and
• Thirdly, a big number of truck-launched anti-ship missiles such as the locally made Hsiung Feng II (160 km range).

If the invading forces approach in a close distance the beaches of Taiwan according to the Concept of the Defence Operations, the RoC Air Force will create a barrier of denial with the

• 7 batteries of Patriot (PAC-2/3) anti-aircraft/missile systems,
• 6 batteries of Sky Bow II (TK-2 or Tien Kung II) anti-aircraft/missile systems,
• Unknown number of Sky Bow III (TK-3 or Tien Kung III) and
• 19 batteries of MIM-23 Hawk anti-aircraft systems, which are currently under replacement by the locally developed Sky Bow III (TK-3) air defence system.

Furthermore, the RoC Army will use its M109A2/A5 (155mm) and M110A2 (203mm) howitzers, its RT/LT-2000 and Kung Feng VI multiple rocket launchers, in coordination with the AH-64E Apache & AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters.

The early warning system of the RoC is equipped with one AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS (Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System) system with 5,555 km range, installed at Leshan Mountain, at Tai'an, Miaoli northern Taiwan and commissioned in 2013. In addition to that the RoC air defence integrated system operates

• 7 AN/FPS-117 3D radars,
• 4 mobile AN/TPS-117 3D radars,
• 4 AN/TPS-75(V) radars,
• 4 HADR (HR-3000) and GE-592 fixed radars.

Defence Budget, Defence Procurements and Defence Procurements Policy

Although, since its establishment in 1949 the RoC has been facing a serious threat for its security from the PRC, the defence budget of the country has not till 2019 been remarkable increased as a percentage of the real GDP of the country. in 2008 the defence budget represented 2.6% of the real GDP of the country and within ten years, in 2018 it was reduced to 1.8% of the real GDP. During the two terms of President Ma the defence budget never excided the US$10.8 Billion threshold. When President Ma was elected in 2008 the defence budget of the RoC was US$10.8 Billion.

In 2009 and in 2010, the defence budget was reduced to US$9.6 Billion and US$9.4 Billion respectively. The following five years of Ma’s presidency, the RoC defence budget was marginally increased and stabilized just above US$10 Billion, except for the year 2012 when it reached US$10.7 Billion. In 2016 when the new President was elected the defence budget was US$9.9 Billion.

The following three years the defence budget was marginally increased. In 2017 it was US$10.6 Billion, in 2018 it was US$10.7 Billion and in 2019 it reached US$10.84 Billion. In 2019 the Government of President Tsai decided to increase the defence budget of 2020 by US$558 Million over the 2019 budget.

In the RoC there are two defence budgets, the “official” and the “special funds”. The “official defence budget” for the year 2020 reached US$11.4 Billion and was increased by 5.2% compare to the 2019, although the Ministry of Defence had originally proposed a budget of US$11.6 Billion in order to meet its needs in 2020. The new “official defence budget” is divided into three major portions with the largest being US$5.3 Billion allocated to personnel maintenance cost (salaries, benefits).  

An additional US$3.07 Billion will be used for maintaining equipment and facility operations. The third portion of US$3.07 Billion will be spent on investments in defence technology and training programs. The last portion of the 2020 defence budget was increased by US$192 Million compared to the 2019 budget.    

Besides the “official defence budget” for the year 2020, the Parliament of the RoC voted for another US$1.7 Billion which was classified as “special funds”. Both allocations “official defence budget” and “special funds” are record high. Both budgets “official” and “special funds” for the year 2020 amount in total US$13.1 Billion and mark an 8.3% increase in military spending compared to 2019, the largest yearly gain since 2008 according to the Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics.

According to the Ministry of Defence of the RoC, the allocation for the defence budget for the year 2020 reached 2.26% of the national GDP, increased by 0.20% of the GDP from 2019, but far less than the target of 3% of the GDP that the new President had set before her election. 

The Defence Budget was increased by 4.44% in 2021 compared to 2020 and reached US$15.42 Billion. This budget includes the Ministry of National Defence Budget, which is US$12.547 Billion, the special budget of US$980 Million for the procurement of fighter jets and the fund budget of US$1.95 Billion.

Late 2021 the Government of RoC decided to approve an extra Budget for FY 2022 for the procurement of military equipment. This extra Defence Procurement Budget was US8.56 Billion and according to the Government it will be used for the procurement of new military equipment between 2022-2026. The extra Defence Procurement Budget was approved in early 2022 and included the production of anti-ship missiles, new frigates, an attack drone system, and installation of combat systems on coastguard ships.    

This extra fund was added to the annual Defence Budget of the year 2022 which reached US$16.22 Billion of which US$12,7 Billion is the budget of the Ministry o National Defence, US$1.42 Billion is dedicated to cover special expenditure and UAS$2.1 Billion for unspecified expenses.

The 2023 Defence Budget was further increased and reached US$18.3 Billion while the 2024 Defense Budget will be the biggest ever budget for the defence of the country reaching US$19.1 Billion. According to the Governments Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) the core of the Defence Budget for 2024 is going to reach US$13.868 Billion. A Special Budget for Procurement will receive US$2.96 Billion which represents a decline on this appropriation in 2023. Furthermore an allocation termed Non-operating Special Funds which is believed to cover the expenses for military infrastructure housing and defence production will receive US$2.26 Billion.

Although the economy of the RoC is prosperous and dynamic, the defence budget of the country is not big enough baring in mind the security challenges that the RoC must deal with.

The country has been trying to develop its defence industry since the late 1970’s with several successful examples such as:

• Thunderbolt-2000 multiple rocket launcher
• Albatross & Cardinal UAV
• Sky Sword I (TC-I) air defence missile
• Antelope air defence system equipped with Sky Sword I (TC-1L) anti-aircraft missile
• CS/MPQ-90 Bee Eye short-medium range 3D air defence AESA radar
• Hsiung Feng III (HF-3), radar-guided ramjet Anti-Ship Missile (AShM, 150 km range)
• Hsiung Feng II (HF-2) radar-guided sea skimming Anti-Ship Missile (AShM, 120 km range)
• Hsiung Feng IIE land attack cruise missile (600 km range)
• Tien Chi Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM, 120 km range)
• Yun Feng a supersonic long-range land attack cruise missile (2,000 km range)
• Tuo Chiang-class corvette
• Ching Chiang-class patrol ship
• F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF),
• Sky Sword I (TC-I) short-range IR guided air to air missile
• Sky Sword II (TC-II) beyond-visual-range missile air to air missile
• Wan Chien air to ground cruise missile
• Sky Sword II (TC-2A) anti-radiation missile
• Sky Bow II/III (TK-2/TK-3) air defence system

Most recently the local defence industry of the country officially publicly displayed the following weapons systems:

• Jian Hsiang anti-radiation loitering munition
• MMS (Mobile Mortar System) equipped with 81/120mm mortars
• CM-32 Cloud Leopard II wheeled APC
• Teng Yun MALE UAV
• Sea Oryx lightweight, short-range air defense system equipped with Sky Sword II (Sea TC-1) surface-to-air infrared homing missile
• Sky Sword II (TC-2) road-mobile air defence missile system
• Sky Sword II (TC-2N) ship vertical launched, surface-to-air missile
• Sky Sword II (TC-2C) advanced air-to-air missile
• T-5 Brave Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainer under development by the Aerospace Industrial Development Corporation (AIDC)

According to the Defence Industry Strategy of the new Government, the development of the local defence industry should be supported in order to cover the armament needs of the Armed Forces of the RoC. The new policy adopted in 2017, calls for no overseas purchase of military equipment when domestic manufacturers can supply.

When local capabilities are lacking, then the authorities should provide guidance to upgrade the local technology level and produce new systems. The new strategy is expected to create eventually 8,000 new jobs and generate revenue of at least US$8.17 Billion, although the National Tsing Hua University estimates the indigenous defence industry will create as many as 59,000 new jobs by 2025.

The most important R&D defence programs currently in progress are:

• The Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS),
• The new Indigenous T-5 Defence Fighter/Trainer Brave Eagle, as well as
• The upgrade of the 142 F-16A/B Block20 to the F-16V Block70 version

The first program is estimated to cost US$16.13 Billion and includes the indigenous design, research, development, construction and test of a new type of submarines with the assistance of foreign company. The Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS) program includes the construction of 8 submarines by CSBC Corp. that will replace the two obsolete Zwaardvis-class.  A foreign defence consultancy to oversee the preliminary design of the new submarine was selected in 2018 and a year later in March 2019 the Government announced the completion of this phase. 

The next stage includes the completion of the blueprints by 2020 and the delivery of the prototype submarine in 2025.  Besides the design and the development of the new submarine the RoC started the construction of the shipbuilding facilities at the city of Kaohsiung for the construction of the submarines. The groundbreaking ceremony for the construction yard took place on the 9^th of May 2019. 

The second R&D defence program includes the design and development of the Indigenous Defence Fighter/Trainer T-5 Brave Eagle. The program includes the construction of 66 aircraft Brave Eagle with a total cost of US$2.28 Billion and it is estimated that will create 1,200 jobs. The first prototype of the Defence Fighter/Trainer T-5 Brave Eagle it was completed in 2020 and all the aircrafts of the program will be delivered by 2026.

The third important defence program which includes the involvement of the local defence industry (more specifically the state-owned Aerospace Industrial Development Corp (AIDC)) is the upgrade of 142 F-16A/B Block20 fighter jets to the F-16V Block70 version. The “Phoenix Rising” program as it is called, was launched in 2016 and the contract was awarded in February 2018. The total cost is estimated at roughly US$4.5 Billion. The first four upgraded aircrafts were delivered to the Air Force in October 2018.

Approximately 24-36 aircraft are expected to undergo modernization each year until 2023, although there might be eventually a change of the rate of the deliveries. (According to the initial planning AIDC will deliver the aircraft on the following rate, in 2018: 6 aircraft, in 2019: 24 aircraft, in 2020: 27 aircraft, in 2021: 34 aircraft, in 2022: 36 aircraft and in 2023: 15 aircraft).  Furthermore, the investment program of the Navy during the 2018-2040 period includes 12 shipbuilding projects, with a total value US$14.7Billion.

According to this program the local shipbuilding industry and defence industry (CSBC Corp.) is planning to build the following 20 years:

• Four 6,000-8,000-ton Aegis destroyers in order to replace the four Kidd-class destroyers,
• Unknown number of 2,000-3,000-ton frigates in order to replace all existing frigates, including the existing 20 O.H. Perry-class, Lafayette-class and Knox-class frigates,
• Four high-speed minelayers,
• One 16,000-ton landing platform dock (LPD),
• 3+4+4 stealthy Tuo Jiang II-class fast attack missile corvette/catamarans, and
• One multi-purpose transport ship.

The first phase of this ambitious shipbuilding program, started in March 2018 with the beginning of the construction of the new LPD (valued US$158 Million), followed by the construction of three stealthy fast attack missile corvette/catamarans Tuo Jiang II-class in May 2019 (valued US$1 Billion) as part of the construction program of 3+8 corvettes and it was completed with the beginning of the construction of four next-generation minelayers in May 2019. According to the Taiwanese media, the new LPD and the first of the fast attack missile corvette/catamarans Tuo Jiang II-class are planned to be delivered in 2025.

US weapon systems sold to the RoC since 2000

The main weapon supplier of the RoC is the U.S. For decades with few exemptions the U.S was the only arms supplier of the RoC. Since 2000 the U.S has sold to the Armed Forces of the RoC the following main weapon systems:

• 2 AN/FPS-115 ultra-high frequency long range early warning radars
• 12 P-3C maritime patrol aircraft (US$1.960 Billion)
• 3 Patriot (PAC-2) missile air defence systems upgrades (US$939 Million)
• 4 Patriot (PAC-3) missile air defence systems and 330 MIM-104F PAC-3 missiles (US$3.1 Billion)
• Upgrade of 6 E-2T to E-2K configuration (Hawkeye 2000 standard) (US$250 Million)
• 162 I-HAWK air defence missiles
• 71 RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles
• 418 AIM-120C, 200 AIM-120C-5 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
• 235 AGM-65 air-to-ground missiles
• 30 AH-64D attack helicopters (US$2.532 Billion)
• 20 launchers and 315 FGM-148 anti-tank missiles (US$86 Million)
• 60 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters with 120 T-700-GE-701D engines (US$3.1 Billion)
• 2 Osprey Class Mine Hunting Ships, incl. refurbishment and upgrade (US$105 Million)
• 114 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) air defence missiles, 3 AN/MPQ-65 Radar Sets, 1 AN/MSQ-133 Information and Coordination Centrals (US$2.81 Billion)
• 769 TOW 2B Aero, Radio Frequency (RF) anti-tank missiles (BGM-71F-Series) 14 TOW 2B Aero, Radio Frequency (RF) (BGM-71F-Series) Fly-to-Buy anti-tank missile；46 Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS)；4 ITAS spares (US$268 Million)
• 146 M109A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 79 M2 machine gun, 6 M88A2 recovery vehicles, 160 AN/PVS-7B Night Vision Goggles, 146 AN/VRC-87E and 6 AN/VRC-90E SINCGARS, etc. (US$405 Million)
• 13 MK 15 Phalanx Block lB Baseline 2, CIWS Guns; 8 CIWS Block 1 Baseline 0 to Block 1B Baseline 2 upgrade kits; 260,000 Rounds of 20mm Mk 244 Mod 0 (APDS) (US$416 Million)
• The sale, refurbishment, and upgrade of 2 O.H.Perry-class frigates (FFG-7) being provided as Excess Defense Articles (EDA) (US$190 Million)
• 50 AGM-88B HARMs and 10 AGM-88B Training HARMs anti-radiation missiles (US$147.5 Million)
• 56 AGM-154C JSOW air-to-ground missiles (US$185.5 Million)
• 144 RIM-66K SM-2 Block IIIA surface-to-air missiles, 16 Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIA All-Up Rounds (AUR) (US$397 Million)
• 60 AGM-84L air-launched anti-ship missiles (US$421 Million)
• 46 MK 48 Mod 6AT Heavyweight Torpedoes (HWT) (US$250 Million)
• MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo (LWTs) and technical assistance for the upgrade and conversion of 168 MK-46 Mod 5 Torpedoes to the MK-54 LWT configuration (US$175 Million)
• 500 Block I FIM-92F MANPAD Stinger ant-aircraft missiles; 4 Block I FIM-92F MANPAD Stinger Fly-to-Buy Missiles, 108 launchers, 31 trainers (US$440.56 Million)
• 36 Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs); 30 0.50 Caliber M2 machine guns; 6 7.62mm M240 machine guns (US$375 Million)
• 108 M1A2T main battle tanks, 14 M88 recovery vehicles, 16 M1070A1 transporters, 16 M1000 trailers, ammunition (US$2 Billion)
• 66 F-16C/D Block70 fighters, 75 F-110 engines, 75 Link 16 systems, 75 AN/APG-83 AESA radars, 120 AN/ALE-50 towed decoy systems, ammunition (US$8.1 Billion)
• Upgrade of 142 F-16A/B Block20 fighter jets to the F-16V Block70 version (US$4.5-5.3 Billion)
• 250 FIM-92F Block-I Stinger MANPADS (US$223.56 Million)
• 4 MQ-9B Sky Guardian UAV, (US$217.6 Million)
• 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II SLM, 100 Harpoon Coastal Defense System Launcher Transporter Units, 25 Radar trucks (US$2.37 Billion)
• 135 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) (US$1 Billion)
• 29 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 Launchers
• Logistic Support for Surveillance Radar (AN/FPS-115) Program (US$ 412.6 Million)
• 100 AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder (US$78.63 Million)
• 6 sets of MS-110 Recce Pods (US$340 Million)
• Repair and Recertification of PATRIOT PAC-3 missiles (US$ 307.1 Million)
• 18 MK-48 Mod6 AT Heavyweight Torpedoes (US$180 Million)
• Volcano Anti-Tank mine laying system (US$146 Million)
• Spare parts and related equipment of US made aircraft (US$419.31 Million)
• US made ship spare parts (US$110.7 Million)